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### 1NC - Uniqueness

#### Harris wins now

Butts 24 [Dylan, Reporter, “Trump faces a tighter race with Kamala Harris set to replace Biden, experts say” CNBC, 7-18-2024. https://www.cnbc.com/2024/07/22/trump-faces-a-tighter-race-with-kamala-harris-set-to-replace-biden.html] TDI

President Joe Biden’s endorsement of Vice President Kamala Harris as the Democratic nominee for president has set the stage for a much tighter and uncertain race in November, according to some experts

Biden stepped down from the race Sunday as top Democrats pressured him to drop out following a disastrous debate performance and as Republican nominee Donald Trump was leading in the polls.

The Democrats had been headed for a “landslide defeat” in November, but now, they stand a chance, said Ian Bremmer, founder and president of Eurasia Group.

“They’ve turned [this race] around, and President Biden has given the Democrats a fighting chance,” he told CNBC’s “Squawk Box Asia” on Monday.

Harris now finds herself on a glide path to the Democratic nomination, though she will still need to win a majority of delegates ahead of the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August.

While some other contenders might throw their hat into the race, “it is very clear that Kamala Harris is the prohibitive favorite to become the nominee,” Bremmer said.

If Harris wins the nomination, she would offer the Democrats a “total reset,” Steven Okun, senior advisor at McLarty Associates, said on CNBC’s “Street Signs Asia.”

“If the Democrats can be unified, come out of this convention, speaking with one voice, energized, excited, then they have a good chance to win in November,” he said.

Allan Lichtman, a presidential historian who has correctly predicted the winner of every presidential election since 1984, told CNBC’s “Capital Connection” that Harris would be in a “strong position to win the upcoming election” in a matchup with Trump.

He will wait until the Democratic convention to make his official prediction.

Harris said in a post on social media platform X that she was looking to work to “earn and win” the nomination while uniting Democrats.

How Harris helps Democrats

According to experts who spoke to CNBC, Harris comes with a number of advantages in comparison to her former running mate.

While Republicans have been gaining ground on the economy, inflation and immigration fronts, abortion is a salient issue where she will have an edge, Okun said. Harris has been outspoken on reproductive issues as the first woman vice president.

“The fact is that Biden and Trump are too old to be running and serving for another four years, and this is now the top vulnerability for Trump,” said Eurasia’s Bremmer.

A recent poll showed that some 85% of the population believed Biden was too old to serve another four years. The same poll found that 60% of Americans thought Trump was too old.

“You see a lot of enthusiasm for Harris, a younger, more vibrant, more energetic former prosecutor that could certainly perform extremely well on the debate stage,” Bremmer added.

Bremmer pointed out that Harris also has some weaknesses. She “isn’t super likable as a retail politician. ... That’s been a vulnerability for her.”  There are also some risks associated with running as a woman — a daughter of an Indian mother and Jamaican father — in today’s America, he added.

On the other hand, she may be better positioned than Biden to drive out certain key demographics, including “women, young people and black voters, Charles Myers, founder and CEO of Signum Global, said on “Squawk Box Asia.”

“It’s a whole new race. There’s a new candidate with an enormous amount of unity and enthusiasm behind her,” he said.

Greater uncertainty for markets

Markets had increasingly been pricing in a Trump victory, with his presidency expected to bring tax cuts and a stronger tariff policy.

However, according to Myers, the race has been thrown into “complete disarray” with Harris set to give Trump a “real run for his money.”

“I’d be very wary and a bit cautious on assuming that Trump is just going to sail to victory,” Myers said, adding that the names and asset classes associated with a Trump win could be perceived as having short-term risk.

Trump has said Harris would be easier to defeat compared with Biden.

By the Democratic convention, Harris would have picked a running mate and likely wrapped up the nomination, at which point the momentum could see her pull ahead in the polls, Myers said.

According to Okun, two likely front-runners for Harris’ running mate are Gov. Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania and Sen. Mark Kelly of Arizona, as they come from key swing states and are seen as more moderate.

###  1NC – Link - Iran

####  Americans support the use of sanctions to stop Iran’s potential proliferation.

**Smeltz and Sullivan 22** [(Dina and Emily, "Americans Support Sanctions on Iran", The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, <https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/2022/americans-support-us-return-iran-nuclear-deal>, 9-9-2022] TDI

In the event of Iran developing nuclear weapons, the US public wants to tighten economic sanctions, and most support a return to the JCPOA.

Negotiations between Iran and the United States to return to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement—in which Iran agreed to significant restrictions on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief—have continued in fits and starts for 17 months. While hurdles in the process still remain, Iran recently dropped two nonstarters for the United States from their original position, potentially paving the way toward a new agreement. Despite their decreased sense of concern about Iran’s nuclear program, the American public is still willing to take significant steps to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapon, though a majority reject using military options.



"bar chart showing partisan splits on iran policy preferences"

Key Findings

If Tehran restarts development of a nuclear weapon, majorities of Americans would support tightening US economic and diplomatic sanctions (79%) and conducting cyberattacks (64%).

A majority reject using force to stop Iran’s nuclear development, although the percentages saying they would support air strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities (46%) and the use of US troops (38%) are significant.

Six in 10 (59%)—including 73 percent of Democrats, 61 percent of Independents and 41 percent of Republicans—would support returning to the deal rather than staying out and risking Iran developing a nuclear weapon.

Just over half of Americans consider Iran’s nuclear program a critical threat to the United States (53%).’

#### The Plan is Clumsy Foreign Policy—Voters want Sanctions on Iran as Deterrence

Pew Research, 6-11-2013, "Global Views of Iran Overwhelmingly Negative", Pew Research Center, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2013/06/11/global-views-of-iran-overwhelmingly-negative/>] TDI

International opinion is clearly against Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Majorities in most countries where the question was asked say they oppose a nuclear-armed Iran, including at least six-in-ten in each of the E3+3 countries: Germany (96%), France (94%), U.S. (93%), Britain (89%), Russia (75%) and China (62%).

In the Middle East and North Africa, Israelis are the most vocal opponents of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons (96% opposed). But they are not the only concerned public in the region. Strong majorities in Jordan (79%), Egypt (73%), Turkey (69%) and Lebanon (59%) also oppose Iran developing a nuclear arsenal. By comparison, opinion is divided in Tunisia (40% favor, 47% oppose), while Palestinians are the only public surveyed where as many as half (51%) support Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons.

Attitudes in most E3+3 countries have changed little since last year except in China where the public is more opposed to a nuclear-armed Iran than in 2012 (62% vs. 54%).

Publics differ when it comes to the use of economic sanctions to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear arms. Roughly three-quarters or more of those who oppose Iran’s nuclear program in the U.S. (78%), Germany (77%), Britain (75%) and France (73%) approve of tougher economic sanctions to deter Iran from developing nuclear weapons. But only 47% share this view in Russia, while the Chinese are divided on the question (44% favor; 47% oppose).

Among Iran’s regional neighbors, there is a similar lack of consensus about strengthening the economic sanctions aimed at Tehran. Solid majorities of those who oppose the Iranian nuclear program in Israel (91%), Egypt (61%), Jordan (74%) and Lebanon (77%) favor a tougher sanctions regime as a means of reigning in Iran’s nuclear ambitions. But majorities in Turkey (66%) and the Palestinian territories (55%) oppose such a strategy. Opinion in Tunisia is divided – 42% favor, while 48% oppose tougher sanctions.

Iran 07

There is deeper disagreement about possible military action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. On this question, there are even different levels of support among the U.S. and its western European allies. Among opponents of Iran’s nuclear program, about two-thirds (64%) in the U.S. and 58% in France would support military action if necessary, but only 50% in Germany and 48% in Britain say the same. Just 28% in Russia and 35% in China back a military option.

Among those who do not want to see a nuclear armed Iran in the Middle East and North Africa, solid majorities in Israel (68%) and Jordan (59%) say it is important to keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons even if it means military action. A plurality holds this view in Lebanon (49%) and Egypt (46%). However, such an option is opposed by 61% in Tunisia, 56% in Turkey, and 46% in the Palestinian territories.

### 1NC – Link – Noko

#### Voters Strongly Prefer Sanctions over Negotiations with North Korea

Pew Research 17, 4-5-2017, "Americans hold very negative views of North Korea amid nuclear tensions", Pew Research Center, <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2017/04/05/americans-hold-very-negative-views-of-north-korea-amid-nuclear-tensions/> TDI

Americans have uniformly negative views of North Korea and its nuclear ambitions – a subject likely to be high on the agenda when President Donald Trump meets in Florida this week with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Roughly two-thirds of Americans (65%) are very concerned about North Korea having nuclear weapons. And 64% say that in the event of a serious conflict, the United States should use military force to defend its Asian allies, such as Japan, South Korea or the Philippines, against the Pyongyang regime, according to a new Pew Research Center survey. A further 61% think sanctions, rather than attempts at closer ties, are the best way to deal with the nuclear threat posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Overall, 78% of Americans have an unfavorable view of the communist nation ruled by Kim Jong Un, with 61% holding a very unfavorable opinion. Negative attitudes toward North Korea are shared across demographic groups, though more college-educated Americans hold negative views (91%) than do Americans with a high school education or less (69%). Unlike public opinion on other aspects of U.S. foreign policy, there are no significant partisan divides on attitudes toward North Korea.

However, when it comes to concerns about North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, there is a slight partisan difference. Roughly three-quarters of Republicans (74%) are very concerned about the weapons program, compared with 66% of Democrats. There is a larger division by age on concern about the North’s nukes. Nearly eight-in-ten Americans ages 50 and older (78%) say they are very concerned about North Korea having nuclear weapons, compared with only 42% of 18- to 29-year-olds.

On the question of defending U.S. allies in Asia in the event of an attack by North Korea, 64% of Americans say the U.S. should use force to defend its allies, while only three-in-ten say the U.S. should not. Republicans are more likely than Democrats (70% vs. 61%) to favor using force if there were an attack, which is required by treaties signed with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.

Men (73%) are also more likely than women (56%) to say the U.S. should defend Asian allies in this hypothetical situation, and college-educated Americans are more willing to use force (74%) than are those with a high school education or less (59%).

When given an option between increasing economic sanctions against Kim Jong Un’s authoritarian regime to deal with its nuclear program or deepening ties with North Korea, 61% of Americans prefer increasing the already-severe sanctions that are in place. Only 28% say they want to deal with the nuclear issue by engaging more and deepening ties with the country. Republicans (70%) are keener on sanctions than Democrats (61%), as are older Americans (69%) compared with young people (49%).

#### US-NoKo relations are a key issue for voters, a top priority is enforcing sanctions-strength and confidence must be displayed

**Yeo and Foreman 24’** [(Andrew and Hanna, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Asia Policy Studies, SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies and Senior Research Assistant - Center for Asia Policy Studies) “Why North Korea matters for the 2024 US election”, Brookings, 7-8-24, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-north-korea-matters-for-the-2024-us-election/>] TDI

