# deterrence da

## korea

### qpq---1nc

#### The United States should condition removal of economic sanctions on denuclearization by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

#### **Korea says yes, but maintaining leverage requires a quid-pro-quo process of engagement.**

Babson ’24 [Brad; Former World Bank official, followed and written extensively on the North Korean economy since 1997. “A Framework for Meaningful Economic Engagement with North Korea.” https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/02/framework-meaningful-economic-engagement-north-korea] TDI

Within this reality, the question now for both Kim and the international community is how to chart a new path forward that can alter strategic calculations toward enhancing peace and stability in the region while enabling a more sustainable and secure future for North Korea. A reorientation of U.S. and international economic engagement policy toward North Korea may contribute to this goal.

Considerations for Proceeding on Economic Engagement

In the past, North Korea has been willing to engage on economic training and projects, both multilaterally and bilaterally, with the UN, foreign governments and NGOs. Many of these projects addressed North Korea’s economic development needs, such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tourism, and at a small scale (e.g., agriculture, water supply and sanitation, energy and reforestation) prior to the impact of sanctions and COVID. North Korea also prepared its own national plan for improving the Sustainable Development Goals in cooperation with the UN.

However, these experiences also reveal the political difficulties of addressing North Korea’s economic development and the reluctance of donors to provide funding while North Korea prioritizes military programs. Thus, it will be important to conduct negotiations with both political authorities and economic technocrats to agree on acceptable and practical ways to proceed with economic engagement in a manner that is very different from past experiences. This can include controls over how economic funds are used for the purposes intended and agreed restrictions on military expenditures in phased threat reduction negotiations.

To be successful, economic engagement requires mutual cooperation aimed at results that reflect both North Korean and donor partner priorities. While North Korea has substantial experience in administering humanitarian aid, it has limited experience with development assistance that involves policy dialogue, technical assistance and project implementation. An important early task will be reaching agreement on the modes and transparency requirements for expanded economic cooperation.

Shifting to Economic Engagement with North Korea

Shifting from a pressure policy to careful economic engagement would be a dramatic change that requires support from not only the U.S. national security establishment, but also the U.S. Congress and, more widely, key partners in East Asia. There are several reasons why such a shift would be in U.S. interests:

Sanctions, even augmented by the COVID-induced border closure with China, have not accomplished their intended purposes. They are being undermined by North Korean sanctions evasion and loss of support from China and Russia. Positive inducements need to be introduced into the policy mix to respond to current realities and to encourage new relations, trust building and cooperative threat reduction.

While geopolitical balance-of-power considerations currently dominate U.S. foreign policy in East Asia, these can be supplemented by building security communities of mutual benefits through nonmilitary, human and economic security cooperation to reduce the risks of armed conflict.

A recalibration of U.S.-North Korea relations that gradually expands economic engagement while maintaining necessary deterrence and adopting a cooperative threat reduction approach to future WMD negotiations would provide incentives for North Korea to reduce risks and reliance on sanctions evasion and for the United States eventually to consider redeploying military resources to meet other global and regional challenges.

### korea---1nc

#### The United States should propose multilateral economic sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the People’s Republic of China.

#### That successfully contains Korean nuclear expansion.

Kim & Snyder ’20 [Sung-Han; Dean & Professor of International Relations, Korea University. Scott; M.A., East Asia Studies, Harvard University, CFR Senior Fellow, Korea Studies. “Denuclearizing North Korea: Time for Plan B.” The Washington Quarterly, Volume 42, Number 4.] TDI

To be successful, the economic dimension of proactive containment would require the renewal and strengthening of cooperation with China. This cooperation would aim to impose targeted economic sanctions similar to those China imposed at the end of 2017, which dramatically decreased Chinese trade with North Korea. Ultimately, the US goal would be to persuade China to join a proactive containment coalition designed to convince Pyongyang’s leaders that the risks of a nuclear North Korea are intolerable to the region and the world. If the United States is not successful, it may pursue economic coercion unilaterally, imposing sanctions against North Korean economic partners to isolate North Korea from the international trade and financial flows necessary for its economic survival.

#### Sanctions are key to contain Korean nuclear expansion:

#### ECONOMIC PRESSURE. Sanctions are key to signal non-proliferation and limit Korean nuclear activities.

Biersteker & Hudáková ’21 [Thomas; Honorary Professor of International Relations/Political Science at The Graduate Institute, Geneva. Zuzana; Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Center for International Studies, Sciences Po. “Are Sanctions on North Korea Working?” https://www.globalasia.org/v16no3/cover/are-sanctions-on-north-korea-working\_thomas-biersteker-zuzana-hud%C3%A1kov%C3%A1] TDI

Episode four, between March and November 2016, was triggered by the fourth North Korean nuclear test and subsequent satellite launch. Resolution 2270, which significantly broadened existing sanctions, began the shift towards a more comprehensive logic seeking to undermine the functional operation of the state. It not only expanded the arms embargo and the number of individual sanctions designees but introduced new mandatory and conditional restrictions. Newly imposed bans on the export of commodities such as coal, iron, gold and titanium sought to deprive North Korea of revenue to finance its nuclear-related activities, while the introduction of transportation-related prohibitions and restrictions on the financial sector aimed to limit evasion. Additional conditional restrictions on the financial and transportation sectors, as well as the imposition of a mandatory inspection requirement of all cargo, were intended to further strengthen the mandatory measures. While the coercion and constraint during episode four were ineffective, given North Korea’s continued engagement in proscribed activities and a stalled mediation process, signaling was effective, because the non-proliferation norm was clearly articulated and North Korea was increasingly stigmatized as an international pariah, resulting in a mixed overall result.

Episode five began in November 2016 in response to North Korea’s fifth nuclear test, the second test in 2016. UN Security Council Resolution 2321 introduced a cap on the export of coal from North Korea, but imposed a number of new export restrictions, including on copper, nickel, silver, and zinc, and introduced mandatory diplomatic, financial sector and transportation-related prohibitions to decrease sanctions evasion. These included restrictions on the use of North Korean embassies and consulates, restrictions on the country’s diplomatic access to bank accounts, mandatory closures of existing offices and bank accounts in North Korea, prohibition on supporting trade with the country, and limits on the procurement, insuring and registering of vessels. Conditional sanctions were further strengthened by a travel ban on North Korean state officials associated with prohibited activities and the expulsion and repatriation of any individual working on behalf of a North Korean bank or financial institution, and other activities highlighted as subject to vigilance. The overall effectiveness of UN sanctions during episode five remained mixed, with effective signaling and ineffective coercion and constraint as a result of ongoing engagement of North Korea in proscribed activities and its refusal to return to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or to the Six-Party talks.

Episode six, in place for a little over a month in August and September 2017, made modest adjustments to the UN sanctions regimes. Triggered by Pyongyang’s testing of ballistic missiles, it expanded individual sanctions with new designations, removed allowances for the export of coal from North Korea, introduced a mandatory port entry ban on designated vessels, limited the total number of authorizations for the country’s nationals working abroad, and imposed a ban on the export of seafood, lead and lead ore. The effectiveness of UN sanctions during the episode remained mixed, with the effectiveness of the signal sent by the new sanctions strengthened by US threats of force.

#### Even if imperfect, sanctions meaningfully impact Korea.

Silberstein ’23 [Benjamin; The Swedish Institute of International Affairs. “The complicated truth about sanctions on North Korea.” https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/07/05/the-complicated-truth-about-sanctions-on-north-korea/] TDI

It is true that sanctions have not reached the stated political goal of inducing North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons. The country has made impressive advances in missile technology and is evidently capable of acquiring the necessary technology despite sanctions. The ‘spy satellite’ launch would be one of around 30 missiles tested in 2023.

Though North Korea has ways to evade sanctions, this does not mean sanctions have no impact. Sanctions interplay with domestic governance and economic systems in ways that are complex and often hard to fully evaluate. The alternative to sanctions is not an open, liberal and free-trading North Korea, but likely a slightly more well-off version of its current state.

The issue of evasion illustrates why the impact of sanctions is so hard to evaluate. Sanctions-evading actions are not rare events, but are institutionalised within North Korea’s economy. Since the 1970s, North Korea has systematically smuggled alcohol, tobacco, drugs and other contraband through its diplomatic networks abroad. These activities continue today and with North Korean capabilities expanding into the cyber realm, sources of illicit income will likely continue to constitute an underestimated part of the regime’s hard-currency revenue flows.

But sanctions evasion and smuggling are very expensive activities. For Chinese, Taiwanese and Singaporean trading companies and entities to risk smuggling oil to North Korea, Pyongyang must pay a massive risk premium on its purchases. North Korea has to pay well above market prices to give sellers a reason to take the risk of arrest and prosecution for sanctions violations.

The same is true for illicit North Korean exports. Sanctions do not stop coal exports entirely, but they slash the prices that North Korea can charge. Any buyer — almost always China — will only risk importing from North Korea if prices are cheap enough to outweigh the risks. Even prior to the harsher sanctions levied in 2016 and 2017, China, through its position as a virtual monopoly buyer, consistently paid below-market prices for North Korean coal. This dynamic is likely even stronger today, as Chinese imports of coal and other sanctioned North Korean goods continue but go mostly unrecorded.

Despite North Korea’s evasion tactics, sanctions are indisputably hurting the North Korean economy. The country’s exports are estimated to be worth only a few hundred million dollars per year — much smaller than its trade losses. The UN Panel of Experts estimated, for example, that North Korea earned around US$370 million from sanctions-violating coal exports in 2019. This is only a fraction of the US$1.19 billion it earned from such exports in 2016, before the harsher sanctions.

The civilian impact of sanctions is unclear. On one hand, sanctions have likely dealt a harsh blow to labour-intensive industries like textiles, where a high proportion of workers are women, resulting in increased unemployment and lower wages. The falling incomes of North Koreans working in sanctioned industries substantially dampen the wider economy. On the other hand, there is no evidence that sanctions have driven up the price of food or other essential goods.

Sanctions have undoubtedly worsened North Korea’s food shortage by hindering imports of fertiliser and spare parts for agricultural equipment. North Korea’s own border closure, though, likely also provided an obstacle to foreign trade. But the impact of sanctions on North Korea’s food system is minimal compared with the regime’s refusal to undertake basic reforms in agriculture. The government bristles at dismantling collective farms or letting farmers sell their products on open markets.

Trade by evasion should logically become easier and cheaper. For sanctions to be effective against North Korea, China — which constitutes more than 90 per cent of North Korea’s foreign trade — would have to implement them. As US–China tensions continue to grow, reasons for China to implement sanctions on North Korea are diminishing.

Reports of North Korean trade deals in weapons and labour with Russia in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are already circulating. Very little is confirmed about these transactions, but there is evidence to support increased economic exchange between the countries. Earlier this year, satellite imagery from the border area indicated that Russia was increasing oil exports to North Korea while exporting unknown goods that could be arms destined for the Wagner Group.

But this does not change North Korea’s situation. Combined with its poor global reputation, sanctions will continue to make North Korea dependent on a very small number of trade partners — mainly China and Russia — who can charge highly unfavourable prices.

#### Aff authors oversimplify and fail to consider the counterfactual. The plan has no chance at solving.

Biersteker & Hudáková ’21 [Thomas; Honorary Professor of International Relations/Political Science at The Graduate Institute, Geneva. Zuzana; Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Center for International Studies, Sciences Po. “Are Sanctions on North Korea Working?” https://www.globalasia.org/v16no3/cover/are-sanctions-on-north-korea-working\_thomas-biersteker-zuzana-hud%C3%A1kov%C3%A1] TDI

Many scholars, policy practitioners, journalists and political observers have concluded that the sanctions imposed on North Korea have not worked. They are correct to observe that sanctions have been in place for decades and that the regime continues to develop its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Their arguments, however, are overly descriptive and far too simple. Evaluating the effectiveness of sanctions is more complex than pointing out that they have been imposed, yet targets continue to engage in proscribed activity.

In this short article, we suggest a framework for analyzing the effectiveness of sanctions and apply it systematically to evaluate the different combinations of restrictive measures imposed on North Korea by the United Nations since 2006. We describe the complexity and the varying effectiveness of the measures over time and conclude with a reminder that it is important to recall why sanctions have been imposed on the country in the first place and to contemplate the counterfactual alternatives of not applying sanctions when it comes to evaluating their effectiveness.

#### DIPLOMATIC LEVERAGE. Maintaining sanctions are key to put the US in a position of power on denuclearization negotiations.

Haggard ’18 [Stephan; University of California San Diego. “Those North Korea sanctions might be working. Here’s why.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/04/06/those-north-korea-sanctions-might-be-working-heres-why/] TDI

Sanctions complement the diplomatic track

South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Trump thus are in a good bargaining position going into the two summits. Moon has said that sanctions relief and assistance to the North are out of the question until the nuclear issue is addressed, a significant departure from his pro-engagement preferences. The risks of Washington and Seoul being at odds over strategy have fallen.

#### Kim’s explicitly tied sanctions to nuclear issues.

Stangarone ’21 [Troy; Senior Director and Fellow, Korea Economics Institute. “Removing Sanctions on North Korea: Challenges and Potential Pathways.” Special Report, Number 504.] TDI

More informal metrics also suggest that sanctions are having an impact on North Korea’s economy and that the regime has an interest in seeing sanctions removed. The February 2019 US-North Korea summit in Hanoi failed to reach an agreement, in part because of Kim Jong Un’s insistence that the major economic sanctions imposed since 2016 be removed in return for the dismantlement of the Yongbyon nuclear facility.13 More recently, Kim convened a rare Workers’ Party congress in January 2021 to address economic failings that the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party said stemmed from “severe internal and external situations and unexpected manifold challenges.”14

#### Unilateral removal greenlights Korean nuclear advances. QPQ shields.

Stangarone ’21 [Troy; Senior Director and Fellow, Korea Economics Institute. “Removing Sanctions on North Korea: Challenges and Potential Pathways.” Special Report, Number 504.] TDI

Risks. Any phased negotiation process with North Korea raises at least two risks. First, the process might stall at some point prior to complete nuclear dismantlement but with Pyongyang having received substantial sanctions relief. The North Korean regime could potentially maintain some capability to threaten the United States and its allies while using the sanctions relief to reconstitute its weapons program and strengthen its domestic authority. Determining an appropriate and proportional exchange of sanctions relief and denuclearization measures could help mitigate this risk. For example, initial dismantlement steps could focus on facilities that could be easily rebuilt or steps that are easily reversible rather than on material degradation of North Korea’s programs. Similarly, initial sanctions relief could be modest in scope, and sanctions could be reimposed if negotiations stalled or if North Korea did not meet its dismantlement requirements. The second risk is that if the process was not contingent on a freeze on North Korea’s programs in the early stages, Pyongyang would be able to continue stockpiling fissile material for new weapons throughout the negotiations.

#### Unchecked Korean nuclear advances cause extinction.

Terry ’23 [Sue Mi; Ph.D., Director of the Asia Program, Wilson Center. "The New North Korean Threat." https://www.foreignaffairs.com/north-korea/new-north-korean-threat] TDI

Among the more overlooked geopolitical developments in 2022 was North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. During the year, it logged nearly 100 missile tests, a record for the country; several of them involved weapons of extraordinary range and potency. In November, the regime launched a Hwasong-17, an intercontinental ballistic missile that can carry multiple warheads and is capable of reaching the United States. A month later, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un personally oversaw the test of a powerful solid-fuel rocket engine — a crucial new capability for the country because solid-fuel rockets can be fired more quickly than liquid-fuel ones and are harder to detect and preempt.

Yet despite these developments, North Korea has not been a major focus for the United States in recent years. Although the country has posed a growing threat since 2006, when it first tested an atomic bomb, international efforts to slow down or stop its nuclear program have flagged. The last attempt by the United States to end the nuclear weapons program failed at the 2019 summit meeting in Hanoi between Kim and Donald Trump, and the Biden administration has not come up with any new ideas on how to achieve this. This is partly because the United States and its Western allies have been preoccupied by other pressing concerns, such as the war in Ukraine. But the West has also become, to some extent, inured to the North Korean threat.

This lack of attention is dangerous. Along with the accelerating number of tests, there are numerous other indications that Pyongyang’s efforts to build weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been rapidly expanding and evolving. Developments over the past few months in particular suggest that the nuclear program is entering a new and more dangerous phase. The risk that a miscalculation by Pyongyang could lead to a conflict is growing, particularly given its lack of communication with Washington. All of these developments make clear the urgent need for the United States and its allies to enhance deterrence of the North Korean regime.

ARMED AND DANGEROUS

North Korea’s pursuit of solid-fuel missiles provides a startling indication of its current aims. All three ICBMs North Korea has tested so far — the Hwasong-14, Hwasong-15, and Hwasong-17 — are liquid fueled. This is in accordance with the five-year plan set forth by the regime in January 2021 at its Eighth Party Congress, where it announced that it would soon be unveiling solid-fuel ICBMs that could be launched from both the sea and land. Pyongyang now appears to be making rapid progress toward that goal. Already, a series of new short-range ballistic missiles it has tested in recent years use solid fuel. It is now foreseeable that North Korea will conduct more solid-fuel engine tests on larger missiles. These include likely tests of a Pukguksong submarine-launched ballistic missile or a new solid-propellant ICBM. Kim’s sister Kim Yo Jong recently warned that the latter may be tested on a full-range trajectory toward the United States rather than on a lofted trajectory into the Sea of Japan, the destination of its previous ICBM tests.

In the coming months, North Korea could also unveil multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology, which will allow its missiles to frustrate U.S. missile defenses. The recently tested Hwasong-17 is designed to carry multiple warheads and could thus theoretically strike Manhattan and Washington at the same time.

As if these missile tests weren’t alarming enough, there are many indications that Pyongyang will soon conduct its seventh nuclear test. Such a test could be used to showcase a more compact tactical nuclear warhead for battlefield use — a weapon that would increase the threat North Korea poses to Japan and South Korea as well as to U.S. forces stationed in both countries. Satellite imagery has made clear, for example, that the Punggye-ri testing site, located in mountainous terrain north of Pyongyang and close to the border with China, is ready for such a detonation at any time. Testing a tactical nuclear warhead would also be consistent with Kim’s announced weapons development goals.

North Korea has already demonstrated its ability to deploy tactical nuclear weapons over the past year. In September and October, it conducted a series of tests of short-range missiles, with one simulating the launch of a nuclear missile from an underwater silo and another rehearsing the launch of nuclear warheads that could target airports in South Korea. But the regime has yet to demonstrate that it has developed a smaller warhead that could arm these missiles. It will need to do that soon if Kim intends to deploy this capability within his announced five-year timeline.

In addition to rapidly enhancing North Korea’s WMD arsenal, Kim has also been lowering the threshold for its use. In September, North Korea announced five conditions under which it would launch a preemptive strike. Notably, these included not only when a nuclear attack on the country is imminent but also when its leaders believe that preparations may be underway for a nonnuclear strike on the North Korean leadership, a North Korean nuclear command structure, or important North Korean strategic targets. Pyongyang has also said it could use a nuclear weapon if it determines that it has no other way to prevent the expansion of a conventional war into one that would threaten the regime’s survival. Kim is clearly signaling that if a conventional, preemptive strike against the North is launched or even appears to be imminent, he reserves the right to respond with nuclear weapons. North Korea is the only country in the world that has threatened the first use of nuclear weapons so explicitly.

Along with its new policy for preemptive WMD use, the Kim regime has sought to cement its nuclear power status by declaring in September that it “will never give up” its nuclear weapons and that its weapons program is “irreversible” and “nonnegotiable.” In effect, Kim is asserting that North Korea will never again discuss denuclearization with the United States, even as it expands its nuclear forces and threatens a preemptive strike. This amounts to a destabilizing triple whammy.

UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

Although the United States and its close allies in Asia have watched Kim’s accelerating WMD program with growing concern, they have not yet mounted a response that can deter the North from its current path. Part of the issue is that Western policymakers and observers are not as concerned as they should be about recent developments. Some North Korea watchers, for example, have posited that the program is for defensive purposes only and that Pyongyang’s testing spree is simply a way to modernize its arsenal, allowing the regime to use it as leverage in future negotiations to win sanctions relief and other concessions. In this reading, the aim of the new first strike policy is merely to deter the United States from contemplating an attack on the regime. The logic of this argument is that Kim is not suicidal and knows that if he launches a first strike on the United States, it could lead to full-scale conflict and his own demise, as well as that of his regime.