Although U.S.-China competition, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and conflict in the Middle East loom large as top foreign policy issues in the upcoming 2024 U.S. elections, presidential candidates Joe Biden and Donald Trump will need to address escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula and U.S.-North Korea relations. Since the collapse of the Hanoi Summit in February 2019, North Korea has adopted a more offensive nuclear doctrine, advanced its missile and satellite technology, improved its cyber capabilities, and strengthened political ties with Russia and China. However, the expected rematch between Biden and Trump in 2024 presents a stark contrast in how the two candidates might address North Korea and its nuclear program in a second term. Both candidates want to project strength and confidence. However, when examining their records, the two leaders diverge in their respective approaches to North Korea. Trump prefers a top-down style, interacting with leaders one-on-one. Meanwhile, Biden coordinates closely with allies and partners, taking cues from the working-level in a bottom-up fashion. Pyongyang’s unwillingness to relinquish its nuclear weapons limits the range of policies available to the United States but also forces the next administration to be flexible and disciplined when approaching the North Korea problem. As November approaches, both candidates should consider building a wider coalition of partners willing to monitor North Korea’s illicit activity and sanctions evasion; seek common ground with Beijing in reorienting Pyongyang to the negotiating table; and consistently advocate for North Korean human rights. North Korea and the 2024 U.S. election Three decades of U.S.-North Korea nuclear diplomacy have left U.S. officials skeptical of any nuclear deal with North Korea. Meanwhile, the North Korea conundrum has only worsened in the absence of diplomacy between Washington and Pyongyang since 2019. In addition to conducting 106 missile launches since 2022, North Korea’s partnerships with China and Russia have enabled Kim Jong Un’s regime to skirt U.N. sanctions, transfer and receive critical technologies, and provide opportunities to test North Korean weapons on the Ukrainian battlefield. The Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed during the June 2024 Kim-Putin summit further demonstrates North Korea’s intent to expand military-technical cooperation and undermine U.S. influence. Although North Korean issues remain lower on the list of U.S. foreign policy priorities considering two wars and competition with China, the newfound Russia-North Korea alliance illustrates how the brewing crisis on the Korean Peninsula relates to wider geopolitical contestation. Trump may be more inclined to engage with Kim given their past rapport. However, high-stakes diplomacy with North Korea would be ill-advised if engagement is pursued at the cost of undermining regional alliance cohesion and deterrence. For Biden, the impasse in North Korean denuclearization may lead his administration to draw greater attention to linkages between North Korea and other adversaries, including Russia, China, and Iran. But doing so would not necessarily improve an already worsening security environment in Northeast Asia without some path to dialogue with North Korea. On North Korea issues, the top priority for the next U.S. administration is halting, if not reversing, progress in the regime’s nuclear and weapons programs. An early task for the next U.S. administration is to rebuild a coalition of partners willing to monitor North Korea’s illicit activity, enforce a weakened sanctions regime, and counter North Korean cyberactivity following Russia’s veto of the resolution renewing the U.N. Panel of Experts’ mandate to investigate such activities. Although Republicans and Democrats remain critical of China, the next administration should also seek cooperation with Beijing to support peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, particularly in light of strengthened North Korea-Russia ties. Finally, Trump or Biden must consistently advocate for North Korean human rights, including enhancing North Koreans’ access to information. Although the Kim regime remains resilient for now, its legitimacy could be challenged down the road by disgruntled elites in the wake of internal or external challenges, particularly if Kim’s health deteriorates and succession plans for the fourth generation of Kim rule are unclear or contested. A few points bear in mind as American voters consider how Trump and Biden might address a deteriorating security situation on the Korean Peninsula. First, Trump may raise the issue of North Korea on the campaign trail given his previous engagement with Kim during two high-profile summits in Singapore in June 2018 and Hanoi in February 2019, respectively. Despite the absence of a deal, Trump may tout his own ability to bring Kim to the diplomatic table and (misleadingly) criticize Biden for not only failing to hold a single dialogue with North Korea but also enabling the regime to dramatically ratchet up provocations on Biden’s watch. Second, Biden can point to his administration’s ability to closely coordinate policy with U.S. allies to ensure that deterrence is maintained on the peninsula despite North Korea’s escalatory actions. Biden may also cast blame on Trump for naively and prematurely pursuing two high-level summits with Kim and weakening military readiness and deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. Third, regardless of whether either candidate includes North Korea in their campaign talking points, Kim may insert himself into the conversation by escalating tensions prior to the U.S. elections if he believes such actions offer an advantage to Trump, his preferred candidate. In addition to his past rapport with Kim, Trump is more willing to break with diplomatic orthodoxy. By stirring up trouble, Pyongyang could help set the table for an incoming Trump administration to return to the negotiating table and reduce tensions in return for concessions sought by Kim (and previously suggested by Trump), such as the reduction of U.S. troops or the suspension of joint military exercises with South Korea, which in turn would create a rift in the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Assessing Trump’s past approach to North Korea As a candidate in 2016, Trump expressed an interest in meeting Kim to discuss North Korea’s nuclear program. While this was a major shift in U.S. thinking on North Korea, the desire for a new approach was not unwarranted at the time given the lack of progress from past efforts, including the Agreed Framework, the Six-Party Talks, and strategic patience. However, North Korea conducted two nuclear tests in 2016 and continued to exacerbate tensions on the global stage as Trump entered the White House in 2017. This included the release of imprisoned American student Otto Warmbier in a comatose state, the murder of Kim’s half-brother Kim Jong Nam in Malaysia, the successful testing of the first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the U.S. mainland, a sixth nuclear test, and multiple short- and medium-range missile launches. Amid these human rights abuses, the administration spotlighted human rights in North Korea by inviting Warmbier’s parents and a North Korean defector during Trump’s first State of the Union Address. On the nuclear front, Trump threatened “fire and fury like the world has never seen,” while Pyongyang warned it was considering striking Guam. The use of bombastic language by both sides increased fears of a nuclear war but also forced rare unity in the United Nations Security Council when China and Russia supported tougher new sanctions on North Korea. Meanwhile, South Korea elected President Moon Jae-in, a progressive, who advocated for unconditional engagement and dialogue with Pyongyang, a departure from a decade of hardline conservative policy toward North Korea. Throughout the last half of 2017, Moon’s diplomatic outreach attempts to North Korea were largely ignored. During his annual New Year’s address in 2018, Kim signaled an openness to dialogue, capping off a foray into global diplomacy first with Beijing and then Seoul. With inter-Korean relations steadily improving, Kim took diplomacy a step further by expressing a willingness to relinquish his nuclear weapons if Washington committed to a formal end to the Korean War and promised to not attack the North. Given Moon’s desire for continued inter-Korean engagement, Moon positioned himself to bring Trump and Kim to the negotiating table. Officials in the Trump administration continued to advocate for close coordination with U.S. allies to prevent Pyongyang from dividing the U.S.-South Korea alliance. However, Trump was eager to negotiate directly with Kim. On June 12, 2018, Trump became the first sitting U.S. president to meet a North Korean leader at the Singapore summit during which Pyongyang committed to the “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” without a detailed timeline and Washington pledged to “provide security guarantees.” Most notably, these guarantees included suspending joint military exercises with South Korea, which Trump claimed were provocative and a waste of money and time. This decision appeased North Korean hardliners but left some U.S. officials as well as Seoul and Tokyo in the lurch, bracing for future abrupt policy reversals and jeopardizing military readiness. Between South Korea and Japan, Seoul had the most to lose from this suspension as Trump officials “deliberately excluded” Moon amid concerns he was “too willing to make concessions to North Korea.” In the aftermath of the Singapore summit, Trump was increasingly eager to make progress on North Korea before the 2018 midterm elections, but he believed that Moon was prioritizing unification and engagement over denuclearization. Progress on working-level negotiations continued to stall as North Korean officials threatened to remove denuclearization from the agenda. Amid the deadlock between U.S. and North Korean officials, Trump increased trade pressure on China to push Beijing to encourage Pyongyang to cooperate during negotiations. In a last-ditch effort to salvage hopes for denuclearization, Trump and Kim met in Hanoi for a second summit hoping for a diplomatic breakthrough. According to then-National Security Advisor John Bolton, despite Trump’s desire to strike a deal, White House officials framed the second summit as “not make-or-break” and repeated the “if we walk, it’s okay” mantra to lower the stakes during briefings. Rather than settling for a bad deal, Trump abruptly walked away from the summit with no joint agreement, leaving the peninsula’s status quo intact. An impromptu encounter between Kim and Trump on the North Korean side of the demilitarized zone in June 2019 suggested the possibility of resuming talks at a future date. Yet, Pyongyang resumed missile testing in the summer and fall of 2019 after a year of no missile launches in 2018, as shown in Figure 1. (image removed) Nevertheless, working-level negotiations between U.S. and North Korean officials ensued in October 2019 in Stockholm. However, the talks collapsed within hours over disagreements on how to dismantle Pyongyang’s nuclear program. As the COVID-19 pandemic began spreading around the world in 2020, North Korea closed its borders in January 2020 and retreated into isolation, evidently disinterested in engaging with the West or Seoul. Biden’s approach to North Korea During the 2020 presidential campaign, Biden criticized Trump’s “special friendship” with Kim and called Kim a “thug” during the second presidential debate. He slammed Trump for emboldening autocrats and raising the prospect of nuclear proliferation. As a candidate, Biden pledged to begin a “sustained, coordinated campaign with our allies and others—including China” to denuclearize North Korea. Upon entering office, the Biden administration conducted a North Korea policy review and consulted with experts and officials from past administrations. Acknowledging past failures, the Biden administration stated that it would not seek any “grand bargain” as Trump did, nor would it follow the Obama-era policy of “strategic patience.” Rather, the Biden administration would pursue a “calibrated and practical approach” that would remain open to diplomacy with North Korea while making “practical progress [to] increase security in the United States—for the United States and our allies.” As one U.S. official at the time shared with the Washington Post, “If the Trump administration was everything for everything, Obama was nothing for nothing … this is something in the middle.” Although Biden officials provided few details on the administration’s North Korea policy, Washington did appear intent on reaching out to Pyongyang, most notably by offering U.S.-produced COVID-19 vaccines and other forms of medical and humanitarian assistance. Moreover, then-U.S. Special Representative to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Ambassador Sung Kim and other top administration officials repeatedly offered to meet with North Korea “anywhere, anytime, without preconditions” to discuss denuclearization or other issues. Despite the Biden administration’s early efforts to engage with Pyongyang on the humanitarian and diplomatic front, the Kim regime ignored U.S. overtures. Amidst a strict pandemic border lockdown, Pyongyang’s decision to self-isolate from the world exacerbated a chronic food insecurity crisis and unease over North Korea’s ability to contain a COVID-19 outbreak. Notwithstanding increased concerns over North Korea’s human rights situation, the Biden administration took nearly two years to nominate and confirm Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues Julie Turner, the first envoy in six years. Since then, Turner has reiterated support for dialogue with Pyongyang but has also elevated issues, such as returning abductees and family separation. On the nuclear front, tensions on the Korean Peninsula dramatically escalated throughout 2022 with a record number of ballistic missile tests conducted that year (see Figure 1). North Korea also rapidly expanded its weapons capabilities, including powerful solid-fuel ICBMs, hypersonic missiles, reconnaissance satellites, submarines, and an underwater nuclear weapons system. To counter these concerning developments, the Biden administration reinvigorated alliances with Japan and South Korea, while also expanding trilateral coordination with Tokyo and Seoul on North Korean provocations. In the absence of negotiations, Washington focused on strengthening its defense and deterrence capabilities. This included increasing joint military exercises and information sharing on North Korean missile launches with Seoul and Tokyo, deploying nuclear strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula, and establishing a nuclear consultative group with South Korea. Although the Biden administration has made significant strides in strengthening alliances and improving defense and deterrence capabilities, it has not found a clear solution to decrease tensions between the United States and North Korea, and on the Korean Peninsula at large. Pyongyang’s refusal to respond to Washington and the absence of any inter-Korea or U.S.-North Korea dialogue has further militarized the peninsula and contributed to an arms race in Northeast Asia. Nevertheless, U.S. officials continue to emphasize the need to denuclearize North Korea and outline “interim steps” toward this goal. On the multilateral front, the United States has collaborated with allies and partners to impose sanctions, cut off illicit finance sources, and hold Pyongyang accountable for human rights abuses. U.S.-North Korea relations under a second Biden or Trump administration Trump’s and Biden’s past policy records on North Korea suggest a different set of opportunities and challenges for each candidate when dealing with Pyongyang. Denuclearization appears unlikely and risk mitigation, much less reengagement between the United States and North Korea, will be difficult under current geopolitical circumstances regardless of who enters the White House in 2025. Since Kim’s retreat into disengagement, the emergence of bloc politics and the so-called China-Russia-North Korea axis have given Kim less incentive for dialogue with Washington, while Beijing and Moscow provide Pyongyang with material resources and diplomatic cover at the U.N. Security Council. Furthermore, the election of a conservative president in South Korea, Yoon Suk Yeol, in 2022 has shifted Seoul’s North Korea policy from engagement with Pyongyang to a more confrontational stance. Seoul would be unlikely to welcome another high-profile summit unless Kim makes substantial concessions on denuclearization. Biden: More continuity and predictability, but less opportunity for a breakthrough The Biden administration has taken a pragmatic approach to North Korea, remaining open to dialogue even without preconditioning denuclearization. Biden’s pragmatism has also meant approaching dialogue through diplomatic channels below the leader’s level and working closely with allies, particularly South Korea and Japan, to boost defense and deterrence against escalating nuclear threats. Biden’s North Korea policy has helped reassure allies of the U.S. commitment to defend them against a North Korea attack despite Pyongyang’s ever-increasing provocations. But his policy has also hit a wall with North Korea’s refusal to negotiate, and there has been little incentive to think outside of the box to break the impasse. If North Korea continues its provocations and rejects dialogue with the United States, a second Biden administration may have little choice but to continue along similar lines to its current North Korea policy. In March 2024, Biden administration officials drew attention to an “interim steps” approach to denuclearization, which the South Korean media interpreted as a sign of greater flexibility in its approach to negotiating with North Korea. In other words, Washington was not insisting on denuclearization upfront. The concept, of course, is not new; it goes back to the days of the Six-Party talks in the early 2000s. Although hawks during the Trump administration rejected the step-by-step approach to denuclearization, other officials, including Trump himself, appeared to at least entertain such an approach. However, Biden’s commitment to non-proliferation reduces the administration’s flexibility to even tacitly recognize North Korea’s nuclear status, even if the United States focuses on risk reduction or confidence-building measures as an initial step. Moreover, there would be little Biden could offer to Kim to pursue risk reduction steps. Sanctions relief and economic aid have not enticed Kim since 2019. On the security front, Biden is unlikely to reduce the U.S. military presence in South Korea or significantly scale back joint military exercises with South Korea (and Japan) given the effort his administration has made to strengthen bilateral and trilateral relations with allies. Even though a second Biden administration might try to exercise greater flexibility in reaching out to North Korea, it would prioritize its alliance commitments to Seoul and Tokyo and its firm position on denuclearization over diplomatic engagement with North Korea if such engagement weakens U.S. credibility and deterrence in the region. Trump: Greater prospect for dialogue, but also higher risk Under a second Trump administration, the range of opportunities and risks for U.S.-North Korea relations is wider. Republicans have generally adopted a hawkish stance on North Korea, seeking pressure through sanctions, isolation, and containment and taking a more vocal position on human rights. Although Trump followed this path during his first year in office in 2017, he later reversed course by engaging directly with Kim in 2018 and 2019. It is possible that a second Trump administration might follow a hardline approach to North Korea given the Republican Party’s general distrust of communist regimes and conservatives’ penchant for pursuing “hawk engagement” with North Korea. However, in the absence of ideological blinders, Trump may be more open to dialogue with North Korea than those Republicans who hold more deep-rooted ideological reservations about engaging with a nuclear-armed, human-rights-violating pariah state. Three reasons suggest Trump is more likely than Biden to resume discussions with Kim. First, Trump and Kim have developed a personal rapport. Even after the end of their “bromance” in 2019, Trump proclaimed on his Truth Social media account in December 2023, “I do get along well with Kim Jong Un!” The chill in U.S.-North Korea relations appears to have little bearing on how Trump sees Kim as a leader. If Trump is elected, a congratulatory statement from Kim may entice Trump to respond. Second, Trump sees himself as a dealmaker. Trump may be motivated to complete unfinished business and seal the deal with North Korea, even if the agreement does not replicate the demands of the “grand bargain” his first administration sought in Hanoi. In the absence of any strong ideological views on non-proliferation, Trump may not demand this time that Kim “go big” by accepting complete denuclearization upfront. Third, Trump’s ego and desire to shape his own legacy may be a further motivating factor to engage Kim. Trump seemed flattered in 2018 after receiving word about his nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize after the Singapore summit. When asked by reporters whether he deserved the prize, Trump humbly bragged, “Everyone thinks so, but I would never say it,” before stating that he wanted to see an agreement “finished” between the United States and North Korea. It would be tempting for Trump to become the first president to “solve” the North Korean nuclear problem (whether that entails denuclearization or not) and normalize U.S.-North Korea relations. It remains unclear what might be gained by another Trump-Kim summit, or what Trump might offer Kim in exchange for North Korea dialing down provocations and suspending or rolling back its nuclear program. Skeptics worry that Trump might strike a bad deal with Kim that enables the regime to preserve its nuclear status without making any real commitments, thus worsening the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. According to three sources who had been briefed on Trump’s thinking on North Korea and spoke to Politico, Trump might accept an agreement that focuses on an initial nuclear freeze and prevents the regime from developing new weapons in exchange for economic aid and financial investments. Trump has denied the claim that he is open to a nuclear North Korea as “disinformation.” However, the arguments outlined in the Politico piece suggest that the United States would at least implicitly and/or temporarily accept North Korea’s status as a nuclear power. Additionally, Trump may suggest the establishment of formal diplomatic ties or a U.S. liaison office in Pyongyang—a point Trump officials previously discussed in advance of the Hanoi summit, as well as under previous administrations—as a means of bringing North Korea to the table even prior to a full commitment to denuclearization. A second Trump administration might resume direct diplomacy with North Korea, but doing so presents several risks. In contrast to Biden, Trump might be more willing to sacrifice coordination and unity with U.S. allies to make a deal with North Korea. Trump has proposed reducing U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula and suspending joint military exercises. Such U.S. actions would be appealing to Kim, but it would also undermine military readiness, weaken deterrence against North Korea, and sow division between Seoul and Washington. Furthermore, the Yoon government remains hostile and distrusting of North Korea. Seoul would likely object to U.S.-North Korea dialogue without addressing North Korea’s complete denuclearization and South Korea’s security concerns. Should Trump feel compelled to reassure South Korea about U.S.-North Korea diplomacy, he might permit Seoul to pursue its own nuclear capabilities to strengthen South Korea’s deterrence against a nuclear North Korea. Trump could also respond to South Korean popular support for redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula or consider nuclear sharing arrangements between the United States and South Korea. Of course, such actions would be diplomatically costly for the Yoon government. The introduction of South Korean nukes could also magnify rather than diminish the security risks on the Korean Peninsula by triggering regional nuclear proliferation. Permitting a nuclear South Korea or the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on Korean soil would also be unacceptable to Kim. Conclusion and policy recommendations The upcoming U.S. election presents an opportunity to take stock of where U.S. policy on North Korea may head. Contrasting personality and leadership styles, as well as different political circumstances in South Korea and in global politics during Trump and Biden’s respective terms in office, have led the two candidates to pursue differing policies toward North Korea. Unfortunately, the policy options available to the next U.S. president will remain limited with a more confident Kim unwilling to relinquish North Korea’s nuclear weapons and strengthened by Russia. Domestically, Kim has reasserted control over the economy and adopted populist “people-first” projects including new housing construction and increased agriculture production. North Korea, therefore, has less incentive to engage the United States now than in 2018. Nevertheless, Trump and Biden might consider the following policy recommendations as they build out their foreign policy strategies. First, Biden or Trump will need to staunch North Korea’s accelerating nuclear and weapons programs. This cannot be done by the United States alone. The Biden administration has spent the past four years reinvigorating alliances and building coalitions including the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral. It may therefore be easier for a second Biden administration to strengthen networks and reach out to new partners in both the developed and developing world, to help monitor and enforce sanctions, and crack down on North Korean cybertheft. The United States should encourage like-minded allies and partners to push the North Korea agenda in other institutions and fora including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the European Union, and the G7. Although there is an assumption that the Trump administration will do away with America’s alliances, Trump’s former national security advisor, Robert O’Brien, has insisted that “America first is not America alone.” With vital national interests at stake, Republicans may also see the value in building a network of countries to slow if not reverse North Korean nuclear proliferation. Managing the risks of a nuclear-armed North Korea should not be the work of a single country, but one that involves establishing trust and coordination with allies and other partners and requires a long-term commitment to preserving peace on the Korean Peninsula. Second, the North Korea-Russia military alliance should motivate the United States to seek common ground with China in stabilizing the deteriorated security situation on the Korean Peninsula. Although Xi Jinping shares the same goal as Putin and Kim in weakening U.S. influence, China is uncomfortable with bloc politics and has stayed relatively muted about developing Russia-North Korea ties. As China scholar Patricia Kim argues, “Beijing is rapidly losing its influence with Pyongyang relative to Moscow, all the while paying the diplomatic costs of being associated with the two pariah states.” This reality for Beijing may provide the next administration with an opportunity to steer Beijing away from Moscow, or at least prevent China from further enabling Russia-North Korea cooperation. Diplomatic cooperation with China on the North Korea issue will prove to be challenging for both Biden and especially Trump as Republicans have embraced a “win at all costs” approach to U.S.-China competition. Still, Trump did press China in the past on North Korean issues, and Beijing’s support for North Korean sanctions was arguably higher during the Trump era than at present. The Biden administration has tried, unsuccessfully, to solicit Beijing’s cooperation. However, China’s weakening influence in North and South Korea and increasing instability on the peninsula may incentivize Beijing to press North Korea not to further undermine regional stability. Finally, the United States must be prepared for the long game with North Korea. The Kim regime has proved resilient time and time again. Despite Kim’s growing confidence following North Korea’s pandemic border lockdown, the regime remains paranoid about outside information and culture that could erode the Kim family’s legitimacy. Information control, which remains critical to Kim’s legitimacy, is just as essential to regime survival as nuclear weapons. Consistent support for North Korean human rights, including the promotion of freedom of information, is a component of North Korea policy that Trump and Biden could easily support.

### 1NC – Link - Venezuela

#### Sanctions are key to win Florida.

Neuman 22 [(William, 6-6-2022), "Venezuela sanctions aren’t working. Don’t repeat the mistakes of the Cuba embargo", <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jun/06/venezuela-sanctions-arent-working-dont-repeat-the-mistakes-of-the-cuba-embargo>, Guardian, 6-6-2022] TDI

Trump saw that he could weaponize Venezuela policy in the 2020 election in Florida, with its large bloc of Hispanic voters, including Cuban Americans, attuned to Venezuela’s fall into authoritarianism. In effect, he made Venezuela the new Cuba – threatening to invade, and piling on sanctions. As foreign policy, Trump’s approach was a failure: it did not remove Maduro or improve conditions in Venezuela. But as an election strategy it was a great success; Trump easily won Florida in 2020 and Republicans gained two congressional seats there. When Biden became president, he inherited a trap. Any change toward Venezuela could be cast as being soft on Maduro and might cost Democrats even more votes in Florida in the midterms and in 2024.

### 1NC – Link – General

#### Voters prefer Hardliner Policy – the “hawk’s advantage”

Friedman 23, Jeffery A. Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, studies the politics and psychology of foreign policy decision-making and direct the John Rosenwald Postdoctoral Fellows Program in U.S. Foreign Policy and International Security, “Issue-Image Tradeoffs and the Politics of Foreign Policy: How Leaders Use Foreign Policy Positions to Shape their Personal Images” World Politics, Vol. 75, No. 2 (2023), pp. 280-315, 4-XX-2023, https://bpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/sites.dartmouth.edu/dist/0/433/files/2022/08/Friedman-Issue-Image-Tradeoffs.pdf

If voters evaluate leaders’ fitness to be commander-in-chief on the basis of their personal attributes, then we should expect leaders to try to convey appealing attributes to the public. This article focuses on how leaders use policy positions as tools for shaping their personal images. As a specific example of this dynamic, it explains why voters are likely to associate hawkish foreign policies with leadership strength, defined as a disposition to vigorously promote national interests and to avoid backing down when challenged by adversaries. 11

Leadership strength is only part of what it takes to be a competent commander-in-chief, but it is important for protecting national security. If a leader has a tendency to back down when threatened, then this could encourage predatory behavior by the leader’s adversaries. Citizens also presumably want their leaders to be proactive when it comes to supporting allies, marginalizing adversaries, and negotiating international agreements that work to America’s advantage. A substantial volume of research indicates that voters do, in fact, value presidents who seem like strong leaders and that they associate leadership strength with making competent foreign policy decisions.12

This article uses the term, hawkishness, to capture two dimensions of foreign policy. The first dimension is a leader’s inclination to employ military versus non-military instruments of foreign policy (“military internationalism”). The second dimension is a leader’s willingness to make compromises to work in concert with other countries (“cooperative internationalism”). All things being equal, a foreign policy “hawk” is more likely to pursue militarized foreign policies and less likely to compromise with other countries. A foreign policy “dove” is someone who pursues foreign policies that are less militarized and more cooperative.13

Militarized foreign policies are useful tools for crafting impressions of leadership strength because they are easy to frame as “standing up” to America’s adversaries or remaining vigilant in the face of foreign threats. Prominent examples of such arguments during presidential campaigns include Lyndon Johnson using the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution to dispel charges that he was soft on communism,14 how Bill Clinton’s 1996 campaign manager, Dick Morris, told Clinton that “I want to bomb the [expletive] out of Serbia to look strong,” 15 or how George W. Bush argued that “sticking to his guns” during the Iraq War demonstrated toughness and resolve.16 Similarly, leaders who demand greater diplomatic concessions from other countries can readily frame that behavior as vigorously promoting their citizens’ interests – a form of rhetoric that was a particular hallmark of Donald Trump.17 By contrast, leaders who oppose militarized foreign policies risk appearing as though they are “backing down” in the face of aggression and leaders who make compromises with other countries expose themselves to potential criticism for making excessive concessions. Prominent examples of this dynamic include charges that President Jimmy Carter was a weak leader for supporting the Panama Canal Treaties,18 or that President Gerald Ford was allowing the Soviet Union to gain undue advantages through arms control negotiations and détente.19 These examples show how the article’s argument plausibly applies to Democrats and to Republicans, to incumbent presidents and to presidential challengers, to campaign promises and to actual foreign policies, to decisions made in and out of wartime, and to policies developed in election and in non-election years.