Such reasoning, however, overlooks more unsettling possibilities. For a start, Kim may believe that through nuclear saber-rattling, he can achieve one of his main strategic goals, which is undermining the U.S.-South Korean alliance. He may calculate that even if he uses nuclear weapons preemptively against the South or U.S. bases in the region, the United States will not retaliate as long as his long-range ICBM force threatens the U.S. mainland. He may figure that Washington — particularly under a future isolationist president — will be unlikely to defend South Korea if by doing so it risks the incineration of American cities.

Moreover, even if Kim intends to avoid rather than initiate a conflict, his growing WMD program could lead to war. History provides ample examples — from World War I to the Cuban missile crisis — of situations in which a series of miscalculations led to or could have led to a catastrophic conflict. Imagine what would happen if a North Korean missile aimed at South Korean territorial waters were to strike South Korean fishing vessels, killing South Korean sailors. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol could order a limited retaliatory strike, precipitating further escalation into a wider conflict. This is hardly a far-fetched scenario: In 2010, tensions between the two countries dramatically ramped up after the North sank the South Korean naval corvette Cheonan and shelled South Korea’s Yeonpyong Island. Although Lee Myung-bak, then South Korea’s president, showed restraint under U.S. pressure after the attack on the Cheonan, the country’s forces responded with artillery fire after the shelling of the island. A future such confrontation could easily spiral out of control, especially in view of North Korea’s new first-strike policy.

### reunification---1nc

#### Lifting sanctions causes Korea reunification:

#### LIBERALIZATION. It creates economic compatibility and integration between the North and South.

Sriyai ’20 [Surachanee; Faculty of Political Science at Chulalongkorn University. “How Economic Sanctions Discourage the Prospect of Reunification of the Korean Peninsula (and what Might help).” North Korean Review, Volume 16, Number 1.] TDI

The UN and U.S. should lift some of their economic sanctions against North Korea and allow the regime to continue with its economic reforms. Notably, there should be negotiations for the reopening of Kaesong Industrial Complex, a RoK-DPRK joint venture that was closed in early 2016 due to sanctions (and some military provocation from North Korea).16 while it was once criticized for funding Pyong - yang’s missile activities, this industrial complex was an initial gateway of exchange between the North and the South, which have been separated for decades, as well as a source of brief introduction to market economy for North Korean workers, even though they were paid directly by Pyongyang. Additional conditions should obviously be discussed before the project can be reopened, such as worker wages and security. The underlying key purpose of lifting these sanctions and resuming some of the joint venture projects with the DPRK is to promote economic growth and gradually introduce the concept of a market economy to the North, which in turn, may loosen up the otherwise restrictive regime through economic reforms. An analysis of Kim’s behaviors and leadership style from the International Crisis group provides an interesting insight that supports this stage of the proposal. From said analysis, it is in Kim’s best interest to maintain support for the status quo through material incentives. In fact, he reportedly has been using material incentives among the new elite coalition by redistributing property rights from the old guard to those he perceives as the next generation of his supporters.17 Reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex or a similar “open-but-controlled” economic proposal should be something with which Kim Jong Un is willing to get on board, as they would allow him to appease the working- class North Koreans and provide them with material rewards sufficient for them to continue to support him.

#### COSTS. Sanctions make reunification infeasible.

Rees ’18 [Kevin; Lieutenant, United States Navy, B.S., Utah State University. “Korean Unification: The Rising Costs And Impact Of Sanctions.” https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD1069719.pdf] TDI

The potential success of Korean reunification is challenged by the economic sanctions imposed on North Korea. In short, these economic sanctions act to amplify the detrimental effects of the DPRK’s short-sighted economic policy choices. Failure to lift these sanctions will prevent North Korea, or a unified Korea, from enjoying the benefits of normalized economic relations. As a result, economic difficulties will not be alleviated merely by achieving successful unification. Instead, limitations on trade imports and exports will continue to deter growth and increase the overall costs of unification. Normalization of trade relationships will be necessary to maximize the growth and capacity of the economy.

#### Reunification causes Taiwan invasion.

Newcomb ’18 [Melissa; Project Manager with the Political and Security Affairs group, National Bureau of Asian Research. "A Unified Korea, a Vulnerable Taiwan." https://www.nbr.org/publication/a-unified-korea-a-vulnerable-taiwan/] TDI

In the military dimension, cross-strait relations could be affected by a peace treaty between the DPRK and the ROK, as it almost certainly would entail a decreased U.S. military presence in the Indo-Pacific. At the Trump-Kim summit in June, President Trump promised to halt joint military exercises with South Korea. During the subsequent Moon-Kim summit in September 2018, the two leaders declared an “era with no war,” to include a cessation of military drills by the countries aimed at one another by November 1.

How the latter pledge will affect U.S. and UN forces is unclear. Regardless, these statements signal a change that could lessen the region-wide impact of deterrence that the U.S. troop presence in South Korea provides. ROK-DPRK unification could also include actual demilitarization of the DMZ and, depending on the terms, an open border. A true DMZ could mean the loss of U.S. forces at the joint command and would translate into fewer resources for deterrence against PRC aggression in the region. A peace agreement or unification could reduce the DMZ to a single UN observation office, or remove UN observers altogether, which could weaken international attention to developments on the peninsula. In short, there would be fewer checks on the PRC’s military activities in Korea.

If U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula are severely reduced or removed altogether, then Taiwan’s military will need reforms in terms of both hardware and human capital. In 2017, President Tsai Ing-wen announced that Taiwan’s military spending will increase by 20% by 2025, with a focus on capabilities such as submarine, unmanned aircraft, and missile defense capabilities. Taiwan may also need to increase its naval forces or coast guard activities to counter maritime aggression. It recently switched from a conscription force to a voluntary military service, but people in Taiwan currently view the military with derision. The death of a military trainee in 2013 sparked massive protests, and there is a general distrust among young people toward the armed forces. Taiwan’s military lacks the general respect and attractive benefits for service members offered in the United States. Attracting and retaining talent will require increasing the military’s prestige among citizens, especially young people.

The easiest way to increase the size of Taiwan’s armed forces would be to include more women. There is a great gender imbalance in the military, which was only 14% women as of 2017. Taiwan could learn much from Israel, a similar small power besieged by larger aggressors, whose military requires all citizens, regardless of gender, to serve. A return to conscription would be deeply unpopular, but providing more benefits to young, healthy people or technical professionals, especially women, would improve morale while enhancing military preparedness in the event of aggression from the PRC. Benefits could include measures as simple as saving plans with higher interest rates, subsidized housing, tuition funding, or preference to move into civil service.

If the two Koreas unite or sign a peace treaty, Beijing will use the situation to its advantage, lauding the treaty as an example of why the “two Chinas” should unite as well. The PRC can be expected to direct stronger rhetoric and misinformation toward its own population as well as to people in Taiwan. Taiwan already has strong anti-propaganda agencies and news literacy programs, but to counteract intensified propaganda or “information warfare,” it would be critical for the country to significantly prioritize and ramp up public awareness campaigns in the lead-up to any sort of unification scenario on the Korean Peninsula. Taiwan would do well to copy Sweden’s example and create an official guidebook for citizens on how to prepare for and respond to crisis and conflict in the event that the PRC were to take unilateral action to unify with Taiwan.

It will be important for Taiwan to prevent itself from being shutout of a unified Korean Peninsula or having its international space further constrained after a removal or drawdown of U.S. forces. To prevent a shutout, Taiwan must cultivate strong ties to the United States and regional partners, especially the two Koreas. Beijing may try to diplomatically isolate the island by asking a new, unified Korea to reaffirm its commitment to the one-China principle. North Korea will probably have no issue with this, but Taiwan could leverage its relations with South Korea (and ask for support from the United States) to prevent a complete capitulation on the issue. A new security framework with the United States may be necessary to protect Taiwan’s ability to defend itself — something more substantive than the current Taiwan Relations Act — potentially through legislation that codifies the Six Assurances and Three Joint Communiqués into law. Congress is already boosting U.S.-Taiwan relations: the Taiwan Travel Act was passed in March 2018; Taiwan was explicitly mentioned in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2019; and a bill called the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act was introduced to deter current allies of Taiwan from switching allegiance to the PRC. Taiwan could also look to the Indo-Pacific region, especially India, for support. Strengthening ties with India, a country historically willing to stand up to China on a range of issues, such as their disputed border and refugees from Tibet, could benefit Taiwan going forward.

#### Taiwan invasion goes nuclear.

Pettyjohn & Wasser ’22 [Stacie; Senior fellow & director of the defense program, Center for a New American Security. Becca; Fellow in the defense program & co-lead of The Gaming Lab, Center for a New American Security. "A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear.” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-20/fight-over-taiwan-could-go-nuclear] TDI

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe.

A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal — not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan — mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear.

Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable. That would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to keep the United States out of the conflict.

China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able to project conventional military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, a growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as well as potentially new warfighting capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and escalation.

China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclear scholars at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around 1,000 deliverable warheads — more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan.

A fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear.

Our recent war game — in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the United States — illustrated that a U.S.-China war could escalate quickly. For one thing, it showed that both countries would face operational incentives to strike military forces on the other’s territory. In the game, such strikes were intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed red lines for both countries, and produced a tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that broadened the scope and intensity of the conflict.

For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory, crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team responded to China’s moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii.

A NEW ERA

One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible. In real life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of experience making nuclear threats. This may push China to preemptively detonate a nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of its warning.

China might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its long-range conventional strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the American people. Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate the seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S. homeland could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would have provoked a response.

The most likely paths to nuclear escalation in a fight between the United States and China are different from those that were most likely during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States feared a massive, blot-from-the-blue nuclear attack, which would precipitate a full-scale strategic exchange. In a confrontation over Taiwan, however, Beijing could employ nuclear weapons in a more limited way to signal resolve or to improve its chances of winning on the battlefield. It is unclear how a war would proceed after that kind of limited nuclear use and whether the United States could de-escalate the situation while still achieving its objectives.

AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION

The clear lesson from the war game is that the United States needs to strengthen its conventional capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to ensure that China never views an invasion of Taiwan as a prudent tactical move. To do so, the United States will need to commit to maintaining its conventional military superiority by expanding its stockpiles of long-range munitions and investing in undersea capabilities. Washington must also be able to conduct offensive operations inside the first and second island chains even while under attack. This will require access to new bases to distribute U.S. forces, enhance their survivability, and ensure that they can effectively defend Taiwan in the face of China’s attacks.

Moreover, the United States needs to develop an integrated network of partners willing to contribute to Taiwan’s defense. Allies are an asymmetric advantage: the United States has them, and China does not. The United States should deepen strategic and operational planning with key partners to send a strong signal of resolve to China. As part of these planning efforts, the United States and its allies will need to develop war-winning military strategies that do not cross Chinese red-lines. The game highlighted just how difficult this task may be; what it did not highlight is the complexity of developing military strategies that integrate the strategic objectives and military capacities of multiple nations.

Moving forward, military planners in the United States and in Washington’s allies and partners must grapple with the fact that, in a conflict over Taiwan, China would consider all conventional and nuclear options to be on the table. And the United States is running out of time to strengthen deterrence and keep China from believing an invasion of Taiwan could be successful. The biggest risk is that Washington and its friends choose not to seize the moment and act: a year or two from now, it might already be too late.

### at: circumvention

#### Sanctions are working.

Haggard ’18 [Stephan; University of California San Diego. “Those North Korea sanctions might be working. Here’s why.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/04/06/those-north-korea-sanctions-might-be-working-heres-why/] TDI

Yet there are limits. Smuggling operations are not going to replace the foreign exchange losses associated with major export bans. In his New Year’s speech, Kim openly signaled that harder times were coming. If China, his largest trading partner, holds firm, Kim faces looming constraints in the form of declining access to much-needed foreign exchange.

Pyongyang’s current-account deficit with China is another sign that sanctions hurt North Korea’s economy. China has restricted North Korean imports but does not face the same constraints on most exports. As a result, North Korea’s deficit is ballooning.

North Korea is probably financing this deficit out of reserves, but its reserves are not unlimited. The recent rounds of sanctions may not work through a slow squeeze, but instead create a balance-of-payments crisis — and a loss of confidence in the informal markets that are keeping the economy afloat.

### at: removal solves

#### Unilateral removal solves nothing.

Bosco & Stanton ’20 [Christy Lee; staff writer, citing: Joseph; East Asia expert, Institute for Corean-American Studies. Joshua; Washington-based attorney, helped draft the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement and Policy Enforcement Act. “Experts: Sanctions Relief Will Not Make North Korea Denuclearize.” https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific\_experts-sanctions-relief-will-not-make-north-korea-denuclearize/6183850.html]

North Korea is unlikely to give up its nuclear weapons even if sanctions are eased, according to experts who think increasing pressure and enforcing sanctions will lead Pyongyang to relent on its nuclear program.

“I do not believe North Korea would give up its nuclear weapons if sanctions are lifted,” said Joseph Bosco, an East Asia expert at the Institute for Corean-American Studies (ICAS). “Instead, they would increase their demands.”

Joshua Stanton, a Washington-based attorney who helped draft the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement and Policy Enforcement Act in 2016, said, “If there is any chance of denuclearizing North Korea, it is to put so much pressure on Kim Jong Un that he or the generals around him decide that denuclearization is their only alternative to the collapse of the state.”

## iran

### qpq---1nc

#### The United States should conditional removal of economic sanctions on compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

#### Iran says yes, but maintaining the pressure of sanctions is necessary to negotiatory success.

Draca et al. ’23 [Mirko; Department of Economics, University of Warwick. Jason Garred; University of Ottawa. Leanne Stickland; Deloitte UK. Nele Warrinnier; Queen Mary University of London, LICOS Centre for Institutions & Economic Performance. “On Target? Sanctions and the Economic Interests of Elite Policymakers in Iran.” The Economic Journal, Volume 133, Issue 649.] TDI

How successful are sanctions at targeting the economic interests of political elites in affected countries? We study the case of Iran, using information on the stock exchange-listed assets of two specific political entities with significant influence over the direction of Iran’s nuclear programme. Our identification strategy focuses on the process of negotiations for sanctions removal, examining which interests benefit most from news about diplomatic progress. The results indicate the ‘bluntness’ of sanctions on Iran, but also provide evidence of their effectiveness in generating substantial economic incentives for elite policymakers to negotiate a deal for sanctions relief.

Economic sanctions are an important tool of foreign policy, providing an instrument by which states may attempt to influence policies abroad without resorting to military force or covert action. In recent years, sanctions have been at the forefront of international responses to Russia’s foreign policy decisions regarding the Ukraine and to Iran’s programme for the development of nuclear technology. Other prominent recent examples of sanctions have included measures levelled against Burma, Iraq, North Korea and Syria, among many others.

Once imposed, sanctions act as a ‘carrot’ for policymakers in the sanctioned country, as the actors imposing sanctions offer to remove them in exchange for policy reform. But if imposing sanctions is costly for the senders then they will prefer to design this incentive as efficiently as possible. In theory, sanctions should therefore be focused on the sources of income most valued by those responsible for the key policy decisions, rather than the economy of the receiving country as a whole. In line with this logic, a central principle underlying the design of modern sanctions regimes is that they should be targeted as much as possible to the economic interests of elite decision makers.1

In practice, however, it may be difficult to design sanctions that stay ‘on target’. This might be because the targeted group is particularly well placed to avoid even carefully designed sanctions, or is able to redistribute the effects of sanctions to less powerful groups within the sanctioned country.2 Alternatively, the policy instruments used by the sender could be too blunt to target any particular group within the sanctioned country. While states are increasingly employing ‘smart sanctions’ instruments designed to affect only particular firms or individuals, many sanctions regimes also incorporate more comprehensive trade and financial restrictions, which may be difficult to selectively ‘switch on and off’ across different agents in a receiving country.3

In this paper, we consider the case of Iran, which was subject to multilateral sanctions related to its nuclear programme until early 2016. Over several years of diplomatic negotiations ending in July 2015, Iran and its sanctioners came to an agreement in which Iran consented to changes in its nuclear policies in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions. If these sanctions were successfully targeted, their removal should have benefited the policymaking elite, rewarding them for changing the policy for which sanctions were imposed.

### iran---1nc

#### The United States federal government should fully enforce economic sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran.

#### That ensures sanctions effectiveness by signaling US commitment.

Mandel ’23 [Eric; Ph.D., Director, Middle East Political Information Network, Senior Security Editor, Jerusalem Report. “The risk of failing to enforce sanctions on Iran.” https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3822774-the-risk-of-failing-to-enforce-sanctions-on-iran/] TDI

Targeted and fully enforced sanctions do work. Proof of the power of financial sanctions is Iran’s recent threat to the European Union, warning them not to list its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist entity, as the U.S. has done. Would Iran make threats about this if economic sanctions were ineffective? The Supreme Leader and the IRGC control much of the Iranian economy.

The power of sanctions also was evident with Iraq’s recent complaints when, as the Journal reported, “the New York Fed began enforcing tighter controls on international dollar transactions by Iraqi commercial banks in a move to curtail money laundering and the illegal siphoning of dollars to Iran and other heavily sanctioned Middle East countries. A U.S. official said the measures would limit the ability of malign actors to use the Iraqi banking system.”

But what if the real problem is not with the sanctions themselves but with the lack of will to enforce them thoroughly?

For decades, U.S. presidents from both parties have acted as if they have exclusive authority in foreign affairs, marginalizing Congress and choosing which sanctions to enforce. So when Congress passes sanctions legislation, expecting the executive branch to comply with the law, it is still up to the White House to choose whether to enforce sanctions partially or not at all. For example, President Obama did not fully implement sanctions before or after concluding the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement, perhaps sending Iran’s notoriously wily negotiators the wrong message.

According to Ed Royce, then-chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, “The Obama administration has continuously stressed that it will ‘vigorously’ enforce sanctions on Iran even as it negotiates a nuclear agreement. But its failure to comply with the law because of its zeal for a nuclear deal has resulted in de facto sanctions relief for the Iranian regime.”

Sometimes the executive branch and Congress even fall behind our usually dovish European allies in sanctions legislation. This month, the Washington Beacon reported Europeans had taken stricter action than the Biden administration in implementing new sanctions against the Iranian regime for human rights abuses against protesters. According to United Against a Nuclear Iran, “The Biden administration has stopped short of designating the highest-ranking officials in the Islamic Republic and is not yet matching the designations of mid-level targets that have been announced by the U.K., Canada, and EU.”

As for American sanctions already in place, their implementation reportedly has been underwhelming: “Iranian oil sales to China have skyrocketed, jumping 40 percent, sparking accusations that the Biden administration is turning a blind eye to sanctions enforcement. … The U.S. has been notably reluctant to enforce its own oil sanctions against China.”

And the Foundation for Democracies’ senior adviser on Iran, Saeed Ghasseminejad, has said, “The Biden administration’s failure to fully enforce its sanctions against Iran is helping the Islamist regime survive. Last year, Iran’s non-oil exports reached their highest value, a clear sign the Biden administration has abandoned any serious effort to enforce sanctions.”

The issue of sanctions again came to mind as the Supreme Court deliberated the case of a Turkish bank, which is an arm of the Turkish government. Halkbank is asking the justices to protect it from charges of evasion of U.S. sanctions and money laundering for the Iranian regime because of sovereign immunity. The Turkish government is a majority stakeholder in the bank. Federal prosecutors allege a “multibillion-dollar scheme to evade U.S. sanctions on Iran” between 2012 and 2016.

If the Supreme Court rules in favor of Halkbank, allowing them to avoid sanctions in the name of sovereign immunity, then why would Iranian, Chinese or Russian corporations owned by their governments be subject to U.S. economic sanctions? Congress needs to weigh in, but the Global Magnitsky Act already allows the U.S. to sanction foreign government officials who are human rights abusers. Unfortunately, its full weight is not enforced on high-level officials such as Iran’s Supreme Leader or its president.