This article does not argue that hawkish foreign policies are the only way that presidents and presidential candidates can signal leadership strength. For instance, President Joe Biden claimed that withdrawing from Afghanistan demonstrated his willingness to make tough decisions.20 Yet, that same rhetoric is usually available to hawkish leaders, too, as with George W. Bush “sticking to his guns” in Iraq. The difference between these cases from the standpoint of this article’s theory is that Biden exposed himself to criticism for backing down in the face of enemy aggression, whereas Bush could more readily portray the invasion and occupation of Iraq as evidence that he was confronting his adversaries head-on. This is the sense in which the article’s argument expects that hawkish foreign policies will generally be more useful than dovish foreign policies when it comes to cultivating reputations of leadership strength.

If voters preferred hawkish foreign policies on their merits, then the politics of image-making would not shape leaders’ behavior. But so long as we believe that leaders’ policy choices have any causal impact on how voters perceive their personal images, then we should expect there to be cases in which the policy positions that maximize voters’ collective policy preferences are not also the positions that maximize leaders’ ability to craft an appealing personal image – a dynamic that this article describes as issue-image tradeoffs. This logic shows why leaders who seek to cultivate mass public opinion do not necessarily have incentives to take policy positions that maximize preference alignment.

#### **Hawkish Foreign Policy is K2 voter perception**

Gadarian 10, 10-xx-2010, Shana Kushner "Foreign Policy at the Ballot Box: How Citizens Use Foreign Policy to Judge and Choose Candidates on JSTOR", No Publication, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1017/s0022381610000526?searchText=hawkish+foreign+policy&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3Dhawkish%2Bforeign%2Bpolicy%26so%3Drel&ab\_segments=0%2Fbasic\_search\_gsv2%2Fcontrol&refreqid=fastly-default%3Ae9fb7497c44bc5bd624c85de219a4b81&seq=11

The public’s views on foreign policy mattered greatly in how the public judged and chose their political leaders from 1980 onward. Voters used foreign policy to judge the political parties and leaders, but not always in the ways expected by democratic theory. The paper reveals two asymmetries in how citizens evaluate parties and candidates: (1) the public more consistently links foreign policy to evaluations of Republicans than Democrats, and (2) citizens lower evaluations of Democratic candidates for appearing too dovish but do not punish hawkishness. Issue ownership appears to have implications not only for how candidates act but also for how citizens act in the voting booth. By revealing these asymmetries, this paper contributes to a broader understanding of both how citizens use their attitudes when choosing leaders to both protect and represent them and the incentives that candidates face in taking foreign policy positions when forced to mention an issue ‘‘owned’’ by their opposition.

Politics is largely about defining what issues voters should consider at election time. To the extent that candidates prime their owned issues during campaigns and thus define the issue space on which the public will evaluate the parties, voters may focus some issues at the expense of other, equally pressing issues. Ultimately, if Democratic candidates will receive less ‘‘credit’’ for talking about foreign policy than their Republican counterparts, campaign resources may be better spent elsewhere.

When circumstances and strategy made terrorism and foreign policy salient in 2004, issue ownership advantaged Republicans and George W. Bush. According to the issue ownership theory, Kerry’s best response was to ignore foreign policy in the 2004 election since it favored Bush, but ignoring issues like defense spending, terrorism, and Iraq proved all but impossible. That being said, Kerry would actually have been best served in 2004 by taking quite hawkish foreign policy positions or at least positions to the right of the public but not as far right as the Republican Party. A public threatened by terrorism preferred a hawkish leader to keep them safe from harm.

A fundamental feature of democracy is that government is meant to reflect the values and opinions of its citizens. Democracy does not demand a one-to-one correspondence between the preferences of the majority and policy outcomes, yet the expectation of popular sovereignty is that the people’s will translates into government action. However, in times of threat, the people may not always want perfect representation but rather strong leadership. The findings from this paper imply ‘‘strong leadership’’ takes on a particular meaning when the threat is terrorism. In the 2004 election, strong leadership meant ‘‘taking the fight to the terrorists’’ and a willingness to use the military in foreign affairs. Citizens who saw the Democratic Party as much more dovish than their own foreign policy position felt significantly cooler toward the party and its presidential nominee than citizens who saw the party as being ‘‘strong’’ on national security issues. The public did not want, however, unrestrained strength in a president; NES respondents felt significantly cooler toward George W. Bush as they perceived his foreign policy positions to be much more hawkish than their own.

Together, these findings suggest that citizens are willing to give leeway to political leaders in producing foreign policy outcomes and thus may not want or receive close representation. From the perspective of democratic theory, gaps between the preferences of the people and policy outcomes may be problematic, but when the people authorize a trustee model of representation on some policy domains, the normative consequences are less clear. If citizens simply hand over the reins of policy out of ignorance and elites do not provide adequate information or deliberative opportunities for citizens to form opinions,

then the trustee model may not be normatively preferable. This model of representation becomes problematic when leaders artificially create crises to maintain power, provide false information about the consequences of policy, or cynically portray their foreign policy positions in elections. However, if citizens recognize the differences between their views and the views of their elected leaders and still choose a loose representation, this seems less problematic when political power is limited by institutional or other means. However, citizens must then be more monitorial than normal to hold leaders accountable when policies veer too far from their priorities and values.

### 1NC – Impact – Climate

#### **Trump’s stance against democracy causes climate catastrophe-extinction**

Darian-Smith 24’[(Eve, Professor and Chair of the Department of Global and International Studies at the University of California, Irvine.) “The Challenge of Political Will, Global Democracy and Environmentalism”, Environmental Policy and Law, 6/4/24, <https://content.iospress.com/articles/environmental-policy-and-law/epl239023>] TDI

1Introduction: 2024 A Make-or-Break Year The year 2024 can be understood as a watershed moment in terms of democracy and its sustainability as a political ideology around the world. Throughout the year, nearly 60 national elections will be held to determine new presidents, prime ministers, and national leaders in countries such as India, Mexico and the UK. In addition, the entire 27 countries of the European Union will be involved in electing 720 members to the European Parliament. These elections involve billions of people –nearly half the global population –in every part of the world including the United States. According to some commentators, this year will experience “one of the largest and most consequential democratic exercises in living memory. The results will affect how the world is run for decades to come”.1 Already in the early months of 2024 national elections have taken place in Indonesia and Pakistan. Notably, political campaigning in both countries rarely referred to the climate emergency as a central electoral issue, despite citizens’ respective fears of rising oceans and devastating droughts and floods related to planetary warming. Similarly, as political campaigning steps up in the UK, US, and India, there is little discourse to the climate emergency as a central pillar of any political party. Across the global political landscape there appears to be a lack of interest in discussing, let alone suggesting possible solutions, to the climate crisis beyond vague references to quasi-scientific techno-fixes such as CO2 capture, storage and conversion, as well as vague promises of transitioning to renewable energy. Canada is a notable case in this regard. Its dependence on oil sands and fracking, which requires more energy for extraction than conventional drilling, has ushered in a quagmire of confusing policies that in the end have done very little to bring the country towards fulfilling its greenhouse gas reduction pledges. This essay explores why –despite worldwide climate science consensus that we are facing ecological collapse and increasing weather catastrophes –there is little discussion about the climate as a central priority of political parties among the upcoming wave of elections. This silence around the climate emergency raises several pressing questions: Why is there limited political will on behalf of national leaders when it comes to mitigating the climate crisis? What does this suggest about the state of democracy when political leaders can sidestep and ignore the escalating demands of their constituencies? Where does this apathy at the national level leave the world’s population facing a climate emergency, and what possible actions can be taken by ordinary people experiencing in their everyday lives the impacts of planetary warming? In thinking about these complex questions, I argue that we need to examine the lack of national political will to address environmental degradation against a global geopolitical backdrop of rising antidemocracy and authoritarianism. By highlighting the clear connection between climate inaction and far-right politics, the pathway forward becomes clear. Connecting two global trends –rising antidemocracy and escalating climate crises –sheds light on what is the biggest hurdle in mitigating ecological collapse. This is the collusion between extremist politicians and international energy and banking sectors upon which a growing number of these national leaders depend to finance their political campaigns.2 This connection underscores the message presented in the United Nation’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report titled “Mitigation of Climate Change” (2022). According to the report, the scientific expertise and know-how to slow planetary warming is already available. Missing, however, is what the report states as “the lack of political will”. In the context of many national governments procrastinating around the climate emergency, this essay is an urgent call for all efforts–particularly in major polluting nations in the global north such as the United States, Canada and Australia–to press political leaders on their environmental policies and to use the electoral process to demand immediate action. Putting this differently, the environmental crisis must become part of national political conversation and a central issue in upcoming national elections. Concurrently, these efforts will also require fighting back against far-right efforts to suppress voting and censoring journalists and independent media, which is proving very challenging in the United States and elsewhere. Despite these uphill battles presented by a global lean toward antidemocracy, the stakes could not be higher. Given the extraordinary number of national elections taking place throughout 2024, this year presents a make-or-break moment in terms of stalling planetary warming and planning for viable collective futures. 2Rising Antidemocracy and the Global Lean Toward Authoritarianism Around the world watchdog organizations such as Freedom House and V-Dem, as well as the Economist and other international organizations, have shown a decline in democratic societies around the world.3 Charting metrics such as the right to vote, access the law, free media and an independent judiciary, these organizations show that basic democratic principles have declined over the past decade with a particularly quick drop during the COVID-19 pandemic (Fig. 1). Fig. 1 Living a Less Free World. Freedom House Freedom in the World Report 2022, page 4. Living a Less Free World. Freedom House Freedom in the World Report 2022, page 4. According to the Economist’s EIU report (which charts a broader set of 60 indicators to measure political democracy than that used by Freedom House) there has been a rather dramatic decline in democratic governance since 2015 (See Fig. 2). The report notes that across the world’s population “Only 7.8% reside in a ‘full democracy’, down from 8.9% in 2015; this percentage fell after the US was demoted from a ‘full democracy’ to a ‘flawed democracy’ in 2016”. The report goes on, “More than one-third of the world’s population live under authoritarian rule (39.4%), a share that has been creeping up in recent years”.4 These gloomy statistics are confirmed by the holocaust historian Dan Stone who sees echoes in today’s antidemocratic politics with past fascist regimes. Ominously, he argues that with the rise of the radical right across Europe, the United States and elsewhere, “fascism is not yet in power. But it is knocking on the door”.5 Fig. 2 The Economist: Democracy Index 2023: Age of Conflict, page 3. The Economist: Democracy Index 2023: Age of Conflict, page 3. Analysts of the global antidemocratic trend tend to focus on issues such as stricter border security, draconian anti-immigration laws, unilateral trade agreements, and white racist ideology that involves Islamophobia and antisemitism. I argue that less noticed, but arguably even more important, is the far-right’s weaponization of the environment in recent years. In my work I show additional factors that should be considered as symptomatic of the global antidemocratic trend. These include the withdrawal of many countries’ commitment to multilateral cooperation to reduce greenhouse gases as pledged in the Paris Agreement in 2015, as well as the rolling back of national environmental policies that protect lands from mining, environments and rainforests from pollution, and animals from potential extinction. Importantly, these policies and practices are occurring in global north and global south countries across a wide range of antidemocratic regimes including those that claim to be liberal democracies. In the United States, the politicization of the environment was very apparent under the former Trump administration that rolled back 50 years of environmental laws, opened up national parks to drilling and mining, withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreement, and stacked the Supreme Court with a conservative 6–3 supermajority that decided to gut the powers of the Environmental Protection Agency (West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency (2022). While current Democratic President Joe Biden has tried to reverse this course of action underscored by his pro-climate Inflation Reduction Act (2022), the harm caused by Trump is long-term and runs deep. Apart from the difficulty of reinstating environmental legislation, it is legally challenging to withdraw mining leases and federal contracts. At the international level, even though the United States has under Biden rejoined the Paris Agreement, the possibility of returning to the global pro-climate momentum of ten years ago that led to the landmark Paris Agreement in 2015 now seems very remote and rather quaint. Notably, 2015 was a high point in the terms of the global democratic index (Fig. 2). The rapid decline in the index since then is a telling reflection of how fast the world has shifted politically toward authoritarianism and away from pro-climate mobilization within less than a decade. 3Environmental Impacts and Public Demands for Climate Action Every country around the world has been impacted to varying degrees by the accelerating climate crisis in recent years. Devastating heat domes and torrential rains have caused enormous swathes of land to burn and drown, and hundreds of thousands of people to flee and be dispossessed of their homelands. Unfortunately, these environmental impacts disproportionately affect those living in less wealthy countries of the global south, particularly people in marginalized socioeconomic positions. Putting this differently, the poor and impoverished have most immediately and consequentially experienced the adverse impacts of the climate emergency. However, with climate scientists predicting 2024 to be the hottest in recorded history, even the wealthy are now feeling the effects. In other words, nobody can pretend that we are not facing a real and imminent climate emergency. While climate science denialism continues to have sway among some far-right political groups and their constituencies, beyond such extreme communities (i.e. Trump’s core MAGA base) there is global recognition that humankind must act immediately to mitigate a climate catastrophe. Not surprisingly, climate anxiety is real, widespread and accelerating, particularly among younger generations.6 This helps explain pro-climate demonstrations around the world throughout 2019 before political momentum was disrupted by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Spearheaded by then high school student Greta Thunberg who started the “School Strike for Climate” social movement in 2018,7 the Global Climate Strike fostered massive demonstrations for a week in September 2019 that coincided with the United Nations Climate Action Summit.8 The September protests saw over 4,500 mass mobilizations in 150 countries with an estimated participation of over six million people. These public protests, in tandem with real life experiences of millions of people on the frontlines of the climate crisis, underscore growing alarm around the climate emergency. This alarm is evidenced in numerous polls showing that most of the world’s population considers the climate crisis a threat requiring urgent political action. For instance, a group of European economists have conducted a survey across 125 countries, interviewing nearly 130,000 people. According to the authors there is “an almost universal global demand for intensifying political action. Across the globe, 89% of respondents state that their national governments should do more to fight global warming. In more than half the countries in our sample, the demand for more government action exceeds 90% ”.9 4Antidemocracy and Anti-environmentalism Despite political demands by huge majorities of ordinary people around the world, political leaders are failing to listen and respond to their citizens. In my book Global Burning: Rising Antidemocracy and the Climate Crisis (2022),10 I examine why this is the case and conclude that the world is experiencing two interrelated global phenomena –rising authoritarianism and escalating planetary warming. These interrelated global trends point to the collusion between a wave of far-right political strongmen over the past decade and their increasing reliance on Big Oil and global banks to finance their electoral campaigns and keep them in office. The book compares catastrophic wildfires in Australia, Brazil and the United States that broke out in 2019-2020 under the far-right leadership of Scott Morrison, Jair Bolsonaro and Donald Trump respectively. I show that each leader came to power on several promises that included the deregulation of environmental laws and promotion of anti-environmental policies that explicitly appealed to mining corporations, agribusiness, and their global financiers. Unfortunately, I could have chosen any number of countries with a similar turn toward far-right extremism and political pandering to the fossil fuel industry. For instance, in September 2022 Sweden, Britain and Italy elected to office far-right leaders. Sweden voted in Jimmie ringAkesson, leader of the far-right party the Sweden Democrats. The party has a deep association with white supremacy and was the only Swedish party to push a climate-skeptic position and oppose the ratification of the Paris Agreement. Again, in September 2022, Britain’s conservative party voted in Liz Truss, a former Shell executive, who quickly overturned a ban on fracking and increased investments in North Sea oil and gas. Truss lasted less than two months in office before being ousted by current Prime Minister Rishi Sunak who has continued to pursue a pro-extraction energy agenda and roll back environmental regulations. Finally, again in September 2022, Italy elected Giorgia Meloni as Prime Minister and leader of the Brothers of Italy party which has deep fascist connections and historically opposed EU plans to reduce gas emissions. At the time of her election, fears that Meloni would open up gas and oil leasing was a major concern for environmental scientists and civil society organizations. That fear remains high. In early 2024, Meloni convened a summit in Rome with two dozen African and European leaders, announcing plans for Italy to become an “energy hub” and creating “a bridge between Europe and Africa” in the so-called Mattei Plan (named after Enrico Mattei and founder of the state oil and gas company Eni in the post-war II era).11 According to Silvia Francescon from the pro-climate Italian think tank Ecco, “There is no reference to the Paris Agreement or the COP decisions. Based on what we currently know, there is undoubtedly a risk that funds meant for climate and international development could be used for projects managed by companies like Eni”. She goes on, “The ambiguity is very worrying”.12 Turning to the more recent national elections in the Netherlands and Argentina in November 2023, and Pakistan and Indonesia in February 2024, the four countries have elected to office far-right political leaders. Argentina, Pakistan and Indonesia voted in Javier Milei, Imran Khan and Prabowo Subianto respectively –all men well-known for their human rights abuses and corruption. The three countries are now widely regarded by the international community to be on a downward trajectory of democratic backsliding. With respect to all four new governments’ policies on the environment, the future looks very bleak. (1) In the Netherlands, far-right Geert Wilders won the Netherlands general election in November 2023 on campaign promises vowing to tear up European Union climate policies. It is not clear how he will be able to exert strong leadership over a coalition government, but Wilders has stated he plans to remove the Netherlands from the Paris Agreement, ramp up oil and gas drilling in the North Sea, and stop the transition to renewable solar and wind energy.13 (2) In Argentina, Javier Milei rose to presidency in November 2023 on a campaign that targeted what he called elite politicians who he denounced as lazy and immoral. Using rhetoric that echoed that of far-right Donald Trump (US) and Jair Bolsonaro (Brazil), Milei claimed to represent the ordinary worker and promised to clean up the economy and crime. Once in office, he added neo-Nazis to his administration and quickly set in motion aggressive polices for deregulating the economy that resulted in a sharp currency devaluation and widespread austerity measures. Attacks on public health, public education and workers’ rights led to massive protests and demonstrations in early 2024. With respect to the environment, Milei denounced climate change as a “socialist lie” that interfered with his free-market policies and called climate science “fake”.14 Given the widespread precarity of millions of people, the marginalized social groups championing the environment have considerable challenges ahead if they are going to turn government policies toward a pro-climate agenda. (3) In Pakistan the major political parties running for government in February 2024 all included reference to the environment in their manifesto statements.15 But specific details about climate mitigation were lacking, and there appeared to be more rhetoric than actual policy and practical implementation. The election results startled everyone, with Imran Khan getting the most votes despite being held in jail. A new coalition government was formed that included the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), with both groups committed to blocking Imran Khan’s party (PTI) form assuming power. In the political jostling of multiparty leadership, climate action will probably not be prioritized despite the desperate urgency faced by the nation’s population still reeling from catastrophic floods in 2022. (4) In Indonesia, the world’s third largest democracy, far-right Prabowo Subianto was voted in as the new president in February 2024. Indonesia is the world’s largest exporter of coal, primarily to China. In addition to expanding its export coal production in recent years, coal is needed to support the extraction of nickel for the development of the country’s domestic battery-making industry. Compounding Indonesia’s rapid escalation of carbon dioxide emissions through mining, the country is the world’s largest exporter of palm oil. Deforestation of palm trees and other biofuels is a major concern among environmental activists and has led to Indigenous communities being driven from their lands and forests. These groups are also very wary of Prabowo Subianto who was removed from the army a few years ago for kidnapping political dissenters. As the new president, there is every indication that Prabowo Subianto will continue the plans of outgoing president Joko Widodo who, despite promises to shift away from coal, in fact increasingly ramped up coal, nickel and palm oil production. Among environmental groups, there are widespread fears that Mr. Prabowo will return to his former style of kidnapping and silencing those associated with resistance to national anti-climate policies. Upcoming national elections in South Africa, India, and across the EU will all probably return increased power to extremist –and in some cases explicitly neofascist –political figures and parties. In the United States, the November 2024 presidential election is already agitating environmental activists and climate scientists. Trump has indicated that if re-elected, his second term will be even more severe than the first and he will aggressively drive fossil fuel production, open national parks to mining and drilling leases, further diminish laws regulating greenhouse gas emissions, undermine and underfund the EPA, and again withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement.16 According to Andrew Rosenberg, a former National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration official, “A return of Trump would be, in a word, horrific”. He went on, “It would also be incredibly stupid. It would roll back progress made over decades to protect public health and safety, [and] there is no logic to it other than to destroy everything. People who support him may not realize it’s their lives at stake, too.”17 Political commentators anticipate that with the rise around the world of antidemocratic regimes there will be a correlative rise in anti-climate legislation and reduced political will at the national level to mitigate the climate emergency. National elections so far in 2024 illustrate that this is a likely scenario. These unfolding elections underscore the connection between antidemocratic politics, climate science skepticism and anti-environmentalism that together perpetrate harm on citizens and promote the degradation of environments. Future national elections throughout the year also bode badly for any aggressive pro-climate laws and policies. Globally, renewed enthusiasm among nations to either honor their respective greenhouse gas emissions pledges or build multilateral collective solutions to slowing the warming planet appears very remote. 5The Global Wave of Anti-Protest Laws A global wave of repressive laws against free speech and public peaceful dissent has emerged in recent years. These anti-protest laws correlate to increasing numbers of antidemocratic leaders determined to shut down challenges to their authority to govern. Civicus Monitor is a watchdog organization with global alliances around the world that has been tracking restrictions on public protests for over two decades.18 Its findings are that excessive force and detentions of people who have demonstrated in the streets is rapidly escalating. In 2022 it reported that the right to protest peacefully, which is protected under international law, had been violated in over 75% of countries where public protests took place. In 2023, it reported that “Among the most targeted and worst-affected groups in 2023 are those advocating for democracy, better governance and protecting the environment”.19 Disturbingly, in the United States the push for anti-protest laws has often been led by multinational fossil fuel companies such as ExxonMobil, Murray Energy Corporation, Chevron and TransCanada. Since 2016, energy companies have worked with law enforcement agencies, lobbyists, think tanks and Republican politicians to enact a range of sweeping anti-protest laws in 21 states that prosecute demonstrators for coming near “infrastructure” such as gas pipelines. These laws emerged as a direct response to Dakota Access Pipeline protests at Standing Rock in 2016 which drew international attention for the violent response of police to peaceful climate protestors that included small farmers and Indigenous peoples on whose lands the pipes were laid (Fig. 3). Notably, many of these anti-protest laws drew their inspiration from model legislation drafted by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a conservative organization funded by Big Oil companies. Fig. 3 Standing Rock solidarity march in San Francisco, November 2016. Photograph by Pax Ahimsa Gethen. (Wikimedia Commons). Standing Rock solidarity march in San Francisco, November 2016. Photograph by Pax Ahimsa Gethen. (Wikimedia Commons). In 2020, the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), an independent think tank based in Washington DC, issued a report titled Muzzling Dissent: How Corporate Influence over Politics Has Fueled Anti-Protest Laws. The report focused on three states –Louisiana, Minnesota and West Virginia –and explored a new legal tactic used by elected officials who are “under the thumb of powerful corporate lobby interests”. In its executive summary, the report stated: Since 2017, so called “Critical Infrastructure Protection” laws targeting protests movement have sprung up in states around the country, in an effort to muzzle opposition to construction of oil and gas pipelines and other polluting chemical and fossil fuel facilities. Under the premise of protecting infrastructure projects, these laws mandate harsh charges and penalties for exercising constitutional rights to freely assemble and to protest.20 Importantly, the report commented on the implications of these laws for broader protests on a range of social justice issues. Criminalization of protests elevates political and corporate interests above civil rights and civil liberties protected under the US Constitution. This report offers a particularly timely examination of a set of laws that carry implications not only for environmental and Indigenous activists and movements, but also for broader social justice movements that utilize protests as a means to effect change. These laws that aim to inflict harsh penalties for protesting oil and gas projects also impact ongoing national protests against police brutality and future protests that might result from the results of the presidential election. 21 A more recent report was published by Greenpeace titled Dollars vs Democracy 2023: Inside the Fossil Fuel Industry’s Playbook to Suppress Protest and Dissent in the United States.22 This report builds on the earlier IPS report, detailing the way fossil fuel companies have colluded with the far right to silence political dissent across 21 states. This has resulted in about 60 percent of US oil and gas operations being shielded from public demonstrations. In addition to the anti-protest laws, Greenpeace mapped a legal strategy whereby oil companies use civil lawsuits (called SLAPPS) to harass and intimidate climate activists and chill legitimate political dissent. Oil companies also provide subsidies to law enforcement agencies for their assistance in cracking down on protestors, as well as sometimes employing private security firms that include “off-duty” police officers. According to its executive summary: In many cases, the fossil fuel industry has worked in lockstep with government allies: officials who may share in the industry’s ideology, but who have also benefited from its election spending, lobbying, targeted payments, and shared financial interests, or have passed through the “revolving door” from industry to government or vice versa. Commenting on the Greenpeace report, Nicholas Robinson, at the International Center for Not-For-Profit Law, said “The fossil fuel industry has lobbied for these extreme anti-protest laws to shut down criticism of them. Climate change is an urgent challenge and all Americans, including the communities most impacted by these fossil fuel projects, have a right to have their voice heard, not silenced, at this critical moment for the planet”.23 Outside the United States, anti-protest laws are equally, if not more, oppressive. For instance, in Australia protestors face severe fines of $25,000 and up to five years in jail for non-violent acts such as blocking traffic, preventing logging in a forest, or remaining in a public place if asked to leave. Harsh new laws have often been rushed through state parliaments with little public debate or comment. The scholar Sophie McNeill argued, “This politically motivated crackdown on protest by successive Australian authorities appears designed to intimidate the climate movement and create a chilling effect on those thinking of taking to the streets.”24 Similar to what is happening in Australia, across Europe in Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, harsh new anti-protest laws have been enacted resulting in mass arrests and the labeling of protestors as “eco-terrorists”, “rioters” and “hooligans”. For instance, in the Hague, Netherlands, water cannon was used to break up a large climate protest in May 2023. More than 1,500 people were arrested and seven activists convicted of sedition for encouraging people to attend a public protest. Britain has led the charge with the most repressive and wide-ranging laws introduced in recent years through the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act (2022) and the Public Order Act (2023). These laws have been pushed by the conservative government and energy lobbyists in direct response to a range of high-profile protests calling for the stop of gas and oil leases being issued and demanding a transition to renewable energy by activist groups such as Greenpeace, Just Stop Oil and Extinction Rebellion (Fig. 4). According to Michael Frost, UN rapporteur on environmental defenders, what is unfolding in Britain is “terrifying” and providing a roadmap for other countries to pass similar legislation. Frost also noted that in crackdowns in Britain and across Europe, police agencies play a coordinated role. Fig. 4 Just Stop Oil activists walking up Whitehall towards Trafalgar Square on Saturday 20 May 2023. Photograph by Alisdare Hickson. (Wikimedia Commons). Just Stop Oil activists walking up Whitehall towards Trafalgar Square on Saturday 20 May 2023. Photograph by Alisdare Hickson. (Wikimedia Commons). I’m sure that there is European cooperation among the police forces against these kinds of activities. My concern is that when [governments] are calling these people eco-terrorists, or are using new forms of vilification and defamation ...  it has a huge impact on how the population may perceive them and the cause for which these people are fighting. It is a huge concern for me.25 Adds Catrinel Motoc, senior campaigner at Amnesty International, “People all around the world are bravely raising their voices to call for urgent actions on the climate crisis but many face dire consequences for their peaceful activism”.26 What the escalating anti-protest laws around the world highlight is that the “fight” against climate change is being redefined and imbued with new meaning. It is no longer only a fight by humans to mitigate a warming planet and defend the natural world and the human species from extinction. Increasingly, with the global rise of antidemocratic governments, the fight has morphed into a battlefront constructed by far-right leaders against their own citizens. This new battle line is driven by the need to prevent people from speaking up and peacefully demonstrating against pro-fossil fuel laws and policies. Given worldwide political demand by everyday citizens for their leaders to address the climate emergency, this reconfigured fight has become a lot more complicated. For the many millions of people taking to the streets to demand government action to avert ecological collapse, the stakes have skyrocketed in terms of monetary fines and threats of repression, incarceration, and violence. 6Conclusion John Kerry, the United States climate chief, in announcing his stepping down in February 2024, urged political leaders around the world to stop delaying on climate mitigation. In pointing to the lack of political will, he said that some leaders have intentionally denied climate science and promoted disinformation, arguing that these leaders “are willing to put the whole world at risk for whatever political motivations may be behind their choices.” He went on to say that no country would be spared by the climate emergency: “This is a multilateral major challenge to the security of every nation on this planet, because we’re one planet, and we’re all linked”.27 Despite such dire warnings, Kerry’s words will likely have very little impact on national leadership, particularly going into a year of many national elections. As stated by Bharat Desai, professor of international law, “It remains to be seen as to how the UN member states earnestly walk-the-talk to stand by the planet Earth”.28 Given mounting geopolitical realities and lack of national political will, there is an urgent need to push for alterative political practices to address the climate emergency. Sub-states and cities are emerging as hubs of innovation and are now at the forefront of building new coalitions and networks at both translocal and transnational scales in implementing pro-climate strategies. These lower-level government initiatives are also increasingly working with grassroots climate activists, educators, farmers, property developers, infrastructure experts, labor representatives and other groups immediately impacted by a warming planet. There is a deep concern to counter widespread disinformation and communicate to wider populations the urgent need to address the climate crisis. It is increasingly clear that it will be up to local communities in cities, sub-states and regions to take the lead in mitigating the climate emergency and transcend the lack of political will among ethically and financially compromised antidemocratic national leaders.’

#### Climate Change causes mass extinction and turns every other impact

**Carrington 22’**[(Damian, environment editor at the Guardian,) “Climate endgame: risk of human extinction ‘dangerously underexplored’”, The Guardian, 8-1-22, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/aug/01/climate-endgame-risk-human-extinction-scientists-global-heating-catastrophe>] TDI

The risk of global societal collapse or human extinction has been “dangerously underexplored”, climate scientists have warned in an analysis. They call such a catastrophe the “climate endgame”. Though it had a small chance of occurring, given the uncertainties in future emissions and the climate system, cataclysmic scenarios could not be ruled out, they said. “Facing a future of accelerating climate change while blind to worst-case scenarios is naive risk management at best and fatally foolish at worst,” the scientists said, adding that there were “ample reasons” to suspect global heating could result in an apocalyptic disaster. The international team of experts argue the world needs to start preparing for the possibility of the climate endgame. “Analysing the mechanisms for these extreme consequences could help galvanise action, improve resilience, and inform policy,” they said. Explorations in the 1980s of the nuclear winter that would follow a nuclear war spurred public concern and disarmament efforts, the researchers said. The analysis proposes a research agenda, including what they call the “four horsemen” of the climate endgame: famine, extreme weather, war and disease. They also called for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to produce a special report on the issue. The IPCC report on the impacts of just 1.5C of heating drove a “groundswell of public concern”, they said. “There are plenty of reasons to believe climate change could become catastrophic, even at modest levels of warming,” said Dr Luke Kemp at the University of Cambridge’s Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, who led the analysis. “Climate change has played a role in every mass extinction event. It has helped fell empires and shaped history. “Paths to disaster are not limited to the direct impacts of high temperatures, such as extreme weather events. Knock-on effects such as financial crises, conflict and new disease outbreaks could trigger other calamities.” The analysis is published in the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences and was reviewed by a dozen scientists. It argues that the consequences of global heating beyond 3C have been underexamined, with few quantitative estimates of the total impacts. “We know least about the scenarios that matter most,” Kemp said. A thorough risk assessment would consider how risks spread, interacted and amplified, but had not been attempted, the scientists said. “Yet this is how risk unfolds in the real world,” they said. “For example, a cyclone destroys electrical infrastructure, leaving a population vulnerable to an ensuing deadly heatwave.” The Covid pandemic underlined the need to examine rare but high-impact global risks, they added. Particularly concerning are tipping points, where a small rise in global temperature results in a big change in the climate, such as huge carbon emissions from an Amazon rainforest suffering major droughts and fires. Tipping points could trigger others in a cascade and some remained little studied, they said, such as the abrupt loss of stratocumulus cloud decks that could cause an additional 8C of global warming. The researchers warn that climate breakdown could exacerbate or trigger other catastrophic risks, such as international wars or infectious disease pandemics, and worsen existing vulnerabilities such as poverty, crop failures and lack of water. The analysis suggests superpowers may one day fight over geoengineering plans to reflect sunlight or the right to emit carbon. “There is a striking overlap between currently vulnerable states and future areas of extreme warming,” the scientists said. “If current political fragility does not improve significantly in the coming decades, then a belt of instability with potentially serious ramifications could occur.” There were further good reasons to be concerned about the potential of a global climate catastrophe, the scientists said: “There are warnings from history. Climate change has played a role in the collapse or transformation of numerous previous societies and in each of the five mass extinction events in Earth’s history.” Three polar bears walking across a fragile-looking glacier towards the sea Domino-effect of climate events could move Earth into a ‘hothouse’ state Read more New modelling in the analysis shows that extreme heat – defined as an annual average temperature of more than 29C – could affect 2 billion people by 2070 if carbon emissions continue. “Such temperatures currently affect around 30 million people in the Sahara and Gulf Coast,” said Chi Xu, at Nanjing University in China, who was part of the team. “By 2070, these temperatures and the social and political consequences will directly affect two nuclear powers, and seven maximum containment laboratories housing the most dangerous pathogens. There is serious potential for disastrous knock-on effects.” Sign up to First Edition, our free daily newsletter – every weekday morning at 7am BST The current trend of greenhouse gas emissions would cause a rise of 2.1-3.9C by 2100. But if existing pledges of action are fully implemented, the range would be 1.9-3C. Achieving all long-term targets set to date would mean 1.7-2.6C of warming. “Even these optimistic assumptions lead to dangerous Earth system trajectories,” the scientists said. Temperatures more than 2C above pre-industrial levels had not been sustained on Earth for more than 2.6m years, they said, far before the rise of human civilisation, which had risen in a “narrow climatic envelope” over the past 10,000 years. “The more we learn about how our planet functions, the greater the reason for concern,” said Prof Johan Rockström, at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research in Germany. “We increasingly understand that our planet is a more sophisticated and fragile organism. We must do the maths of disaster in order to avoid it.”

## 2NR – Uniqueness

#### Harris beats Trump now but its close.

Mchardy 7/19 [Martha, reporter, "Kamala Harris Can Beat Donald Trump With This Running Mate, Polls Suggest" Newsweek, 7-19-2024. https://www.newsweek.com/kamala-harris-can-beat-donald-trump-this-running-mate-polls-1927699] TDI

Kamala Harris could beat Donald Trump in a presidential election if she chooses Josh Shapiro as her running mate, according to a new poll.

The survey, conducted by Public Policy Polling between July 17 and 18, focused on registered voters in Michigan and Pennsylvania, which is believed by some experts to be the state Democrats need to hold in order to win.

Voters were asked for their voting intentions in a number of different scenarios, including Kamala Harris as Democratic candidate for president, running against Donald Trump and JD Vance. The vice president was then matched up with several different running mates to test their support base.

The poll found that, with the right running mate, Harris could likely beat the Republican ticket in November. In Pennsylvania, 47 percent of voters said they would vote for her if she were running alongside the state's Governor, Josh Shapiro, while only 46 percent backed Trump and Vance.