American national security interests would be better served if our adversaries felt the full effects of economic sanctions. Our foreign policy would be more respected and influential if we leveraged the consequences of sanctions, rather than watering them down. In the Middle East, our current policies are perceived as a weakness; it worries our allies and gives solace to our adversaries.

Sanctions work only if they are strong, fully enforced, and given enough time to work. Our Middle East adversaries know Americans have a short attention span — their strategy is to wait us out. We must move our timeline to a Middle Eastern one, to get the most benefit from sanctions.

#### Sanctions are key to prevent Iranian nuclear breakout:

#### ECONOMIC PRESSURE. Imposing economic costs is key to nonprolif.

Arslanian ’23 [Ferdinand; University of St Andrews. “The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Nuclear Non-Proliferation: The Case of Iran (2005-15).” The International Spectator, Volume 58, Issue 4.] TDI

The framework was applied to the case of Iran beginning with the faltering of nuclear negotiations in 2005 and ending with Iran singing the JCPOA in 2015. The empirical examination began with a discussion the pre-2005 baseline sub-episode in which US unilateral sanctions were undermined by European countries by replacing US economic engagement and pursuing diplomatic engagement, thus nullifying the causal mechanisms through which sanctions could have affected the target. The faltering of diplomacy in resolving the 2002 nuclear crisis, especially with the ascension of the hardline neo-Principalists, paved the way for the two main sub-episodes. The first (2005-10) was instigated by Iran’s decision to resume its nuclear programme. This led to a shift from the original US unilateral sanctions to specific multilateral and extra-territorial sanctions targeting the nuclear programme and the financial sector. In examining the pathways, the demand-side pathway shows that sanctions evasion networks strengthened the incumbent neo-Principalists’ control over the economy as their ruling coalition was consolidated by the policy of ‘Petro-Populism’ which benefited from high global oil prices and the redirection of oil exports. While the subsequent collapse of oil prices in 2008 undermined the dominance of the ruling coalition and created a rift within the political system, it was insufficient to overthrow the ruling faction and its hard-line stance on nuclear proliferation. In examining the supply-side pathway, the targeted sanctions do not appear to have significantly halted the progress of the programme owing to Iran’s evasive measures and Chinese assistance. Both pathways contributed towards the decision to advance the nuclear programme and produce highly enriched uranium. In the second sub-episode (2010-15), the multilateral and extra-territorial sanctions regime shifted from targeted to sectoral. Henceforth, the successful targeting of Iran’s crude oil exports, among other measures, impacted the country’s domestic politics, or its demand-side pathway, as the associated economic deterioration created a broad anti-sanction coalition that challenged the neo-Principalists and negotiated a nuclear deal once it assumed power. On the other hand, with regard to the supply-side pathway, economic sanctions slowed and increased the costs of the nuclear programme, but failed to halt its progress.

In examining the relevance of the developed theoretical framework for explaining the case of Iran, the framework clearly explains the repeated interaction between the target and the sanctions regime as each milestone in the nuclear programme is met by a qualitative change in the regime. As for the causal pathways, the empirical case shows more evidence of the demand-side domestic politics pathway in comparison to the supply-side pathway. Solingen’s distinction between the different responses of inward-looking and internationalising coalitions to international pressure plays a role in explaining the differing responses of the Reformists and neo-Principalists. On the other hand, the broad coalition that negotiated the deal does not represent an internationalising coalition as much as it indicates the centrality of the target's pattern of integration in the international economy, with its reliance on oil exports, to its domestic system of political economy and its overall political survival.

These findings give credence to the traditional cost hypothesis in economic sanctions which relates sanctions’ effectiveness to the target’s incurred economic costs, a hypothesis that has been subject to an extensive critique. Nevertheless, the framework provides a clear pathway through which the hypothesis functions, namely through undermining the economic basis of the target’s political system. As the framework is designed to examine prolonged and obstinate cases of non-proliferation sanctions, the findings can provide an insight into the case of DPRK by relating its brief period of readiness to negotiate disarmament in 2018 with the PRC’s preceding strict enforcement of UNSC sanctions threatening the economic basis of its political system (Kim Citation2020).

#### Robust modelling confirms a statistically significant relationship with military investment.

Farzanegan ’21 [Mohammad Reza; Economics of the Middle East Research Group, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Center for Near and Middle Eastern Studies, School of Business & Economics, Marburg, Germany & CESifo, ERF. “The Effects of International Sanctions on Iran’s military spending: A Synthetic Control Analysis.” Defence and Peace Economics, Volume 33, Issue 7.] TDI

Figure 1 shows the per capita military spending trajectory of Iran and its synthetic counterpart for the 2003–2015 period. The synthetic Iran almost exactly reproduces the per capita military spending for Iran during the entire pre-international sanctions period but the two lines diverge from each other significantly starting in 2012. While per capita military spending decelerates in the factual Iran, per capita military spending in the synthetic Iran keeps ascending at a pace similar to the pre-2012 sanctions period. The difference between the two series continues to grow towards the end of the sample period. Therefore, the results imply a significant negative effect of the international sanctions on Iran’s military spending.

The estimated effect of international sanctions on per capita military spending is given by the difference between the factual Iran and its synthetic version, as illustrated in Figure 2. I find that over the entire 2013–2015 period, per capita military spending was reduced by approximately 117 US$ per year on average. Considering the average size of population for post-2012 period in Iran (approximately 77 million), the total average amount of annual reduction in Iran’s military spending is estimated to be approximately 9 billion US$ from 2013 to 2015. It is also important to consider the uncertainty around the estimated fall of military spending per capita of Iran in post-2012 sanction period. To do this, I follow a methodology developed by Firpo and Possebom (2018) and Ferman, Pinto, and Possebom (2020) to gain more insight into the statistical significance of the estimated results. Ferman, Pinto, and Possebom (2020) proposed a uniform confidence set around the estimated effect by SCM, which contains all functions that are deviations from the estimated treatment effect by an additive and constant factor and are not rejected by the placebo test. Figure 2 shows the estimated per capita military spending gap between the factual Iran and the counterfactual Iran with uniform confidence sets at 91.6% level (which is the highest level of confidence intervals given the sample size of 12 countries). I observe that the negative effect of the 2012 international sanctions on Iran’s military spending is statistically significant in all years after 2012.

#### ‘Sanctions failing’ is wrong.

Arslanian ’23 [Ferdinand; University of St Andrews. “The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Nuclear Non-Proliferation: The Case of Iran (2005-15).” The International Spectator, Volume 58, Issue 4.] TDI

The literature on economic sanctions is highly pessimistic on the tool’s effectiveness, with Iran representing the case par excellence that validates this pessimism. More optimist scholars argue that relying on the case of Iran to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of sanctions is “theoretically misguided” (Miller Citation2014, 938) given Iran’s political enmity with and economic insulation from its primary sender, the United States (US). Paradoxically, however, Iran’s signing of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that curtailed its nuclear programme following decades of multi-level economic sanctions and proliferation breakthroughs, has challenged the conventional wisdom over the futility of economic sanctions, especially in the case of Iran.

While several papers have addressed the role of economic sanctions in the Iranian deal, they remain theoretically underdeveloped. Scholars have failed to distinguish between its different phases and identify the precise causal mechanisms, in addition to confusing the sanctions’ different objectives between regime change and non-proliferation. This article seeks to address these shortcomings through developing a theoretical framework that integrates the causal mechanistic approach to economic sanctions (Arslanian Citation2020; Connolly Citation2018; Jones Citation2015) with the demand and supply sides of nuclear proliferation (Early Citation2012; Solingen Citation2012). More precisely, this article seeks to answer the following research question: what are the causal mechanisms through which non-proliferation economic sanctions have coerced Iran to sign a nuclear deal that curtailed its programme?

#### COERCIVE DIPLOMACY. Empirics prove sanctions are critical leverage in nuclear negotiations.

Harris ’20 [Benjamin; University of the Sunshine Coast. “Coercive Diplomacy and the Iranian Nuclear Crisis.” International Negotiation, Volume 26, Issue 2.] TDI

By late 2011, the US launched attacks against the Iranian financial sector. The US Treasury Department named the entire Iranian financial sector a money laundering entity, under provisions in the US PATRIOT Act. In combination with 2012 National Defense Authorization Act and amendments to CISADA, these measures essentially blocked Iranian banks’ access to the US economy. While significant, these efforts would pale in comparison to EU sanctions against the financial sector. Come March 2012, the EU passed a ban on financial messaging services for the transfer of funds to Iran.9 The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Communication (SWIFT) controls the majority of worldwide funds transfers (not just those in and out of the EU) and is headquartered in Belgium and therefore subject to EU regulations. This was described by SWIFT’s CEO as an “extraordinary and unprecedented step” (Gladstone 2012). Such measures had never been instituted by SWIFT before. Effects were quick and devastating with estimates suggesting that annually SWIFT is used two million times and amounts to $US35 billion in trade with Europe alone (Schanzer & Dubowitz 2015). Virtually all the major commercial and state banks of Iran operate on the SWIFT system and essentially had no alternatives (Cordesman, Gold & Coughlin-Schulte 2014). The SWIFT sanction was so effective that Iran was reportedly operating a barter system with many trading partners (Monshipouri & Dorraj 2013). Not only did this have a significant impact on government finances, but it also made it nearly impossible for businesses and individuals to receive and send funds abroad. The economic situation had become dire with contractions of 0.8% and 12.9% of GDP in 2012 and 2013 respectively (World Bank 2019a). Furthermore, this was affecting the average Iranian, as inflation peaked in 2013 at 34%, vastly raising the cost of living (World Bank 2019b).

Within a month of the SWIFT ban taking effect, Iran agreed to talks in April 2012. Prior to this, faceto-face dialogue between Iran and the P5+1 had not taken place for more than a year.10 While no ground was made in terms of a comprehensive agreement, both sides agreed on a framework of ongoing negotiations. In June, the P5+1 tabled an official offer, which it dubbed as “stop, shut and ship,” that stated that enrichment to 20% would be stopped, the new enrichment facility at Qom would be shut, and Iran’s entire stockpile of 20% enriched uranium would be shipped out of the country (Kroenig 2014). This sparked further discussion and consideration of Iran being extended the enrichment incentive, as “stop, shut and ship” did not explicitly preclude the Iranians from transforming raw uranium into LEU through enrichment. While alluded to here and to some degree in the 2009 fuel-swap proposal, it had never been an explicit P5+1 policy, nor had it ever been officially extended to Iran as an option. As stated above, this entitlement to enrichment went against the global norm but was otherwise a reasonable request. For the P5+1, they could still secure an agreement that closely monitored the Iranian program and allow an appropriate amount enrichment to take place, thus securing their primary goal of ensuring the program was peaceful and transparent.