#### Harris and Shapiro beat Trump and Vance in a key battleground state, the one likely to decide the election.

Mchardy 24 [Martha, reporter, "Kamala Harris Can Beat Donald Trump With This Running Mate, Polls Suggest" Newsweek, 7-19-2024. https://www.newsweek.com/kamala-harris-can-beat-donald-trump-this-running-mate-polls-1927699] TDI

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## 2NR – Impact

### Climate

#### Trump 2024 causes mass climate change devastation and extinction

**Plumer and Friedman 24’** [(Brad and Lisa, Plumer write about the policies and innovations that governments, companies and people are pursuing to try to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. He reports on a wide range of energy technologies including electric grids, renewable energy, nuclear power, geothermal, carbon capture, hydrogen, electric vehicles and much more. Friedman writes about how governments are addressing climate change and the effects of those policies on communities. She has been a reporter for more than 30 years, half of them covering climate change) “What Trump 2.0 Could Mean for the Environment”, New York Times, 7-16-24, https://archive.is/Q6oOd#selection-4679.0-5235.290]TDI

As president, Donald Trump’s sweeping attempts to roll back federal environmental regulations were often stymied — by the courts, by a lack of experience, even by internal resistance from government employees. But if he retakes the White House in November, Mr. Trump would be in a far better position to dismantle environmental and climate rules, aided by more sympathetic judges and conservative allies who are already mapping out ways to bend federal agencies to the president’s will. “It’s going to be easier,” said Myron Ebell, who led the transition at the Environmental Protection Agency after Mr. Trump won in 2016. “They’re going to have better people, more committed people, more experienced people. They will be able to move more quickly, and more successfully, in my view.” On the campaign trail, Mr. Trump has promised to repeal federal regulations designed to cut greenhouse gas pollution that is rapidly heating the planet. Many of his allies want to go further. They are drafting plans to slash budgets, oust career staffers, embed loyalists in key offices and scale back the government’s powers to tackle climate change, regulate industries and restrict hazardous chemicals. Those plans, while wildly ambitious, may be more attainable next time around. Perhaps the biggest change in Mr. Trump’s favor is that over the past two years, the Supreme Court’s conservative supermajority has significantly curbed the legal authority of the government to impose environmental rules on businesses. (image removed) Mr. Trump may have more success in dismantling environmental protections if he is re-elected, this time aided by more sympathetic judges and conservative allies.Credit...Scott McIntyre for The New York Times At the same time, Mr. Trump has proposed reclassifying tens of thousands of career civil servants, making it easier to fire them. He has said that move, which he tried to implement at the end of his first term, is necessary to “destroy the deep state” that he says secretly worked against his presidency. The result is that a second Trump administration might not face as many legal or bureaucratic guardrails as the first. “Because of the Supreme Court in particular, he’ll be able to get away with a lot more than anyone ever suspected,” said Christine Todd Whitman, who led the Environmental Protection Agency under President George W. Bush. She said the courts have effectively given a second Trump administration a “free hand” to slash regulations. That could mean a drastic transformation of the E.P.A., which was created by a Republican, Richard Nixon, and for five decades has played a powerful role in American society, from forcing communities to reduce smog to regulating the use of pesticides. Businesses and conservative groups have long said that excessive regulation drives up costs for industries from electric utilities to home building. Environmentalists say that handcuffing the E.P.A. now, when time is short to contain global warming, could have dire consequences. A significant weakening of the E.P.A., said Ms. Whitman, is “going to be devastating for the country and the world, frankly, because we all suffer from climate change.” Mr. Trump’s spokeswoman, Karoline Leavitt, said in a statement that “President Trump made America a net exporter of energy for the first time because he cut red tape and gave the industry more freedom to do what they do best — utilize the liquid gold under our feet.” If elected, he would “cancel Joe Biden’s radical mandates, terminate the Green New Scam, and make America energy independent again,” she said. In 2023, the United States pumped more crude oil than any other nation in history and it is the world’s leading exporter of liquefied natural gas. Rolling back regulations Mr. Trump doesn’t detail his plans for the E.P.A., apart from promising to scrap two major Biden administration regulations designed to reduce greenhouse gases from power plants and cars. His allies, however, have laid out specific proposals as part of a transition plan known as Project 2025, spearheaded by the conservative Heritage Foundation. While Mr. Trump has recently sought to distance himself from Project 2025, much of the plan was written by people who were top advisers during his first term and could serve in prominent roles if he wins in November. In a 32-page section on the E.P.A., the plan takes aim at the agency’s authority to tackle global warming, including by revisiting a 2009 scientific finding that says carbon dioxide emissions endanger public health. The blueprint also calls for repealing regulations governing air pollution from factories that crosses state borders and for reconsidering limits on PFAS, toxic compounds known as “forever chemicals” that have been detected in nearly half the nation’s tap water. Project 2025 also calls for eliminating E.P.A.’s office of environmental justice, which focuses on reducing pollution in low-income and minority areas;breaking up an office dedicated to children’s health; resetting scientific advisory boards “to expand opportunities for a diversity of scientific viewpoints”; and appointing a political loyalist as the agency’s science adviser in order to “reform” the agency’s research. “To implement policies that are consistent with a conservative EPA, the agency will have to undergo a major reorganization,” reads the section on the E.PA., which was written by Mandy Gunasekara, the agency’s chief of staff during the Trump administration. Ms. Gunasekara didn’t respond to a request for comment. Image A person at a podium with blue lights shining on them in front of an audience in a large hall. Project 2025 calls for reorganizing the E.P.A. and dissolving the Office of Environmental Justice.Credit...Jose Luis Magana/Associated Press Mr. Trump has also spoken of his desire to get rid of federal employees who might oppose him. Project 2025 proposes that the E.P.A. look for “relocation opportunities” for certain senior employees. As president, Mr. Trump relocated one agency within the Interior Department from Washington, D.C. to Colorado, prompting 87 percent of the affected employees to quit or retire rather than move. Mr. Trump’s plan for agency staff will be to “vilify them, reclassify them, and then fire them,” said Gina McCarthy, who led the E.P.A. under President Barack Obama. Project 2025 also recommends installing political appointees in parts of the E.P.A. that have been dedicated to nonpartisan technical and scientific research, like the National Vehicle and Fuel Emissions Laboratory in Ann Arbor, Mich. That laboratory, where about 140 engineers, chemists, toxicologists, lawyers and economists study vehicle performance and emissions standards, is “the last word on automobile pollution,” said William K. Reilly, who led the E.P.A. under President George H.W. Bush. “If political people are put in there we will find we have destroyed one of the greatest achievements we have in the government.” Some E.P.A. employees are already preparing for a Trump presidency. The American Federation of Government Employees Council 238, a union that represents about 8,000 E.P.A. workers, recently secured a new contract provision that allows workers to file a grievance if they face retaliation for their scientific work. Still, a dramatic reorganization along with new political pressures could drive many career employees to leave, hollowing out the agency, which some say is what a Trump administration would want. “These proposals are basically taking a blender to the agency,” said Marie Owens, president of Council 238. “Frankly, it’s frightening, people are asking, should I leave before all this happens?” Fewer obstacles During his four years in office, Mr. Trump tried to roll back or weaken nearly 100 environmental rules, including Obama-era limits on greenhouse gases from power plants and cars and wetlands protections. But deregulation often proved more challenging than expected. Scaling back federal regulations is an arduous, time-consuming process that requires agencies to lay out detailed justifications for changing rules, respond to public comments and then defend the moves in federal court. Judges often have little patience for rushed or sloppy work. In Mr. Trump’s first term, officials sometimes announced they had erased a regulation only to be reversed by the courts because they had skipped important steps. All told, the administration lost 57 percent of cases challenging its environmental policies, a much higher loss rate than previous administrations, according to a database kept by New York University’s Institute for Policy Integrity. At various points, courts overturned the Trump administration’s attempts to relax restrictions on carbon-dioxide emissions from power plants; blocked a rule that would have limited what scientific studies the E.P.A. could use; and found the administration broke the law when it failed to enact nationwide standards to curb harmful ozone pollution. Judges also rejected attempts to take gray wolves off the endangered species list and to roll back rules that restricted methane leaks from oil and gas wells. Image Smokestacks against a landscape streaked with the red colors of taillights. Mr. Trump has promised to do away with regulations designed to reduce greenhouse gases from power plants and cars.Credit...Natalie Behring/Associated Press Jason Schwartz, the legal director of the Institute for Policy Integrity, said the Trump administration’s regulatory rollbacks often ignored congressional statutes or inflated the costs of regulations on industry. Mr. Trump’s allies have presumably learned from those missteps, experts said. “The first Trump administration came in without having been prepared to take over the government,” said Jeffrey Holmstead, a former senior E.P.A. official in President George W. Bush’s administration who now works as an energy lawyer for Bracewell LLP. “I don’t think they’ll make the same mistakes again.” Have Climate Questions? Get Answers Here. What’s causing global warming? How can we fix it? This interactive F.A.Q. will tackle your climate questions big and small. The courts could also prove more sympathetic next time around. With three Supreme Court justices appointed by Mr. Trump, the court now has a conservative supermajority that has shown a deep skepticism toward environmental regulation. The court has sometimes blocked rules that were still being adjudicated in lower courts or before they were implemented. In June, the Supreme Court overturned the so-called Chevron doctrine, which for 40 years said that courts should defer to government agencies when a law is unclear. That ruling could undercut the regulatory authority of many federal agencies. The Supreme Court also halted E.P.A. rules that limited smokestack pollution blowing across state borders, overturned expanded protections for millions of acres of wetlands and narrowed the agency’s ability to regulate emissions from power plants. Thomas J. Pyle, president of the American Energy Alliance, which supports the fossil fuel industry, said the Supreme Court’s decision on Chevron could help a second Trump administration revoke California’s authority to set stricter tailpipe pollution standards than the federal government, which the state is using to phase out sales of gasoline-powered cars in favor of electric models. Image Members of the media set up in front of a building. Mr. Trump’s ambitions could win support from the Supreme Court’s conservative supermajority.Credit...Jason Andrew for The New York Times A second Trump administration might also find the lower federal courts to be more receptive, after Mr. Trump installed more than 200 conservative judges in his first term. Some of those appointees recently ordered the Biden administration to lift its pause on approvals for natural-gas export terminals and struck down a regulation that would have required states to measure greenhouse gases from transportation. “It’s a much more favorable judiciary for a new Trump administration and his allies,” said Jody Freeman, director of the Harvard Law School Environmental and Energy Law Program. “They’d meet with not just less resistance in the courts, on average, but a certain appetite for doing the things they’d want to do.” To be sure, experts said a second Trump administration wouldn’t enjoy completely free rein. Many E.P.A. rules, for instance, are litigated in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, where two-thirds of current judges were appointed by Democrats. And the Supreme Court’s overturning of Chevron might make it harder in some cases to water down existing regulations, said Mr. Holmstead. Some Republicans also downplayed the importance of Project 2025, saying that many businesses aren’t eager to gut the E.P.A. “Industry is no longer debating whether climate change is happening, many are actively working on the energy transition and don’t necessarily want to see climate work at agencies eliminated,” said Samantha Dravis, who served as E.P.A.’s policy chief in the Trump administration. Environmental groups are preparing to fight. Many say they are studying Project 2025 and mapping out legal arguments that might sway conservative-leaning courts. The Natural Resources Defense Council points out that it won 89 percent of its 163 lawsuits against the first Trump administration. “The reason we won those cases is because presidents have to follow the law, and that’s not going to change with the election,” said Michael Wall, chief litigation officer for the Natural Resources Defense Council Action Fund. “We have every reason to think they took lessons from the first term, but it’s also true that we took lessons from their first term.” Still, many environmentalists say that while they might block some moves, they can’t force a Trump administration to adopt policies that will cut greenhouse gases. And the window to limit global warming to relatively low levels is rapidly closing. “There’s no skeleton key that’s going to protect everything Biden has accomplished,” said Sam Ricketts, founder of S2 Strategies, a clean-energy consulting group. “I’d love to say that there is a fail-safe plan to protect the gains we’ve made should Trump be president again. There is not.”

**Trump 2024 causes climate change-that pushes marginalized communities to the breaking point**

**Darian-Smith 24’**[(Eve, Professor and Chair of the Department of Global and International Studies at the University of California, Irvine.) “The Challenge of Political Will, Global Democracy and Environmentalism”, Environmental Policy and Law, 6/4/24, <https://content.iospress.com/articles/environmental-policy-and-law/epl239023>] TDI