The reality of life for Iran in light of the oil and SWIFT bans quickly became apparent. The official rhetoric out of Tehran was no less confrontational but it began to acknowledge the costs of the sanctions were becoming consequential to the economy and the public at large. As such, complying with demands might prove more beneficial. In July 2012, Minister for Industries and Business, Mehdi Ghazanfari, stated that “we must realize that confronting enemy requires serious thought and intelligence” (Ghazanfari 2012). By December 2012 suffering had increased and many officials including the Chief of the General Inspection Office started pointing fingers. He stated that “all people who believed that the sanctions were nothing, but a worthless piece of paper and did not make the necessary arrangements to handle them will be required to account for their actions since the country is now suffering from the problem” (Bozorgmehr & Basu 2012). Even Ahmadinejad, who had spent much of 2012 attempting to convince the public that this was a psychological war that Iran would win, publicly stated in early 2013 that Iran was suffering “the heaviest economic onslaught on a nation in history” and that 2012 “was a very difficult year for our economy” (Israel National News 2013). Therefore, the fact that the lowest common denominator policy had become significantly less timid in its approach meant the P5+1 could finally deploy coercion that was significant enough to signal a rethink of cost and benefit in Iran.

#### That’s key to long-term nonprolif.

Harris ’20 [Benjamin; University of the Sunshine Coast. “Coercive Diplomacy and the Iranian Nuclear Crisis.” International Negotiation, Volume 26, Issue 2.] TDI

This analysis has shown that the GIA can be largely attributed to the strategy of coercive diplomacy. While the outcome was not as one-sided as some in the West might have hoped for, it did deal with the primary objective: non-proliferation and the ability for Iran to hold the world at ransom through a nuclear hedging strategy. In this sense, coercive diplomacy is an appropriate strategy as it attains the primary objective but does not preclude the target (Iran) from leaving the crisis with a sense of gain. This was achieved by addressing Iran’s long-term issues, rather than providing incentives directly connected to the nuclear program. The outcome of the GIA and the consequential JCPOA was gradually improving economic relations with the West, including the US. Additionally, it gave Iran the authority to enrich its own uranium, with its own facilities, albeit with heavy restrictions on the levels of enrichment and the stockpile it could hold at any one time. This decision does make Iran’s nuclear breakout time shorter than no enrichment capacity should it choose to cheat the deal but, as the analysis suggests, this was and remains an implausible option.

#### Iran prolif is fast and existential.

Fard ’23 [Erfan; Counter-terrorism analyst & Middle East Studies researcher; International Security Studies, London M. University; International Relations, CSULA. "Iran requires a delicate dance on the edge of peril." https://www.israelhayom.com/opinions/the-iranian-nuclear-challenge-a-delicate-dance-on-the-edge-of-peril/] TDI

In today's world, few issues are as pressing and concerning as the imminent weaponization of Iran's nuclear program. In this op-ed, we delve into the technical intricacies of Iran's nuclear program, specifically focusing on fissile material production and weaponization timelines. It is crucial to understand these aspects for a comprehensive view of the situation and its implications for international security and regional stability. Because the Iranian rough regime is a bad actor in the political theatre.

Fissile material production forms the bedrock of nuclear weapon development. Unfortunately, Iran's enrichment capacity, uranium stockpile, and enrichment facilities have surpassed the limits set by the dead Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This surplus raises fears that Iran possesses enough enriched uranium to produce multiple nuclear weapons. The urgency of the situation cannot be overstated; estimations suggest that Iran could produce weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) in just one week. The trajectory of Iran's nuclear program underlines the need for immediate international attention and decisive action.

Another critical facet of nuclear weapons development is weaponization. While Iran has not resumed weaponization research, experts estimate it would take approximately a couple of weeks to complete the necessary weaponization steps. This timeline assumes parallel progress in fissile material production and weaponization. Hence, it is vital to monitor and address weaponization capabilities. Alas, erroneously, IAEA reports indicate a lack of a viable nuclear weapon design and suitable explosive detonation systems, providing valuable insights and alarm into imagined Shia mullah's nuclear capabilities. The potential threat lies in the likelihood that imagined Shia mullahs in Tehran with nuclear capabilities could develop a variety of nuclear bombs, posing a grave danger to regional and global stability. It will be a nightmare for the modern world. "Like a sword that has fallen into the hand of a brigand."(Rumi)

The imminent weaponization of Iran's nuclear program poses a grave threat to regional and global security. The Middle East is already a tumultuous region, and the addition of nuclear weapons to the mix would escalate tensions to unprecedented levels. Iran's adversarial relationships with neighboring countries, notably Israel, exacerbate concerns. Israel, with its historic rivalry with Iran after 1979, perceives a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat, potentially triggering a nuclear arms race in the region. The delicate balance of power and peace that the world strives to maintain could be shattered, with dire consequences for all.

Significantly, Iran has cultivated a transnational terrorist network involving a variety of extremist groups aimed at encircling Israel. Despite improvements in the Saudi-Iran cold war dynamics, Iran remains committed to asserting its influence as a dominant power in the region. On a daily basis, Iranian propaganda consistently underscores their objective of eliminating and destabilizing Israel.

Iran's possession of nuclear weapons would disrupt the fragile regional stability in the Middle East. Neighboring countries would be compelled to reevaluate their defense strategies and alliances, potentially leading to a dangerous arms buildup. The region would likely witness increased militarization and a higher risk of conflicts, pushing the already volatile region closer to the brink. The Israel-Iran rivalry, in particular, could escalate to a perilous level, threatening not only the two nations but also regional stability and peace.

The persistence of the mullahs' regime in Iran poses a fundamental obstacle to achieving stability and peace in the region. The essence of the Shia mullahs' regime is rooted in the destructive ideology of Khomeinism.

From Israel's standpoint, Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons is an immediate and existential threat. Iran's regime has, on numerous occasions, expressed hostile intentions toward Israel, and its leadership has denied Israel's right to exist. Given the Iranian regime's history of supporting terrorist groups in the region, a nuclear-armed Iran would dramatically tip the balance of power, endangering Israel's security and altering the dynamics of the entire region. Israel would be forced to reevaluate its defense strategies, potentially leading to an escalation of military activities.

### terror---1nc

#### Sanctions are key to combat Iran’s economic support of terrorist proxies.

Zarate ’15 [Juan; Senior Adviser, Center for Strategic and International Studies. “The Implications of Sanctions Relief under the Iran Agreement.” https://www.csis.org/analysis/implications-sanctions-relief-under-iran-agreement] TDI

The U.S. Treasury targeted Iran’s banks by using Iran’s own conduct — its proliferation activity, support for terrorist groups and Shia militias, and lack of anti-money-laundering controls, as well as the secretive and corrupt nature of the regime itself — as the cornerstone of the campaign. Iran’s suite of suspect activities and attempts to avoid international scrutiny spurred the private sector to stop doing business with Iran. No reputable bank would want to be caught facilitating Iran’s nuclear program or helping it make payments to Hezbollah terrorist cells around the world. If they did, they would be caught and sanctioned, with enormous reputational and business consequences.

This was a virtuous cycle of isolation that would reduce Iranian access to the international financial system more and more over time. The more the Iranians tried to hide their identities or evade sanctions, the more suspect their transactions would appear and the riskier it would become for banks and other financial institutions to deal with them. Over time, bank accounts, lines of credit, and correspondent accounts were shut down. Iran’s own actions to avoid scrutiny and obfuscate transactions would lead to greater financial constriction.

#### Lifting sanctions guarantees terror.

Zarate ’15 [Juan; Senior Adviser, Center for Strategic and International Studies. “The Implications of Sanctions Relief under the Iran Agreement.” https://www.csis.org/analysis/implications-sanctions-relief-under-iran-agreement] TDI

In the first instance, the unfettered return of funds to the Iranian regime will allow Tehran the flexibility to fund its allies and proxies and flex its muscles in the region. Iran will get a massive infusion of capital from initial sanctions relief, with estimates up to $150 billion from frozen oil proceeds. There may be unaccounted-for money that is dislodged and returned to Iran – to include other frozen or blocked Iranian assets that are unreported or have remained in limbo in recent years due to the sanctions regime. Regardless of amounts available to the regime or percentage used to support terrorist proxies, there will be an infusion of terrorist financing into the global system. The Administration has acknowledged that some of the unfrozen funds will go to support terrorist and militant groups, like Hezbollah, HAMAS, Iraqi Shia militias, and the Houthis in Yemen. This is certainly the expectation of Iran’s allies. Iran could even use its capital to support the Taleban and al Qaida, with which Iran has maintained a relationship and provided support in the past.

With Iran expanding its reach and presence throughout the Middle East, witnessing IRGC commanders and proxies positioned from the Golan to Yemen, there will be more concern about Iran’s misuse of the economy, the benefits of sanctions relief, and the international financial and commercial system for dangerous and illicit activities. This infusion of cash will relieve budgetary constraints for a country that had only an estimated $20 billion in fully accessible foreign exchange reserves prior to November 201319 but was spending at least $6 billion annually to support Assad.20

The regime itself, and its core institutions like the Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC, will benefit most immediately and deeply. Iran is a theocratic regime that controls the key elements of the economy, with the IRGC controlling the nation’s largest construction company, much of its telecommunications sector, strategic sectors like shipping, and a large portion of the value on the Tehran Stock Exchange.

#### Robust modelling confirms the link.

Wang et al. ’22 [Yaohui, Yupeng Shen & Zhaoying Han; Department of International Relations, Nankai University. “Economic sanctions and state-sponsored terrorism: the case of Iran.” Israel Affairs, Volume 28, Issue 5.] TDI

In his landmark work on state sponsorship of terrorism, Daniel Byman evaluates the changing relationship between transnational terrorist groups and supportive governments since the 1970s and argues that ‘It is more accurate to say that the dynamic between states and terrorist groups may be changing but has become perhaps more important’.36 Indeed, many prominent terrorist organisations are heavily reliant on states for funds and protection. Without such connections, these organisations cannot sustain collective actions. The deleterious consequences of the state-terrorist nexus show that the international community must strive to contain not only terrorist groups but also their supportive governments.