1Introduction: 2024 A Make-or-Break Year The year 2024 can be understood as a watershed moment in terms of democracy and its sustainability as a political ideology around the world. Throughout the year, nearly 60 national elections will be held to determine new presidents, prime ministers, and national leaders in countries such as India, Mexico and the UK. In addition, the entire 27 countries of the European Union will be involved in electing 720 members to the European Parliament. These elections involve billions of people –nearly half the global population –in every part of the world including the United States. According to some commentators, this year will experience “one of the largest and most consequential democratic exercises in living memory. The results will affect how the world is run for decades to come”.1 Already in the early months of 2024 national elections have taken place in Indonesia and Pakistan. Notably, political campaigning in both countries rarely referred to the climate emergency as a central electoral issue, despite citizens’ respective fears of rising oceans and devastating droughts and floods related to planetary warming. Similarly, as political campaigning steps up in the UK, US, and India, there is little discourse to the climate emergency as a central pillar of any political party. Across the global political landscape there appears to be a lack of interest in discussing, let alone suggesting possible solutions, to the climate crisis beyond vague references to quasi-scientific techno-fixes such as CO2 capture, storage and conversion, as well as vague promises of transitioning to renewable energy. Canada is a notable case in this regard. Its dependence on oil sands and fracking, which requires more energy for extraction than conventional drilling, has ushered in a quagmire of confusing policies that in the end have done very little to bring the country towards fulfilling its greenhouse gas reduction pledges. This essay explores why –despite worldwide climate science consensus that we are facing ecological collapse and increasing weather catastrophes –there is little discussion about the climate as a central priority of political parties among the upcoming wave of elections. This silence around the climate emergency raises several pressing questions: Why is there limited political will on behalf of national leaders when it comes to mitigating the climate crisis? What does this suggest about the state of democracy when political leaders can sidestep and ignore the escalating demands of their constituencies? Where does this apathy at the national level leave the world’s population facing a climate emergency, and what **possible actions** can be **taken by ordinary people experiencing** in their **everyday lives** the **impacts of planetary warming**? In thinking about these complex questions, I argue that we need to examine the lack of national political will to address environmental degradation against a global geopolitical backdrop of rising antidemocracy and authoritarianism. By highlighting the clear connection between climate inaction and far-right politics, the pathway forward becomes clear. Connecting two global trends –**rising antidemocracy** and **escalating climate crises** –sheds light on what is the biggest hurdle in mitigating ecological collapse. This is the collusion between extremist politicians and international energy and banking sectors upon which a growing number of these national leaders depend to finance their political campaigns.2 This connection underscores the message presented in the United Nation’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report titled “Mitigation of Climate Change” (2022). According to the report, the scientific expertise and know-how to slow planetary warming is already available. Missing, however, is what the report states as “the lack of political will”. In the context of many national governments procrastinating around the climate emergency, this essay is an urgent call for all efforts–particularly in major polluting nations in the global north such as the United States, Canada and Australia–to press political leaders on their environmental policies and to use the electoral process to demand immediate action. Putting this differently, the environmental crisis must become part of national political conversation and a central issue in upcoming national elections. Concurrently, these efforts will also require fighting back against far-right efforts to suppress voting and censoring journalists and independent media, which is proving very challenging in the United States and elsewhere. Despite these uphill battles presented by a global lean toward antidemocracy, the stakes could not be higher. Given the extraordinary number of national elections taking place throughout 2024, this year presents a make-or-break moment in terms of stalling planetary warming and planning for viable collective futures. 2Rising Antidemocracy and the Global Lean Toward Authoritarianism Around the world watchdog organizations such as Freedom House and V-Dem, as well as the Economist and other international organizations, have shown a decline in democratic societies around the world.3 Charting metrics such as the right to vote, access the law, free media and an independent judiciary, these organizations show that basic democratic principles have declined over the past decade with a particularly quick drop during the COVID-19 pandemic (Fig. 1). Fig. 1 Living a Less Free World. Freedom House Freedom in the World Report 2022, page 4. Living a Less Free World. Freedom House Freedom in the World Report 2022, page 4. According to the Economist’s EIU report (which charts a broader set of 60 indicators to measure political democracy than that used by Freedom House) there has been a rather dramatic decline in democratic governance since 2015 (See Fig. 2). The report notes that across the world’s population “Only 7.8% reside in a ‘full democracy’, down from 8.9% in 2015; this percentage fell after the US was demoted from a ‘full democracy’ to a ‘flawed democracy’ in 2016”. The report goes on, “More than one-third of the world’s population live under authoritarian rule (39.4%), a share that has been creeping up in recent years”.4 These gloomy statistics are confirmed by the holocaust historian Dan Stone who sees echoes in today’s antidemocratic politics with past fascist regimes. Ominously, he argues that with the rise of the radical right across Europe, the United States and elsewhere, “fascism is not yet in power. But it is knocking on the door”.5 Fig. 2 The Economist: Democracy Index 2023: Age of Conflict, page 3. The Economist: Democracy Index 2023: Age of Conflict, page 3. Analysts of the global antidemocratic trend tend to focus on issues such as stricter border security, draconian anti-immigration laws, unilateral trade agreements, and white racist ideology that involves Islamophobia and antisemitism. I argue that less noticed, but arguably even more important, is the far-right’s weaponization of the environment in recent years. In my work I show additional factors that should be considered as symptomatic of the global antidemocratic trend. These include the withdrawal of many countries’ commitment to multilateral cooperation to reduce greenhouse gases as pledged in the Paris Agreement in 2015, as well as the rolling back of national environmental policies that protect lands from mining, environments and rainforests from pollution, and animals from potential extinction. Importantly, these policies and practices are occurring in global north and global south countries across a wide range of antidemocratic regimes including those that claim to be liberal democracies. In the United States, the politicization of the environment was very apparent under the former **Trump administration** that **rolled back 50 years of environmental** laws, opened up national parks to drilling and mining, withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreement, and stacked the Supreme Court with a conservative 6–3 supermajority that decided to gut the powers of the Environmental Protection Agency (West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency (2022). While current Democratic President Joe Biden has tried to reverse this course of action underscored by his pro-climate Inflation Reduction Act (2022), **the harm caused by Trump is long-term and runs deep**. Apart from the difficulty of reinstating environmental legislation, it is legally challenging to withdraw mining leases and federal contracts. At the international level, even though the United States has under Biden rejoined the Paris Agreement, the possibility of returning to the global pro-climate momentum of ten years ago that led to the landmark Paris Agreement in 2015 now seems very remote and rather quaint. Notably, 2015 was a high point in the terms of the global democratic index (Fig. 2). The rapid decline in the index since then is a telling reflection of how fast the world has shifted politically toward authoritarianism and away from pro-climate mobilization within less than a decade. 3Environmental Impacts and Public Demands for Climate Action Every country around the world has been impacted to varying degrees by the accelerating climate crisis in recent years. Devastating heat domes and torrential rains have caused enormous swathes of land to burn and drown, and hundreds of thousands of people to flee and be dispossessed of their homelands. Unfortunately, these **environmental impacts disproportionately affect those living in less wealthy countries** of the global south, particularly people **in marginalized socioeconomic positions**. Putting this differently, **the poor and impoverished have most immediately** and **consequentially experienced** the **adverse impacts** of the climate emergency. However, with climate scientists predicting 2024 to be the hottest in recorded history, even the wealthy are now feeling the effects. In other words, nobody can pretend that we are not facing a real and imminent climate emergency. While climate science denialism continues to have sway among some far-right political groups and their constituencies, beyond such extreme communities (i.e. Trump’s core MAGA base) there is global recognition **that humankind must act immediately to mitigate a climate catastrophe**. Not surprisingly, climate anxiety is real, widespread and accelerating, particularly among younger generations.6 This helps explain pro-climate demonstrations around the world throughout 2019 before political momentum was disrupted by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Spearheaded by then high school student Greta Thunberg who started the “School Strike for Climate” social movement in 2018,7 the Global Climate Strike fostered massive demonstrations for a week in September 2019 that coincided with the United Nations Climate Action Summit.8 The September protests saw over 4,500 mass mobilizations in 150 countries with an estimated participation of over six million people. These public protests, in tandem with real life experiences of millions of people on the frontlines of the climate crisis, underscore growing alarm around the climate emergency. This alarm is evidenced in numerous polls showing that most of the world’s population considers the climate crisis a threat requiring urgent political action. For instance, a group of European economists have conducted a survey across 125 countries, interviewing nearly 130,000 people. According to the authors there is “an almost universal global demand for intensifying political action. Across the globe, 89% of respondents state that their national governments should do more to fight global warming. In more than half the countries in our sample, the demand for more government action exceeds 90% ”.9 4Antidemocracy and Anti-environmentalism Despite political demands by huge majorities of ordinary people around the world, political leaders are failing to listen and respond to their citizens. In my book Global Burning: Rising Antidemocracy and the Climate Crisis (2022),10 I examine why this is the case and conclude that the world is experiencing two interrelated global phenomena –rising authoritarianism and escalating planetary warming. These interrelated global trends point to the collusion between a wave of far-right political strongmen over the past decade and their increasing reliance on Big Oil and global banks to finance their electoral campaigns and keep them in office. The book compares catastrophic wildfires in Australia, Brazil and the United States that broke out in 2019-2020 under the far-right leadership of Scott Morrison, Jair Bolsonaro and Donald Trump respectively. I show that each leader came to power on several promises that included the deregulation of environmental laws and promotion of anti-environmental policies that explicitly appealed to mining corporations, agribusiness, and their global financiers. Unfortunately, I could have chosen any number of countries with a similar turn toward far-right extremism and political pandering to the fossil fuel industry. For instance, in September 2022 Sweden, Britain and Italy elected to office far-right leaders. Sweden voted in Jimmie ringAkesson, leader of the far-right party the Sweden Democrats. The party has a deep association with white supremacy and was the only Swedish party to push a climate-skeptic position and oppose the ratification of the Paris Agreement. Again, in September 2022, Britain’s conservative party voted in Liz Truss, a former Shell executive, who quickly overturned a ban on fracking and increased investments in North Sea oil and gas. Truss lasted less than two months in office before being ousted by current Prime Minister Rishi Sunak who has continued to pursue a pro-extraction energy agenda and roll back environmental regulations. Finally, again in September 2022, Italy elected Giorgia Meloni as Prime Minister and leader of the Brothers of Italy party which has deep fascist connections and historically opposed EU plans to reduce gas emissions. At the time of her election, fears that Meloni would open up gas and oil leasing was a major concern for environmental scientists and civil society organizations. That fear remains high. In early 2024, Meloni convened a summit in Rome with two dozen African and European leaders, announcing plans for Italy to become an “energy hub” and creating “a bridge between Europe and Africa” in the so-called Mattei Plan (named after Enrico Mattei and founder of the state oil and gas company Eni in the post-war II era).11 According to Silvia Francescon from the pro-climate Italian think tank Ecco, “There is no reference to the Paris Agreement or the COP decisions. Based on what we currently know, there is undoubtedly a risk that funds meant for climate and international development could be used for projects managed by companies like Eni”. She goes on, “The ambiguity is very worrying”.12 Turning to the more recent national elections in the Netherlands and Argentina in November 2023, and Pakistan and Indonesia in February 2024, the four countries have elected to office far-right political leaders. Argentina, Pakistan and Indonesia voted in Javier Milei, Imran Khan and Prabowo Subianto respectively –all men well-known for their human rights abuses and corruption. The three countries are now widely regarded by the international community to be on a downward trajectory of democratic backsliding. With respect to all four new governments’ policies on the environment, the future looks very bleak. (1) In the Netherlands, far-right Geert Wilders won the Netherlands general election in November 2023 on campaign promises vowing to tear up European Union climate policies. It is not clear how he will be able to exert strong leadership over a coalition government, but Wilders has stated he plans to remove the Netherlands from the Paris Agreement, ramp up oil and gas drilling in the North Sea, and stop the transition to renewable solar and wind energy.13 (2) In Argentina, Javier Milei rose to presidency in November 2023 on a campaign that targeted what he called elite politicians who he denounced as lazy and immoral. Using rhetoric that echoed that of far-right Donald Trump (US) and Jair Bolsonaro (Brazil), Milei claimed to represent the ordinary worker and promised to clean up the economy and crime. Once in office, he added neo-Nazis to his administration and quickly set in motion aggressive polices for deregulating the economy that resulted in a sharp currency devaluation and widespread austerity measures. Attacks on public health, public education and workers’ rights led to massive protests and demonstrations in early 2024. With respect to the environment, Milei denounced climate change as a “socialist lie” that interfered with his free-market policies and called climate science “fake”.14 Given the widespread precarity of millions of people, the marginalized social groups championing the environment have considerable challenges ahead if they are going to turn government policies toward a pro-climate agenda. (3) In Pakistan the major political parties running for government in February 2024 all included reference to the environment in their manifesto statements.15 But specific details about climate mitigation were lacking, and there appeared to be more rhetoric than actual policy and practical implementation. The election results startled everyone, with Imran Khan getting the most votes despite being held in jail. A new coalition government was formed that included the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), with both groups committed to blocking Imran Khan’s party (PTI) form assuming power. In the political jostling of multiparty leadership, climate action will probably not be prioritized despite the desperate urgency faced by the nation’s population still reeling from catastrophic floods in 2022. (4) In Indonesia, the world’s third largest democracy, far-right Prabowo Subianto was voted in as the new president in February 2024. Indonesia is the world’s largest exporter of coal, primarily to China. In addition to expanding its export coal production in recent years, coal is needed to support the extraction of nickel for the development of the country’s domestic battery-making industry. Compounding Indonesia’s rapid escalation of carbon dioxide emissions through mining, the country is the world’s largest exporter of palm oil. Deforestation of palm trees and other biofuels is a major concern among environmental activists and has led to Indigenous communities being driven from their lands and forests. These groups are also very wary of Prabowo Subianto who was removed from the army a few years ago for kidnapping political dissenters. As the new president, there is every indication that Prabowo Subianto will continue the plans of outgoing president Joko Widodo who, despite promises to shift away from coal, in fact increasingly ramped up coal, nickel and palm oil production. Among environmental groups, there are widespread fears that Mr. Prabowo will return to his former style of kidnapping and silencing those associated with resistance to national anti-climate policies. Upcoming national elections in South Africa, India, and across the EU will all probably return increased power to extremist –and in some cases explicitly neofascist –political figures and parties. In the United States, the November 2024 presidential election is already agitating environmental activists and climate scientists. **Trump** has indicated that if **re-elected, his second term will be even more severe than the first** and he will aggressively drive fossil fuel production, open national parks to mining and drilling leases, further diminish laws regulating greenhouse gas emissions, undermine and underfund the EPA, and again withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement.16 According to Andrew Rosenberg, a former National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration official, “**A return of Trump would be, in a word, horrific**”. He went on, “It would also be incredibly stupid. It would **roll back progress** made over decades to protect public health and safety, [and] there is no logic to it other than to **destroy everything**. People who support him may not realize it’s their lives at stake, too.”17 Political commentators anticipate that with the rise around the world of antidemocratic regimes there will be a correlative rise in anti-climate legislation and reduced political will at the national level to mitigate the climate emergency. National elections so far in 2024 illustrate that this is a likely scenario. These unfolding elections underscore the connection between antidemocratic politics, climate science skepticism and anti-environmentalism that together perpetrate harm on citizens and promote the degradation of environments. Future national elections throughout the year also bode badly for any aggressive pro-climate laws and policies. Globally, renewed enthusiasm among nations to either honor their respective greenhouse gas emissions pledges or build multilateral collective solutions to slowing the warming planet appears very remote. 5The Global Wave of Anti-Protest Laws A global wave of repressive laws against free speech and public peaceful dissent has emerged in recent years. These anti-protest laws correlate to increasing numbers of antidemocratic leaders determined to shut down challenges to their authority to govern. Civicus Monitor is a watchdog organization with global alliances around the world that has been tracking restrictions on public protests for over two decades.18 Its findings are that excessive force and detentions of people who have demonstrated in the streets is rapidly escalating. In 2022 it reported that the right to protest peacefully, which is protected under international law, had been violated in over 75% of countries where public protests took place. In 2023, it reported that “Among the most targeted and worst-affected groups in 2023 are those advocating for democracy, better governance and protecting the environment”.19 Disturbingly, in the United States the push for anti-protest laws has often been led by multinational fossil fuel companies such as ExxonMobil, Murray Energy Corporation, Chevron and TransCanada. Since 2016, energy companies have worked with law enforcement agencies, lobbyists, think tanks and Republican politicians to enact a range of sweeping anti-protest laws in 21 states that prosecute demonstrators for coming near “infrastructure” such as gas pipelines. These laws emerged as a direct response to Dakota Access Pipeline protests at Standing Rock in 2016 which drew international attention for the violent response of police to peaceful climate protestors that included small farmers and Indigenous peoples on whose lands the pipes were laid (Fig. 3). Notably, many of these anti-protest laws drew their inspiration from model legislation drafted by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a conservative organization funded by Big Oil companies. Fig. 3 Standing Rock solidarity march in San Francisco, November 2016. Photograph by Pax Ahimsa Gethen. (Wikimedia Commons). Standing Rock solidarity march in San Francisco, November 2016. Photograph by Pax Ahimsa Gethen. (Wikimedia Commons). In 2020, the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), an independent think tank based in Washington DC, issued a report titled Muzzling Dissent: How Corporate Influence over Politics Has Fueled Anti-Protest Laws. The report focused on three states –Louisiana, Minnesota and West Virginia –and explored a new legal tactic used by elected officials who are “under the thumb of powerful corporate lobby interests”. In its executive summary, the report stated: Since 2017, so called “Critical Infrastructure Protection” laws targeting protests movement have sprung up in states around the country, in an effort to muzzle opposition to construction of oil and gas pipelines and other polluting chemical and fossil fuel facilities. Under the premise of protecting infrastructure projects, these laws mandate harsh charges and penalties for exercising constitutional rights to freely assemble and to protest.20 Importantly, the report commented on the implications of these laws for broader protests on a range of social justice issues. Criminalization of protests elevates political and corporate interests above civil rights and civil liberties protected under the US Constitution. This report offers a particularly timely examination of a set of laws that carry implications not only for environmental and Indigenous activists and movements, but also for broader social justice movements that utilize protests as a means to effect change. These laws that aim to inflict harsh penalties for protesting oil and gas projects also impact ongoing national protests against police brutality and future protests that might result from the results of the presidential election. 21 A more recent report was published by Greenpeace titled Dollars vs Democracy 2023: Inside the Fossil Fuel Industry’s Playbook to Suppress Protest and Dissent in the United States.22 This report builds on the earlier IPS report, detailing the way fossil fuel companies have colluded with the far right to silence political dissent across 21 states. This has resulted in about 60 percent of US oil and gas operations being shielded from public demonstrations. In addition to the anti-protest laws, Greenpeace mapped a legal strategy whereby oil companies use civil lawsuits (called SLAPPS) to harass and intimidate climate activists and chill legitimate political dissent. Oil companies also provide subsidies to law enforcement agencies for their assistance in cracking down on protestors, as well as sometimes employing private security firms that include “off-duty” police officers. According to its executive summary: In many cases, the fossil fuel industry has worked in lockstep with government allies: officials who may share in the industry’s ideology, but who have also benefited from its election spending, lobbying, targeted payments, and shared financial interests, or have passed through the “revolving door” from industry to government or vice versa. Commenting on the Greenpeace report, Nicholas Robinson, at the International Center for Not-For-Profit Law, said “The fossil fuel industry has lobbied for these extreme anti-protest laws to shut down criticism of them. Climate change is an urgent challenge and all Americans, including the communities most impacted by these fossil fuel projects, have a right to have their voice heard, not silenced, at this critical moment for the planet”.23 Outside the United States, anti-protest laws are equally, if not more, oppressive. For instance, in Australia protestors face severe fines of $25,000 and up to five years in jail for non-violent acts such as blocking traffic, preventing logging in a forest, or remaining in a public place if asked to leave. Harsh new laws have often been rushed through state parliaments with little public debate or comment. The scholar Sophie McNeill argued, “This politically motivated crackdown on protest by successive Australian authorities appears designed to intimidate the climate movement and create a chilling effect on those thinking of taking to the streets.”24 Similar to what is happening in Australia, across Europe in Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, harsh new anti-protest laws have been enacted resulting in mass arrests and the labeling of protestors as “eco-terrorists”, “rioters” and “hooligans”. For instance, in the Hague, Netherlands, water cannon was used to break up a large climate protest in May 2023. More than 1,500 people were arrested and seven activists convicted of sedition for encouraging people to attend a public protest. Britain has led the charge with the most repressive and wide-ranging laws introduced in recent years through the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act (2022) and the Public Order Act (2023). These laws have been pushed by the conservative government and energy lobbyists in direct response to a range of high-profile protests calling for the stop of gas and oil leases being issued and demanding a transition to renewable energy by activist groups such as Greenpeace, Just Stop Oil and Extinction Rebellion (Fig. 4). According to Michael Frost, UN rapporteur on environmental defenders, what is unfolding in Britain is “terrifying” and providing a roadmap for other countries to pass similar legislation. Frost also noted that in crackdowns in Britain and across Europe, police agencies play a coordinated role. Fig. 4 Just Stop Oil activists walking up Whitehall towards Trafalgar Square on Saturday 20 May 2023. Photograph by Alisdare Hickson. (Wikimedia Commons). Just Stop Oil activists walking up Whitehall towards Trafalgar Square on Saturday 20 May 2023. Photograph by Alisdare Hickson. (Wikimedia Commons). I’m sure that there is European cooperation among the police forces against these kinds of activities. My concern is that when [governments] are calling these people eco-terrorists, or are using new forms of vilification and defamation ...  it has a huge impact on how the population may perceive them and the cause for which these people are fighting. It is a huge concern for me.25 Adds Catrinel Motoc, senior campaigner at Amnesty International, “People all around the world are bravely raising their voices to call for urgent actions on the climate crisis but many face dire consequences for their peaceful activism”.26 What the escalating anti-protest laws around the world highlight is that the “fight” against climate change is being redefined and imbued with new meaning. It is no longer only a **fight by humans to mitigate** a warming planet and defend the natural world and the **human species from extinction**. Increasingly, with the global rise of antidemocratic governments, the fight has morphed into a battlefront constructed by far-right leaders against their own citizens. This new battle line is driven by the need to prevent people from speaking up and peacefully demonstrating against pro-fossil fuel laws and policies. Given worldwide political demand by everyday citizens for their leaders to address the climate emergency, this reconfigured fight has become a lot more complicated. For the many millions of people taking to the streets to demand government action to avert ecological collapse, the stakes have skyrocketed in terms of monetary fines and threats of repression, incarceration, and violence. 6Conclusion John Kerry, the United States climate chief, in announcing his stepping down in February 2024, urged political leaders around the world to stop delaying on climate mitigation. In pointing to the lack of political will, he said that some leaders have intentionally denied climate science and promoted disinformation, arguing that these leaders “are willing to put the whole world at risk for whatever political motivations may be behind their choices.” He went on to say that no country would be spared by the climate emergency: “This is a multilateral major challenge to the security of every nation on this planet, because we’re one planet, and we’re all linked”.27 Despite such dire warnings, Kerry’s words will likely have very little impact on national leadership, particularly going into a year of many national elections. As stated by Bharat Desai, professor of international law, “It remains to be seen as to how the UN member states earnestly walk-the-talk to stand by the planet Earth”.28 Given mounting geopolitical realities and lack of national political will, there is an urgent need to push for alterative political practices to address the climate emergency. Sub-states and cities are emerging as hubs of innovation and are now at the forefront of building new coalitions and networks at both translocal and transnational scales in implementing pro-climate strategies. These lower-level government initiatives are also increasingly working with grassroots climate activists, educators, farmers, property developers, infrastructure experts, labor representatives and other groups immediately impacted by a warming planet. There is a deep concern to counter widespread disinformation and communicate to wider populations the urgent need to address the climate crisis. It is increasingly clear that it will be up to local communities in cities, sub-states and regions to take the lead in mitigating the climate emergency and transcend the lack of political will among ethically and financially compromised antidemocratic national leaders.

#### **Trump’s stance against democracy causes climate catastrophe-extinction**

Darian-Smith 24’[(Eve, Professor and Chair of the Department of Global and International Studies at the University of California, Irvine.) “The Challenge of Political Will, Global Democracy and Environmentalism”, Environmental Policy and Law, 6/4/24, <https://content.iospress.com/articles/environmental-policy-and-law/epl239023>] TDI

1Introduction: 2024 A Make-or-Break Year The year 2024 can be understood as a watershed moment in terms of democracy and its sustainability as a political ideology around the world. Throughout the year, nearly 60 national elections will be held to determine new presidents, prime ministers, and national leaders in countries such as India, Mexico and the UK. In addition, the entire 27 countries of the European Union will be involved in electing 720 members to the European Parliament. These elections involve billions of people –nearly half the global population –in every part of the world including the United States. According to some commentators, this year will experience “one of the largest and most consequential democratic exercises in living memory. The results will affect how the world is run for decades to come”.1 Already in the early months of 2024 national elections have taken place in Indonesia and Pakistan. Notably, political campaigning in both countries rarely referred to the climate emergency as a central electoral issue, despite citizens’ respective fears of rising oceans and devastating droughts and floods related to planetary warming. Similarly, as political campaigning steps up in the UK, US, and India, there is little discourse to the climate emergency as a central pillar of any political party. Across the global political landscape there appears to be a lack of interest in discussing, let alone suggesting possible solutions, to the climate crisis beyond vague references to quasi-scientific techno-fixes such as CO2 capture, storage and conversion, as well as vague promises of transitioning to renewable energy. Canada is a notable case in this regard. Its dependence on oil sands and fracking, which requires more energy for extraction than conventional drilling, has ushered in a quagmire of confusing policies that in the end have done very little to bring the country towards fulfilling its greenhouse gas reduction pledges. This essay explores why –despite worldwide climate science consensus that we are facing ecological collapse and increasing weather catastrophes –there is little discussion about the climate as a central priority of political parties among the upcoming wave of elections. This silence around the climate emergency raises several pressing questions: Why is there limited political will on behalf of national leaders when it comes to mitigating the climate crisis? What does this suggest about the state of democracy when political leaders can sidestep and ignore the escalating demands of their constituencies? Where does this apathy at the national level leave the world’s population facing a climate emergency, and what possible actions can be taken by ordinary people experiencing in their everyday lives the impacts of planetary warming? In thinking about these complex questions, I argue that we need to examine the lack of national political will to address environmental degradation against a global geopolitical backdrop of rising antidemocracy and authoritarianism. By highlighting the clear connection between climate inaction and far-right politics, the pathway forward becomes clear. Connecting two global trends –rising antidemocracy and escalating climate crises –sheds light on what is the biggest hurdle in mitigating ecological collapse. This is the collusion between extremist politicians and international energy and banking sectors upon which a growing number of these national leaders depend to finance their political campaigns.2 This connection underscores the message presented in the United Nation’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report titled “Mitigation of Climate Change” (2022). According to the report, the scientific expertise and know-how to slow planetary warming is already available. Missing, however, is what the report states as “the lack of political will”. In the context of many national governments procrastinating around the climate emergency, this essay is an urgent call for all efforts–particularly in major polluting nations in the global north such as the United States, Canada and Australia–to press political leaders on their environmental policies and to use the electoral process to demand immediate action. Putting this differently, the environmental crisis must become part of national political conversation and a central issue in upcoming national elections. Concurrently, these efforts will also require fighting back against far-right efforts to suppress voting and censoring journalists and independent media, which is proving very challenging in the United States and elsewhere. Despite these uphill battles presented by a global lean toward antidemocracy, the stakes could not be higher. Given the extraordinary number of national elections taking place throughout 2024, this year presents a make-or-break moment in terms of stalling planetary warming and planning for viable collective futures. 2Rising Antidemocracy and the Global Lean Toward Authoritarianism Around the world watchdog organizations such as Freedom House and V-Dem, as well as the Economist and other international organizations, have shown a decline in democratic societies around the world.3 Charting metrics such as the right to vote, access the law, free media and an independent judiciary, these organizations show that basic democratic principles have declined over the past decade with a particularly quick drop during the COVID-19 pandemic (Fig. 1). Fig. 1 Living a Less Free World. Freedom House Freedom in the World Report 2022, page 4. Living a Less Free World. Freedom House Freedom in the World Report 2022, page 4. 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But it is knocking on the door”.5 Fig. 2 The Economist: Democracy Index 2023: Age of Conflict, page 3. The Economist: Democracy Index 2023: Age of Conflict, page 3. Analysts of the global antidemocratic trend tend to focus on issues such as stricter border security, draconian anti-immigration laws, unilateral trade agreements, and white racist ideology that involves Islamophobia and antisemitism. I argue that less noticed, but arguably even more important, is the far-right’s weaponization of the environment in recent years. In my work I show additional factors that should be considered as symptomatic of the global antidemocratic trend. These include the withdrawal of many countries’ commitment to multilateral cooperation to reduce greenhouse gases as pledged in the Paris Agreement in 2015, as well as the rolling back of national environmental policies that protect lands from mining, environments and rainforests from pollution, and animals from potential extinction. Importantly, these policies and practices are occurring in global north and global south countries across a wide range of antidemocratic regimes including those that claim to be liberal democracies. In the United States, the politicization of the environment was very apparent under the former Trump administration that rolled back 50 years of environmental laws, opened up national parks to drilling and mining, withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreement, and stacked the Supreme Court with a conservative 6–3 supermajority that decided to gut the powers of the Environmental Protection Agency (West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency (2022). While current Democratic President Joe Biden has tried to reverse this course of action underscored by his pro-climate Inflation Reduction Act (2022), the harm caused by Trump is long-term and runs deep. Apart from the difficulty of reinstating environmental legislation, it is legally challenging to withdraw mining leases and federal contracts. At the international level, even though the United States has under Biden rejoined the Paris Agreement, the possibility of returning to the global pro-climate momentum of ten years ago that led to the landmark Paris Agreement in 2015 now seems very remote and rather quaint. Notably, 2015 was a high point in the terms of the global democratic index (Fig. 2). The rapid decline in the index since then is a telling reflection of how fast the world has shifted politically toward authoritarianism and away from pro-climate mobilization within less than a decade. 3Environmental Impacts and Public Demands for Climate Action Every country around the world has been impacted to varying degrees by the accelerating climate crisis in recent years. Devastating heat domes and torrential rains have caused enormous swathes of land to burn and drown, and hundreds of thousands of people to flee and be dispossessed of their homelands. Unfortunately, these environmental impacts disproportionately affect those living in less wealthy countries of the global south, particularly people in marginalized socioeconomic positions. Putting this differently, the poor and impoverished have most immediately and consequentially experienced the adverse impacts of the climate emergency. However, with climate scientists predicting 2024 to be the hottest in recorded history, even the wealthy are now feeling the effects. In other words, nobody can pretend that we are not facing a real and imminent climate emergency. While climate science denialism continues to have sway among some far-right political groups and their constituencies, beyond such extreme communities (i.e. Trump’s core MAGA base) there is global recognition that humankind must act immediately to mitigate a climate catastrophe. Not surprisingly, climate anxiety is real, widespread and accelerating, particularly among younger generations.6 This helps explain pro-climate demonstrations around the world throughout 2019 before political momentum was disrupted by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Spearheaded by then high school student Greta Thunberg who started the “School Strike for Climate” social movement in 2018,7 the Global Climate Strike fostered massive demonstrations for a week in September 2019 that coincided with the United Nations Climate Action Summit.8 The September protests saw over 4,500 mass mobilizations in 150 countries with an estimated participation of over six million people. These public protests, in tandem with real life experiences of millions of people on the frontlines of the climate crisis, underscore growing alarm around the climate emergency. This alarm is evidenced in numerous polls showing that most of the world’s population considers the climate crisis a threat requiring urgent political action. For instance, a group of European economists have conducted a survey across 125 countries, interviewing nearly 130,000 people. According to the authors there is “an almost universal global demand for intensifying political action. Across the globe, 89% of respondents state that their national governments should do more to fight global warming. In more than half the countries in our sample, the demand for more government action exceeds 90% ”.9 4Antidemocracy and Anti-environmentalism Despite political demands by huge majorities of ordinary people around the world, political leaders are failing to listen and respond to their citizens. In my book Global Burning: Rising Antidemocracy and the Climate Crisis (2022),10 I examine why this is the case and conclude that the world is experiencing two interrelated global phenomena –rising authoritarianism and escalating planetary warming. These interrelated global trends point to the collusion between a wave of far-right political strongmen over the past decade and their increasing reliance on Big Oil and global banks to finance their electoral campaigns and keep them in office. The book compares catastrophic wildfires in Australia, Brazil and the United States that broke out in 2019-2020 under the far-right leadership of Scott Morrison, Jair Bolsonaro and Donald Trump respectively. I show that each leader came to power on several promises that included the deregulation of environmental laws and promotion of anti-environmental policies that explicitly appealed to mining corporations, agribusiness, and their global financiers. Unfortunately, I could have chosen any number of countries with a similar turn toward far-right extremism and political pandering to the fossil fuel industry. For instance, in September 2022 Sweden, Britain and Italy elected to office far-right leaders. Sweden voted in Jimmie ringAkesson, leader of the far-right party the Sweden Democrats. The party has a deep association with white supremacy and was the only Swedish party to push a climate-skeptic position and oppose the ratification of the Paris Agreement. Again, in September 2022, Britain’s conservative party voted in Liz Truss, a former Shell executive, who quickly overturned a ban on fracking and increased investments in North Sea oil and gas. Truss lasted less than two months in office before being ousted by current Prime Minister Rishi Sunak who has continued to pursue a pro-extraction energy agenda and roll back environmental regulations. Finally, again in September 2022, Italy elected Giorgia Meloni as Prime Minister and leader of the Brothers of Italy party which has deep fascist connections and historically opposed EU plans to reduce gas emissions. At the time of her election, fears that Meloni would open up gas and oil leasing was a major concern for environmental scientists and civil society organizations. That fear remains high. In early 2024, Meloni convened a summit in Rome with two dozen African and European leaders, announcing plans for Italy to become an “energy hub” and creating “a bridge between Europe and Africa” in the so-called Mattei Plan (named after Enrico Mattei and founder of the state oil and gas company Eni in the post-war II era).11 According to Silvia Francescon from the pro-climate Italian think tank Ecco, “There is no reference to the Paris Agreement or the COP decisions. Based on what we currently know, there is undoubtedly a risk that funds meant for climate and international development could be used for projects managed by companies like Eni”. She goes on, “The ambiguity is very worrying”.12 Turning to the more recent national elections in the Netherlands and Argentina in November 2023, and Pakistan and Indonesia in February 2024, the four countries have elected to office far-right political leaders. Argentina, Pakistan and Indonesia voted in Javier Milei, Imran Khan and Prabowo Subianto respectively –all men well-known for their human rights abuses and corruption. The three countries are now widely regarded by the international community to be on a downward trajectory of democratic backsliding. With respect to all four new governments’ policies on the environment, the future looks very bleak. (1) In the Netherlands, far-right Geert Wilders won the Netherlands general election in November 2023 on campaign promises vowing to tear up European Union climate policies. It is not clear how he will be able to exert strong leadership over a coalition government, but Wilders has stated he plans to remove the Netherlands from the Paris Agreement, ramp up oil and gas drilling in the North Sea, and stop the transition to renewable solar and wind energy.13 (2) In Argentina, Javier Milei rose to presidency in November 2023 on a campaign that targeted what he called elite politicians who he denounced as lazy and immoral. Using rhetoric that echoed that of far-right Donald Trump (US) and Jair Bolsonaro (Brazil), Milei claimed to represent the ordinary worker and promised to clean up the economy and crime. Once in office, he added neo-Nazis to his administration and quickly set in motion aggressive polices for deregulating the economy that resulted in a sharp currency devaluation and widespread austerity measures. Attacks on public health, public education and workers’ rights led to massive protests and demonstrations in early 2024. With respect to the environment, Milei denounced climate change as a “socialist lie” that interfered with his free-market policies and called climate science “fake”.14 Given the widespread precarity of millions of people, the marginalized social groups championing the environment have considerable challenges ahead if they are going to turn government policies toward a pro-climate agenda. (3) In Pakistan the major political parties running for government in February 2024 all included reference to the environment in their manifesto statements.15 But specific details about climate mitigation were lacking, and there appeared to be more rhetoric than actual policy and practical implementation. The election results startled everyone, with Imran Khan getting the most votes despite being held in jail. A new coalition government was formed that included the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), with both groups committed to blocking Imran Khan’s party (PTI) form assuming power. In the political jostling of multiparty leadership, climate action will probably not be prioritized despite the desperate urgency faced by the nation’s population still reeling from catastrophic floods in 2022. (4) In Indonesia, the world’s third largest democracy, far-right Prabowo Subianto was voted in as the new president in February 2024. Indonesia is the world’s largest exporter of coal, primarily to China. In addition to expanding its export coal production in recent years, coal is needed to support the extraction of nickel for the development of the country’s domestic battery-making industry. Compounding Indonesia’s rapid escalation of carbon dioxide emissions through mining, the country is the world’s largest exporter of palm oil. Deforestation of palm trees and other biofuels is a major concern among environmental activists and has led to Indigenous communities being driven from their lands and forests. These groups are also very wary of Prabowo Subianto who was removed from the army a few years ago for kidnapping political dissenters. As the new president, there is every indication that Prabowo Subianto will continue the plans of outgoing president Joko Widodo who, despite promises to shift away from coal, in fact increasingly ramped up coal, nickel and palm oil production. Among environmental groups, there are widespread fears that Mr. Prabowo will return to his former style of kidnapping and silencing those associated with resistance to national anti-climate policies. Upcoming national elections in South Africa, India, and across the EU will all probably return increased power to extremist –and in some cases explicitly neofascist –political figures and parties. In the United States, the November 2024 presidential election is already agitating environmental activists and climate scientists. Trump has indicated that if re-elected, his second term will be even more severe than the first and he will aggressively drive fossil fuel production, open national parks to mining and drilling leases, further diminish laws regulating greenhouse gas emissions, undermine and underfund the EPA, and again withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement.16 According to Andrew Rosenberg, a former National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration official, “A return of Trump would be, in a word, horrific”. He went on, “It would also be incredibly stupid. It would roll back progress made over decades to protect public health and safety, [and] there is no logic to it other than to destroy everything. People who support him may not realize it’s their lives at stake, too.”17 Political commentators anticipate that with the rise around the world of antidemocratic regimes there will be a correlative rise in anti-climate legislation and reduced political will at the national level to mitigate the climate emergency. National elections so far in 2024 illustrate that this is a likely scenario. These unfolding elections underscore the connection between antidemocratic politics, climate science skepticism and anti-environmentalism that together perpetrate harm on citizens and promote the degradation of environments. Future national elections throughout the year also bode badly for any aggressive pro-climate laws and policies. Globally, renewed enthusiasm among nations to either honor their respective greenhouse gas emissions pledges or build multilateral collective solutions to slowing the warming planet appears very remote. 5The Global Wave of Anti-Protest Laws A global wave of repressive laws against free speech and public peaceful dissent has emerged in recent years. These anti-protest laws correlate to increasing numbers of antidemocratic leaders determined to shut down challenges to their authority to govern. Civicus Monitor is a watchdog organization with global alliances around the world that has been tracking restrictions on public protests for over two decades.18 Its findings are that excessive force and detentions of people who have demonstrated in the streets is rapidly escalating. In 2022 it reported that the right to protest peacefully, which is protected under international law, had been violated in over 75% of countries where public protests took place. In 2023, it reported that “Among the most targeted and worst-affected groups in 2023 are those advocating for democracy, better governance and protecting the environment”.19 Disturbingly, in the United States the push for anti-protest laws has often been led by multinational fossil fuel companies such as ExxonMobil, Murray Energy Corporation, Chevron and TransCanada. Since 2016, energy companies have worked with law enforcement agencies, lobbyists, think tanks and Republican politicians to enact a range of sweeping anti-protest laws in 21 states that prosecute demonstrators for coming near “infrastructure” such as gas pipelines. These laws emerged as a direct response to Dakota Access Pipeline protests at Standing Rock in 2016 which drew international attention for the violent response of police to peaceful climate protestors that included small farmers and Indigenous peoples on whose lands the pipes were laid (Fig. 3). Notably, many of these anti-protest laws drew their inspiration from model legislation drafted by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a conservative organization funded by Big Oil companies. Fig. 3 Standing Rock solidarity march in San Francisco, November 2016. Photograph by Pax Ahimsa Gethen. (Wikimedia Commons). Standing Rock solidarity march in San Francisco, November 2016. Photograph by Pax Ahimsa Gethen. (Wikimedia Commons). In 2020, the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), an independent think tank based in Washington DC, issued a report titled Muzzling Dissent: How Corporate Influence over Politics Has Fueled Anti-Protest Laws. The report focused on three states –Louisiana, Minnesota and West Virginia –and explored a new legal tactic used by elected officials who are “under the thumb of powerful corporate lobby interests”. In its executive summary, the report stated: Since 2017, so called “Critical Infrastructure Protection” laws targeting protests movement have sprung up in states around the country, in an effort to muzzle opposition to construction of oil and gas pipelines and other polluting chemical and fossil fuel facilities. Under the premise of protecting infrastructure projects, these laws mandate harsh charges and penalties for exercising constitutional rights to freely assemble and to protest.20 Importantly, the report commented on the implications of these laws for broader protests on a range of social justice issues. Criminalization of protests elevates political and corporate interests above civil rights and civil liberties protected under the US Constitution. This report offers a particularly timely examination of a set of laws that carry implications not only for environmental and Indigenous activists and movements, but also for broader social justice movements that utilize protests as a means to effect change. These laws that aim to inflict harsh penalties for protesting oil and gas projects also impact ongoing national protests against police brutality and future protests that might result from the results of the presidential election. 21 A more recent report was published by Greenpeace titled Dollars vs Democracy 2023: Inside the Fossil Fuel Industry’s Playbook to Suppress Protest and Dissent in the United States.22 This report builds on the earlier IPS report, detailing the way fossil fuel companies have colluded with the far right to silence political dissent across 21 states. This has resulted in about 60 percent of US oil and gas operations being shielded from public demonstrations. In addition to the anti-protest laws, Greenpeace mapped a legal strategy whereby oil companies use civil lawsuits (called SLAPPS) to harass and intimidate climate activists and chill legitimate political dissent. Oil companies also provide subsidies to law enforcement agencies for their assistance in cracking down on protestors, as well as sometimes employing private security firms that include “off-duty” police officers. According to its executive summary: In many cases, the fossil fuel industry has worked in lockstep with government allies: officials who may share in the industry’s ideology, but who have also benefited from its election spending, lobbying, targeted payments, and shared financial interests, or have passed through the “revolving door” from industry to government or vice versa. Commenting on the Greenpeace report, Nicholas Robinson, at the International Center for Not-For-Profit Law, said “The fossil fuel industry has lobbied for these extreme anti-protest laws to shut down criticism of them. Climate change is an urgent challenge and all Americans, including the communities most impacted by these fossil fuel projects, have a right to have their voice heard, not silenced, at this critical moment for the planet”.23 Outside the United States, anti-protest laws are equally, if not more, oppressive. For instance, in Australia protestors face severe fines of $25,000 and up to five years in jail for non-violent acts such as blocking traffic, preventing logging in a forest, or remaining in a public place if asked to leave. Harsh new laws have often been rushed through state parliaments with little public debate or comment. The scholar Sophie McNeill argued, “This politically motivated crackdown on protest by successive Australian authorities appears designed to intimidate the climate movement and create a chilling effect on those thinking of taking to the streets.”24 Similar to what is happening in Australia, across Europe in Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, harsh new anti-protest laws have been enacted resulting in mass arrests and the labeling of protestors as “eco-terrorists”, “rioters” and “hooligans”. For instance, in the Hague, Netherlands, water cannon was used to break up a large climate protest in May 2023. More than 1,500 people were arrested and seven activists convicted of sedition for encouraging people to attend a public protest. Britain has led the charge with the most repressive and wide-ranging laws introduced in recent years through the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act (2022) and the Public Order Act (2023). These laws have been pushed by the conservative government and energy lobbyists in direct response to a range of high-profile protests calling for the stop of gas and oil leases being issued and demanding a transition to renewable energy by activist groups such as Greenpeace, Just Stop Oil and Extinction Rebellion (Fig. 4). According to Michael Frost, UN rapporteur on environmental defenders, what is unfolding in Britain is “terrifying” and providing a roadmap for other countries to pass similar legislation. Frost also noted that in crackdowns in Britain and across Europe, police agencies play a coordinated role. Fig. 4 Just Stop Oil activists walking up Whitehall towards Trafalgar Square on Saturday 20 May 2023. Photograph by Alisdare Hickson. (Wikimedia Commons). Just Stop Oil activists walking up Whitehall towards Trafalgar Square on Saturday 20 May 2023. Photograph by Alisdare Hickson. (Wikimedia Commons). I’m sure that there is European cooperation among the police forces against these kinds of activities. My concern is that when [governments] are calling these people eco-terrorists, or are using new forms of vilification and defamation ...  it has a huge impact on how the population may perceive them and the cause for which these people are fighting. It is a huge concern for me.25 Adds Catrinel Motoc, senior campaigner at Amnesty International, “People all around the world are bravely raising their voices to call for urgent actions on the climate crisis but many face dire consequences for their peaceful activism”.26 What the escalating anti-protest laws around the world highlight is that the “fight” against climate change is being redefined and imbued with new meaning. It is no longer only a fight by humans to mitigate a warming planet and defend the natural world and the human species from extinction. Increasingly, with the global rise of antidemocratic governments, the fight has morphed into a battlefront constructed by far-right leaders against their own citizens. This new battle line is driven by the need to prevent people from speaking up and peacefully demonstrating against pro-fossil fuel laws and policies. Given worldwide political demand by everyday citizens for their leaders to address the climate emergency, this reconfigured fight has become a lot more complicated. For the many millions of people taking to the streets to demand government action to avert ecological collapse, the stakes have skyrocketed in terms of monetary fines and threats of repression, incarceration, and violence. 6Conclusion John Kerry, the United States climate chief, in announcing his stepping down in February 2024, urged political leaders around the world to stop delaying on climate mitigation. In pointing to the lack of political will, he said that some leaders have intentionally denied climate science and promoted disinformation, arguing that these leaders “are willing to put the whole world at risk for whatever political motivations may be behind their choices.” He went on to say that no country would be spared by the climate emergency: “This is a multilateral major challenge to the security of every nation on this planet, because we’re one planet, and we’re all linked”.27 Despite such dire warnings, Kerry’s words will likely have very little impact on national leadership, particularly going into a year of many national elections. As stated by Bharat Desai, professor of international law, “It remains to be seen as to how the UN member states earnestly walk-the-talk to stand by the planet Earth”.28 Given mounting geopolitical realities and lack of national political will, there is an urgent need to push for alterative political practices to address the climate emergency. Sub-states and cities are emerging as hubs of innovation and are now at the forefront of building new coalitions and networks at both translocal and transnational scales in implementing pro-climate strategies. These lower-level government initiatives are also increasingly working with grassroots climate activists, educators, farmers, property developers, infrastructure experts, labor representatives and other groups immediately impacted by a warming planet. There is a deep concern to counter widespread disinformation and communicate to wider populations the urgent need to address the climate crisis. It is increasingly clear that it will be up to local communities in cities, sub-states and regions to take the lead in mitigating the climate emergency and transcend the lack of political will among ethically and financially compromised antidemocratic national leaders.’