Policymakers have long used economic sanctions as a diplomatic instrument to induce policy changes, including coercing targeted governments to suspend support from backing violent campaigns. This article presented insights into the sanctions-terrorism nexus by examining the Iranian sponsorship of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the PIJ. It found that economic sanctions against Tehran have reduced the frequency of terrorist attacks by the three terrorist organisations. With diminished resources, sanctioned regimes economise expenditures on terrorist proxies and thus undermine the ability of these groups to conduct operations. As such, our findings belie concerns that sanctions may create a counterproductive effect when used to deter state sponsorship of terrorism. If anything, sanctions can be a valuable tool to fight terrorism.

#### Terrorism is a global geopolitical risk. The post-Hamas environment is unique.

O’Donnell ’23 [Lynne; Australian journalist and author. “After Hamas Attacks, Terror Threats Are on the Rise.” https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/23/israel-hamas-war-terrorism-attack-intelligence-afghanistan-taliban] TDI

In the weeks since the atrocities committed by Hamas in Israel on Oct. 7, there’s been an alarming uptick in terrorist activity in Europe, with Western intelligence chiefs warning that Islamist extremists, jihadis, and antisemites, inspired by Hamas’s bold attack, could be looking for new ways to attack Western targets. Groups affiliated with al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Taliban, and based across Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, will likely try to demonstrate their own capabilities to secure attention in a crowded field. After all, terror groups need the publicity of high-profile attacks to attract recruits, cash, weapons, and protection.

The intelligence chiefs of the Five Eyes partners — Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States — met last week at a conference in California organized by the FBI, and they issued a joint warning that the threat of domestic attacks has risen as a direct result of the unfolding crisis in the Middle East.

“We have seen an increase in reported threats, but vigilance is heightened right now just because of the fluid and volatile environment in the Middle East and the way in which that could spin out in the U.S.,” Christopher Wray, the FBI chief, told 60 Minutes. The spy chiefs said that lone actors radicalized online, organized terrorist groups, state actors such as Iran, and far-right and neo-Nazi groups could become more active. “Make no mistake, this is a dangerous time,” Wray said.

### at: circumvention

#### Sanctions are crushing Iran’s economy.

Ng ’21 [Abigail; Reporter, CNBC. “These 6 charts show how sanctions are crushing Iran’s economy.” https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/23/these-6-charts-show-how-sanctions-are-crushing-irans-economy.html] TDI

Here are six charts that show how Iran’s economy is struggling.

Iran’s economy contracted an estimated 4.99% in 2020, steadily shrinking since 2017.

In comparison, the Islamic Republic enjoyed a sharp economic growth of 12.5% in 2016 after the nuclear deal was signed. However, that reprieve was short-lived.

“It’s impossible to know precisely what the numbers would be had there been no sanctions,” said Abrams, former U.S. special representative for Iran during the Trump administration who is nowa senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). “But I think it’s pretty clear that the sanctions have had an impact on the Iranian economy and on the government budget.”

The International Monetary Fund sees Iran’s gross domestic product growing 3% in 2021.

The sanctions lowered Iran’s ability to sell oil and prevented them from repatriating money from energy sales, Abrams said.

“There are billions of dollars sitting in banks in Iraq and China and South Korea … that Iran cannot get its hands on due to the sanctions,” he said.

According to IMF estimates, the Islamic Republic’s oil exports are expected to continue falling in 2021.

Exports and imports both fell sharply after the sanctions were reimposed. Besides oil, Iran’s industrial metals, a large source of the country’s export revenue, were also sanctioned.

IMF estimates suggest Iran fell into a trade deficit of $3.45 billion in 2020. The country had a trade surplus of $6.11 billion in 2019, according to the IMF.

The Iranian currency has dropped steadily since early 2018, but Matthew Bey, a senior global analyst at Stratfor, said the rial has “somewhat stabilized.”

Still, its value on the unofficial market stands at more than 250,000 rials per dollar — that’s far from the central bank’s official rate of 42,000 rials per dollar that’s used for most imported goods.

A weaker currency makes imports more expensive for locals, and high inflation means the cost of living is rising at a time when the people are already struggling with a weak economy and job market.

High unemployment rates are set to increase even further given Iran’s economic struggles.

An estimated 12.4% of the population is expected to be out of work in 2021, according to IMF projections.

Iran’s government is spending beyond its means, and has seen a widening fiscal deficit. While this is not always a bad thing, it could restrict the country’s ability to improve economic activity and recover from the coronavirus pandemic.

## aff

### at: korea qpq

#### Korea’s rejected it, even if process-based.

Stangarone ’21 [Troy; Senior Director and Fellow, Korea Economics Institute. “Removing Sanctions on North Korea: Challenges and Potential Pathways.” Special Report, Number 504.] TDI

The second pathway would maintain sanctions until North Korea completely or significantly dismantled its weapons programs. However, North Korea has consistently rejected giving up its nuclear program without receiving reciprocal benefits simultaneously.

The third pathway would consist of an incremental exchange of sanctions relief and denuclearization measures as part of a comprehensive roadmap. Under this approach, the negotiators would develop a detailed plan that specified which parts of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs would be dismantled, the timelines for dismantlement, and what UN sanctions relief or additional economic incentives North Korea would receive in return. The main advantage of a roadmap is that both sides would agree from the outset on the ultimate destination of the process, what the various dismantlement steps and sanctions relief measures would be, when they would take place, and what sort of remedial measures would be adopted if either side did not live up to its obligations. The downside of this approach, however, is that North Korea has generally rejected the idea of developing a comprehensive, detailed roadmap, and an all-or-nothing approach can foreclose the potential for limited but tangible progress.

### at: china counterplan

#### China won’t cooperate on Korea.

Rubin ’22 [Michael; Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute, former Pentagon official, Ph.D. & M.A. in History, Yale University. “History Proves China Will Never Help Biden on North Korea.” https://www.aei.org/op-eds/history-proves-china-will-never-help-biden-on-north-korea%EF%BF%BC/] TDI

Biden may believe he knows Xi and can work with the Chinese leader, but history matters. Xi looks down on democrats. Whether Democrats or Republicans hold the White House, he believes he can cheat with impunity. Not only does pride mean no U.S. president and ~~his~~ national security team would admit their own naiveté, but litigating deceit would extend past the end of the U.S. president’s term, at which point it would be Groundhog Day as the new president tried to reset relations with a blank slate.

And, while some surrounding Biden may try to draw a redline, here too precedent matters. China sees the U.S. abandonment of Afghanistan and Biden’s talk of ending “forever wars” as a sign the United States no longer has the stamina to run a 100-day marathon let alone a 100-year one. That Biden subsequently entertained ending the Korean War, a move that would mean the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula, undercuts any effort by Biden to puff his chest out now.

For the past two years, Xi has played Biden like a fiddle. Xi’s team, meanwhile, views Biden’s team as incompetent naïfs. If Biden is to break that dynamic, it is time to speak softly, treat Xi with the disdain he deserves, and show through the Pentagon budget, unabashed support for Taiwan, and prolonged Carrier Strike Group deployments toward the Korean Peninsula and Japan that the United States means business.

### korea nuclear testing defense

#### Testing is defensive theatrics, not precursor to war.

Lewis ’24 [James; Senior Vice President, CSIS. “Is Kim Jong-un Crazy? Why North Korea Won't Start a War.” https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/kim-jong-un-crazy-why-north-korea-wont-start-war-208959]

Is North Korea's Kim Jong-un Crazy? The short answer is no, he’s not crazy, and while he may engage in all sorts of theatrics, he won’t start a war. Even suggesting this is silly.

North Korea's decision to reject reunification does not open “a perilous new era,” as some would have it. Kim’s efforts to build nuclear weapons and long-range missiles are intended to prevent war, to prevent the U.S. from invading or attacking North Korea, not to win one. Before saying “we would never do that,” look at American interventions through Kim’s eyes (and the perspective he shares with Russia, Iran, and China) and consider Iraq in 2003. For dictators, the U.S. is a rogue state, unwilling to accept a status quo they prefer. Kim wants to prevent invasion and protect family rule, and starting a war does not do that.

### no reunification

#### No Korea reunification.

Kim ’24 [Jeongmin; Lead Correspondent, NK News, Editorial Director, KOREA PRO. “Why North Korea declared unification ‘impossible,’ abandoning decades-old goal.” https://www.nknews.org/2024/01/why-north-korea-declared-unification-impossible-abandoning-decades-old-goal/] TDI

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ended 2023 with a milestone announcement that his party has concluded reunification is realistically “impossible” and that the two Koreas are separate “belligerent states” at war.

Experts told NK News that this is the first time Pyongyang has explicitly dropped unification as a goal of its inter-Korean policy in decades, and they described Kim’s call for the military to prepare to “subjugate” South Korea as fundamentally different from past threats — defining the ROK as a foreign nation to conquer, not a compatriot to win over.

While it has been a trend for the DPRK to talk about South Korea as a separate entity in the past year, Kim Jong Un’s pronouncement still marks a significant change and consolidates this tendency as an official party line, experts said.

#### It’s culturally infeasible.

Mueller ’20 [John; Political science department & senior research scientist, Mershon Center for International Security Studies, Ohio State University; Visiting fellow, Brookings Institution, Hoover Institution and Norwegian Nobel Institute. "Nuclear Anti‐​Proliferation Policy and the Korea Conundrum: Some Policy Proposals." https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/nuclear-anti-proliferation-policy-korea-conundrum-some-policy] TDI

This does not mean that unification is in the offing. The economic and cultural divergence of the two Koreas over the last seven decades has been extensive, and the notion that they could or should be unified any time soon is at best romantic and at worst dangerous. The unification of the two Germanys was a remarkably difficult and costly process even though those two countries were far less different from each other than the two Koreas have grown to be. A better model might be found in the peaceful and mutually advantageous coexistence of Germany and Austria — two separate countries that share a common language, history, and cultural heritage. It is very sensible for South Korea to expand economic and social contacts with North Korea, and to seek family reunifications. But a conscious drive for unification in the near future would be unwise for the South and threatening to the North.

### taiwan defense

#### No Taiwan invasion.

von Sydow ’24 [Alexis; MA, Analyst, China, Swedish National China Centre. "Most Experts Agree: China Isn’t About to Invade Taiwan." https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/most-experts-agree-china-isnt-about-to-invade-taiwan/] TDI

These are the takeaways from available forecasts, and they stand in stark contrast to alarmist predictions from the U.S. military and other actors. They suggest that alarmist narratives are arrived at by looking at the growing risk of war in isolation, without consideration of its general low baseline probability. Alarmists also tend to heavily exaggerate the degree of internal change caused by Xi Jinping, which is a factor that appears doubtful when aggregating forecasts.

Moreover, even though available forecasts rate the risk of war as low, they might still be overestimating it. This is because all these forecasts are found in works that study military issues and political attitudes. But other things matter, too. Taiwan’s crucial role in the semiconductor industry is well known, and destroying these supply chains would cost the world economy trillions of dollars per year. On top of this comes the effects of the economic warfare that almost certainly would result if China attacked Taiwan. Most estimates conclude that such consequences would hit China even harder than the West. It is hard to imagine that China does not realize this or refuses to take it into account when weighing the possibility of using force. This should further subtract from the generally low level of risk estimated by the forecasts we have reviewed.

### at: iran qpq

#### Sanctions offer no leverage in negotiations.

Salehi-Isfahani ’22 [Djavad; professor of economics at Virginia Tech. He is a research affiliate of the Middle East Initiative at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “No, Iranians aren't negotiating from a weak economic position.” https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/08/30/no-iranians-arent-negotiating-from-a-weak-economic-position/]

Critics of the Biden administration’s attempt at a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear crisis is based on this simple argument — that Iran’s economy is sinking, so Washington should wait for a weaker Iran to offer more concessions.

This type of thinking prompted former President Donald Trump to exit the nuclear deal in 2018, expecting a quick collapse of Iran’s economy, with Iranian leaders either gone or willing to submit to U.S. demands in return for sanctions relief. The fact that three years later this has not happened and Iran is much closer to a nuclear breakout suggests deep flaws in this type of thinking.

Last year, Iran’s economy grew by 4.3 percent, and both IMF and the World Bank forecast growth of about 3 percent per year in coming years. Since 2012, under sanctions the non-oil GDP, which accounts for most of what Iran’s workforce produces, grew at 2.9 percent per year.

### iran prolif defense

#### No Iran prolif.

Einhorn ’23 [Robert; Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology; Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative; B.A. in Government, Cornell University; M.A. in Public Affairs and International Relations, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University. “Will Putin’s invasion spur nuclear proliferation?” https://www.brookings.edu/articles/will-putins-invasion-spur-nuclear-proliferation/] TDI

Iran is the country most likely to become the 10th nuclear-armed state. A return to the JCPOA is now hard to imagine. Iran is steadily increasing its enrichment capacity and reducing its breakout time to a matter of days. Still, a nuclear-armed Iran is not inevitable.

Tehran may decide to settle for a threshold nuclear capability — accumulating substantial stocks of weapons-grade uranium but stopping short of breaking out and using that material to fabricate nuclear weapons. It might settle for a threshold capability if it judged that its current, asymmetric conventional military strategy was succeeding.

It might also do so if it believed that having the option to acquire nuclear weapons relatively quickly would bring strategic benefits without running the risks associated with attempting to build nuclear weapons, including the possibility of a military attack against its nuclear facilities. In 2005, former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani made the case for a threshold capability: “As long as we can enrich uranium,” he said, “we don’t need anything else. Our neighbors will be able to draw the proper conclusions.”

Alternatively, as many observers believe, Iran may not be content with a threshold capability and may decide instead to run the risks of attempting to build nuclear weapons. It might calculate that Russia and China would shield it from tough economic penalties and that domestic Israeli difficulties or U.S.-Israeli frictions would reduce the probability of coordinated military strikes.

For the time being, however, I think Iran will opt for the more cautious approach: continuing to produce a large inventory of near weapons-grade uranium; stopping short of leaving the NPT and building nuclear weapons; and preserving the option to break out at a future time of its choosing.

### sanctions don’t solve terror

#### Sanctions are useless for counterterror.

Donovan et al. ’23 [Kimberly; Director, Economic Statecraft Initiative. Maia Nikolazde; Assistant Director, Economic Statecraft Initiative. Ryan Murphy; Project Assistant, Economic Statecraft Initiative. “Global Sanctions Dashboard: How Iran evades sanctions and finances terrorist organizations like Hamas.” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/global-sanctions-dashboard-how-iran-evades-sanctions-and-finances-terrorist-organizations-like-hamas/] TDI

Iran has managed to advance Hamas’s goals in Israel, and Russia’s in Ukraine, while being designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, designated across multiple jurisdictions and by the United Nations (UN) for a range of issues including, but not limited to, terrorism, proliferation, cybercrime, and human rights abuses. It has also been identified as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern by the United States and has been effectively shut off from the global banking system under the powerful Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT ACT. How does Iran manage to facilitate cross-border transactions and receive payments for oil exports despite being heavily sanctioned? Who is involved in Iran’s evasion network? Finding answers to these questions will be key in truly degrading Iran’s financial capabilities for bolstering state and non-state threat actors who wage wars and spread instability in the Middle East and beyond.

United Arab Emirates: Global financial hub or global evasion hub?

As a countermeasure to US, Western, and UN sanctions, the Iranian regime has set up an illicit global network of shell companies, banks, and exchange houses that facilitate transactions on its behalf. This shadow network has been a target of the Treasury Department’s recent tranche of designations of facilitators of Iran sanctions evasion. A significant number of entities in Iran’s now-sanctioned “shadow banking network” are based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), one of the world’s leading financial hubs. UAE-based foreign exchange houses have enabled sanctioned Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industry Commercial Co. (PGPICC) to facilitate sales of billions of dollars worth of petrochemicals from Iranian petrochemical companies to foreign buyers. Dubai-based front companies have also processed payments from foreign customers to PGPICC, all while hiding PGPICC’s involvement in these transactions.

The UAE has become a haven for evasion for sanctioned Russians as well. The US Treasury recently took action against several Russia-based financial services companies that have been laundering Russian money through the UAE financial system. For example, Huriya, a now-sanctioned Russia-based private equity company, moved Russian assets into UAE institutions where they would not be sanctioned right after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began.

The UAE’s favorable, low-tax business environment, vibrant gold trade, and strategic location attract investors from around the world. Unfortunately, the UAE also attracts nefarious Iranian, Russian, and other actors who are taking advantage of loopholes in its financial system to evade sanctions. Western sanctioning authorities are running out of patience with the UAE and are pushing for the Emirati government to implement more robust controls and enforcement mechanisms. Earlier in March, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international coordinating body combating money laundering, gray-listed the UAE. This listing requires UAE financial institutions to enhance their anti-money-laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CFT) regulatory regimes, and also warns non-UAE financial institutions to increase scrutiny of their transactions with the UAE. Given its aspirations of becoming a global financial hub next to New York and London (which would be challenging as a gray-listed country), the UAE took action on FATF’s recommendations, after which FATF improved the UAE’s rating but still left the country in the gray list.

The UAE is a valuable trading partner of the United States and a major financial hub of the Middle East and the world. The country has so far maintained a multi-vector foreign policy, one that enables the UAE to keep business ties with both the sanctioning and sanctioned parties. However, with the United States and European Union desperate to enforce sanctions to ensure that Iran-supplied Russia doesn’t outgun Ukraine on the battlefield and Iran is not able to fund its network of proxies and terrorist groups, neutrality on sanctions enforcement is not an option: Either the UAE stands with its Western partners and enforces sanctions, or it undermines Western sanctions, which will have implications for the UAE’s status as a global financial hub.

Western allies have so far refrained from sanctioning large financial institutions based in the UAE. However, if the UAE turns into a global evasion hub, Western allies will have no other option but to start sanctioning the UAE, however painful and undesirable that might be. Western allies have demonstrated a shared understanding and strong will in countering sanctions evasion, and have already set up channels for coordinating the sanctions designation process against Russia. Such channels can be leveraged to counter Iran’s evasion efforts. To this point, US Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo is traveling to Europe this week to work with European counterparts on degrading Hamas’s ability to raise and move money.

### terror defense

#### No existential terror.

Fettweis ’19 [Christopher; Associate professor of political science, Tulane University, Ph.D., University of Maryland-College Park. “Pessimism and Nostalgia in the Second Nuclear Age.”; *Strategic Studies* *Quarterly*, Volume 13, Issue 1.] TDI

Finally, despite the string of bleak and terrifying projections from a variety of experts, nuclear weapons have remained well beyond the capabilities of the modern apocalyptic terrorist. The great fear of the SNA literature, that scientific knowledge and technology would gradually become more accessible to nonstate actors, has remained only a dream. Nor does there appear to be a great reservoir of fissile material in the world’s various black markets waiting to be weaponized.58

Just because something has not yet occurred does not mean that it cannot or will not occur eventually. However, it is worth noting that the world has not experienced any close calls regarding nuclear terrorism. Forecasting future unique events is a necessarily dicey enterprise, but one way to improve accuracy is to examine events that have already or almost happened. Given the many complexities involved with nuclear weapons, especially for amateurs as any terrorists would almost certainly be, it is not unreasonable to expect a few failures, or near misses, to precede success. While it is possible that we might not know about all the plots disrupted by international law enforcement, keeping the lid on nuclear near misses would presumably be no small task. As of this writing, the public is aware of no serious attempts to construct, steal, or purchase nuclear weapons, much less smuggle and detonate one. “Leakage” does not seem to be a problem, yet.59

The uniformly pessimistic projections about the second nuclear era have not, at least thus far, been borne out by events. Post–Cold War trends have instead been generally moving in directions opposite to these expectations, with fewer nuclear weapons in the hands of the same number of countries and none pursuing more. Why, then, does nuclear pessimism persist? What are the roots of the current fashionable unwillingness—or even inability—to detect positive patterns in nuclear security?