### NATO Collapse

#### Trump 2024 causes NATO collapse, global prolif, and extinction

**Tannehill 23’** [(Brynn,Naval Academy graduate, former naval aviator, author, and senior defense analyst) “What Donald Trump Really Means When He Says He Wants “Peace””, The New Republic, 5-23-23, https://newrepublic.com/article/172659/donald-trump-really-means-says-wants-peace] TDI

The American public’s most recent chance to see Donald Trump at his worst came during that infamous CNN “town hall” meeting, during which Trump issued a steady, Gish gallop stream of lies. But largely lost in the stream of awfulness of that night were the foreign policy implications of a second Trump term, and how catastrophically disruptive and damaging they would be for global stability and U.S. national interests. One of his biggest whoppers of the night was the repeated claim that he would end the war in Ukraine “within 24 hours,” without providing any details as to how. When moderator Kaitlan Collins pressed him about which side he supported in the war, he refused to support Ukraine. He instead deflected by saying, “I want everybody to stop dying.” However, we know what his plan is. Trump represents an extreme view of the isolationist, pro-Russian school of foreign policy thought. If that were to become U.S. policy in 2024 (and it seems likely it will if he becomes president again), here’s what the world might look like. Based on portions of an interview with Sean Hannity that were edited out, Trump’s plan is to cut off aid to Ukraine and pressure Ukraine into formally ceding Russian-speaking portions of the country to Vladimir Putin. These would most likely be Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and parts of the Kherson Oblast. Trump would be giving Putin everything he wanted: These are exactly the areas that Russia claimed to have annexed during the fall of 2022 after holding a rigged referendum. Trump also regurgitated the Kremlin talking points about this war being about liberating oppressed Russian-speaking individuals from a tyrannical Zelenskiy government. (Worth noting: Volodomyr Zelenskiy is a native Russian speaker). It’s no secret that Trump has always favored Russia, echoed its talking points, and had a soft spot for Putin. During the 2016 campaign, he denied that Russia had ever invaded Ukraine, despite the 2014 invasion of Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk. Then he rolled back sanctions on Russia and slow-rolled new sanctions after it became apparent Russia had interfered in the U.S. election. Worse, he sided with Putin and against U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies on the interference. He refused to divulge what he spoke with Putin about in Helsinki in 2018, keeping U.S. officials in the dark. Trump’s foreign policy plans for his second term are even more despot-friendly than in his first. Multiple sources deep within the former regime, including chief of staff John Kelly, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, and John Bolton have all confirmed that Trump intended to leave NATO. He also was ready to completely pull the United States out of South Korea. Esper was so dismayed by Trump’s recklessness that he reportedly hoped Biden would win the election. When confronted with these allegations, Trump’s spokesman did not deny them, instead claiming that those speaking out were warmongers and that Trump just wanted peace. When all of these factors are taken together, it’s not hard to trace out how things are likely to go catastrophically wrong very quickly in a second Trump term. For the sake of analysis, let’s presume that he does exactly what he has indicated he will do: namely, cut off Ukraine from aid, pressure Zelenskiy to cede land, withdraw from NATO, and pull all U.S. forces from South Korea. The U.S. provides the vast majority of the total aid to Ukraine. Without U.S. aid, victory for Ukraine likely becomes impossible, though it would almost certainly refuse to end the war on the terms Trump suggests. Instead, it would cast desperately about for more munitions from any source it could get and refuse to accept a humiliating set of ceasefire conditions. The war, as brutal as it is now, would likely drag out even longer than it would with U.S. support. An exhausted Russia lacks the means to push much further into Ukraine and would keep pressuring it to accept the deal offered by a Trump administration. Ukraine would lack the means to expel the invasion, but it would never accept such a humiliating, one-sided deal. If it were forced to it, the Ukrainian government could decide that the only way to secure a durable peace would be by developing its own nuclear weapons, without any security guarantees from the U.S. or NATO. Without the U.S. in NATO, things could disintegrate quickly in Europe. Poland, the Baltics, Sweden, and Finland all feel they are in Russia’s crosshairs. With NATO shattered, Poland could decide that the only way to prevent Russia from finishing off Ukraine, rearming, and moving on to other neighboring countries to rebuild the “Ruskiy Mir” (Russian World, which broadly means all the former Soviet states and Eastern Europe as satellite nations) is to send its own forces to fight beside Ukraine. Again, this is worse than the status quo where NATO forces are not directly involved in the war. It would likely lead to Russia attacking Poland. Poland would also be incentivized to start its own nuclear weapons program, no longer having the conventional or nuclear protection of the U.S. under NATO. It’s also hard to underestimate the absolute panic a U.S. abandonment of Ukraine and withdrawal from NATO would cause among the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and in Finland. These states are likely incapable of defending themselves against Russia without swift and decisive intervention by the U.S. and NATO. And Russia very much considers all of them to be part of the traditional “Russian World.” Which brings up another terrifying possibility: What if Trump wins a second term, forces Ukraine to cede land to Russia for peace, but doesn’t leave NATO? This is less of an improvement than one might think. Suppose Russia invaded the Baltic states after a period of rearming and reorganizing, and the U.S. (along with Putin’s ally Hungary) voted down the Baltic states’ request for NATO to invoke Article 5, which holds that an attack on one NATO nation is an attack on all but which requires unanimous consent to put into force. If Russia knew beforehand that Trump was sympathetic to its claims that the Baltics are traditionally Russian and would veto an Article 5 request, it could leave Europe less prepared for further Russian aggression than if the U.S. had already left NATO. NATO would be caught mostly unprepared by the U.S. acting as a “fifth column” within its ranks. Its member nations would be utterly unready to go it alone outside of the NATO structure. The picture isn’t quite as bleak in the Pacific, but it is still bad. Without the U.S. as a guarantor of security, and with an increasingly belligerent China representing a foe too large to resist without a U.S. alliance, neighbors such as South Korea will be tempted to develop nuclear weapons. It could take its cues from Israel and North Korea, who have used the threat of nuclear war to ward off potential invasions or to gain leverage in negotiations. The sort of global withdrawal Trump wants may not result in new wars but will probably encourage nuclear proliferation. Without the U.S. supporting its global allies, nations such as Russia, China, and North Korea will benefit in the same way Iran benefited from the U.S. pullback from the Gulf region after the withdrawal from Iraq in 2012, the abandonment of our Kurdish allies in 2019, and the unilateral Trump decision in 2020 to rapidly pull out of Afghanistan in 2021. Biden followed through on the agreement to do the last with disastrous results. This destabilization will encourage military aggression. Client states abandoned by the U.S. will likely seek autonomy and security through the only realistic means available: namely, nuclear proliferation. Nations betrayed by a Trump administration may even seek to work together to develop nuclear weapons covertly, in the same way that Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan allegedly helped North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran’s nuclear programs. Trump claims to want to prevent war, build up U.S. security, and “stop the killing.” However, when you trace out the most likely outcomes of his proposed policies, you find they would achieve the exact opposite: more war, more death, an internationally weakened United States, emboldened regional adversaries, and more nuclear weapons held by more countries. In some ways, nuclear proliferation among nations resembles the problem we have domestically with all these guns: The more countries that have them, the more chances there will be for a state that feels backed into a corner to use them.

#### NATO prevents Taiwan invasion and WW3 from miscalc

**Binnendijk 19’** [(Hans, distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He previously served as senior director for defense policy on the Clinton administration’s National Security Council.) ”5 consequences of a life without NATO”, Defense News, 3-19-2019, <https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/03/19/5-consequences-of-a-life-without-nato/>] TDI

Most people retire by age 70. Next month, NATO turns 70. U.S. President Donald Trump has now been joined by Barry Posen, a so-called realist political scientist, in suggesting that it may be time for the alliance to retire as well. To see if they are correct, let’s consider what international life might be like without NATO. There would be at least five set of consequences, all negative. The most catastrophic impact of NATO’s retirement would be the risk of Russian aggression and miscalculation. Without a clear commitment to defend allied territory backed up by an American nuclear deterrent, President Vladimir Putin will certainly see opportunities to seize land he believes is Russian. He has already done this in Georgia and Ukraine. Had they not joined NATO, the Baltic states would probably already be occupied by Russian troops. Certainly Putin would also see an opportunity to seize more of Ukraine without the “shadow” of NATO to protect it. History teaches us that major wars start when aggressive leaders miscalculate. German leader Adolf Hitler attacked Poland in 1939, believing that after then-British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s Munich Agreement, England would be unlikely to respond. North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950 after the United States appeared to remove Seoul from its defensive perimeter. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, believing the United States had signaled that it would not respond. In each case, miscalculation led to larger conflict. Secondly, NATO’s retirement would also decrease American military reach, its political influence and its economic advantage. American bases throughout Europe not only provide for the defense of Europe — they bring the U.S. a continent closer to trouble spots that threaten vital American interests. Fighting the Islamic State group, clearly an American interest, would have been markedly more difficult without permanent U.S. bases in Europe and without the American-built coalition that included every NATO nation. Without NATO, the mutual security interests that underpin both U.S. bases and coalition operations would be undermined. This extends to the economic realm. U.S. annual trade in goods and services with Europe exceeds $1 trillion, and U.S. total direct investment in Europe nears $3 trillion. These economic ties enhance U.S. prosperity and provide American jobs, but they require the degree of security now provided by NATO to endure. NATO’s retirement would thirdly exacerbate divisions within Europe. NATO’s glue not only holds European militaries together — it provides the principal forum to discuss and coordinate security issues. The European Union is unlikely to substitute for NATO in this respect because it has no military structure, few capabilities and no superpower leadership to bring divergent views together. Germany and France already seek a plan B should NATO collapse, but without the United Kingdom in the European Union, an all-European approach is likely to fail. The added insecurity of NATO’s collapse would also amplify current populist movements in Europe. The consequence could be renationalization of European militaries, a system that brought conflict to the 19th and early 20th centuries. The fourth consequences of life without NATO would be global. American bilateral alliances in Asia would each be shaken to their core should NATO fail. America’s defense commitments there would become worthless. With China determined to claim a dominant position in Asia, the collapse of NATO would cause America’s Asian partners to seek accommodation with China, much as the Philippines is in the process of doing. Trump’s decision to abandon the economic Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement has already given China new advantages in the region. Without credible American security commitments, there would be little to stop China from controlling the South China Sea and probably occupying Taiwan as well. Add to this equation the new footholds that China is building in central Asia, Africa and Europe: Abandoning NATO would help assure China’s competitive success. The final impact of NATO’s retirement would be the near collapse of what has been called the “liberal international order.” This order consists of treaties, alliances, agreements, institutions and modes of behavior mostly created by the United States in an effort to safeguard democracies. This order has kept relative peace in the trans-Atlantic space for seven decades. The Trump administration has begun to unravel elements of this order in the naive notion that they undercut American sovereignty. The entire European project is built on the edifice of this order. NATO is its principal keystone. Collapsing this edifice would undercut the multiple structures that have brought seven decades of peace and prosperity. So the answer is clear. Life without NATO would be more dangerous and less prosperous. Russia and China would be the big winners at America’s expense. NATO simply can’t retire. Yes, NATO has problems. It needs to be managed. But there is too much left to be done for retirement. And there is too much to lose if NATO fails.

### LIO Collapse

#### Trump 2.0 collapses the LIO, destroys alliances, and emboldens Putin and Xi.

Drezner 23’[(Daniel, Professor of international politics for Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy) "Bracing for Trump 2.0", Foreign Affairs, 9/5/23, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/bracing-trump-possible-return-allies-rivals]TDI

During his first term, Trump scrambled the dense network of alliances and partnerships that the United States had built over the previous 75 years. For long-standing allies in Europe, Latin America, and the Pacific Rim, the United States suddenly exhibited a bewildering array of capricious behavior. Trump blasted allies for not contributing enough to collective security and for allegedly robbing the United States blind on trade deals. He repeatedly threatened to exit previously sacrosanct agreements including NATO, the World Trade Organization, the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, and NAFTA. By contrast, although U.S. adversaries also had to deal with the occasional tantrum from Trump, it was for them in many ways the best of times. Trump bent over backward to ingratiate himself with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. His administration yo-yoed between coercing and accommodating these states, with the latter tactic usually winning out. These autocrats happily pocketed gains from the United States’ strained relations with allies. Xi could go to Davos in 2017 and effectively declare that China, rather than the United States, was the status quo power. Putin could bide his time while the Trump White House withdrew the U.S. ambassador from Ukraine and withheld Javelin weapons systems in an effort to coerce Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky into aiding Trump’s 2020 reelection campaign. There was no need for Putin or Xi to act recklessly when their rival was self-sabotaging. Biden’s victory over Trump in 2020 ended much of this bizarre behavior. Biden has reasserted traditional alliances to an extent not seen since U.S. President George H. W. Bush. As Richard Haass, the former president of the Council on Foreign Relations, has put it, Biden has transformed U.S. foreign policy “from ‘America first’ to alliances first.” Biden consulted widely with European leaders in crafting the U.S. response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, resulting in a degree of transatlantic cooperation that has surprised even Putin. Similarly, the administration has garnered support from numerous allies to counter China: imposing export controls in consultation with Japan and the Netherlands; bolstering the Quad, a defense coalition made up of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States; and developing the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, a U.S.-led talking shop of 14 countries, including Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam. Public opinion polling conducted across a group of 23 countries as varied as Hungary, Japan, and Nigeria shows that much of the world holds more positive attitudes toward the United States under Biden than it did under Trump. At the same time, rivals such as Russia and China have had to adjust to a U.S. president who walks the walk as well as talks the talk on great-power competition. Trump ranted and raved and lashed out at China, but in the end, he was more interested in making deals than in advancing U.S. interests—demonstrated, for instance, by his push to finalize the Phase One trade agreement with China in early 2020 without pressing Chinese authorities about the emerging COVID-19 pandemic. His approach to Russia was mercurial; Trump himself has said that he was the “apple of [Putin’s] eye.” By contrast, the Biden administration has proved ready and willing to mobilize the federal government to counter both these autocracies—the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act are far more ambitious pieces of legislation than anything passed during the Trump years. These measures aim to accomplish what Trump only talked about: “home shoring” critical industrial sectors. Biden has also been far more adept at attracting new allies and partners. NATO has expanded to include Finland and is soon likely to count Sweden in, as well. The trilateral partnership between Japan, South Korea, and the United States in Northeast Asia has been strengthened; the gathering of these countries’ leaders at Camp David in August would have been unthinkable during the Trump years. Biden will sign a strategic partnership agreement with Vietnam during a state visit to Hanoi in September, deepening ties between two countries wary of Chinese expansionism. The AUKUS pact with Australia and the United Kingdom has cemented security cooperation with these key allies. The United States has bolstered bilateral cooperation with Taiwan. Both Russian and Chinese firms are discovering that their ability to freeload off the liberal international order has been compromised. Foreign leaders recognize that a second term for Trump would be even more extreme and chaotic than his first term. As U.S. adversaries find themselves increasingly isolated, many elites in these countries are holding out hope for a future windfall—heralded by Trump’s return to the presidency in 2025. China watchers report hearing more mentions of Trump in their visits to Beijing than they do in the United States. Chinese officials hope that a new Trump administration will fray U.S. alliances again. As for Russia, policymakers in Europe and the United States agree that Putin is unlikely to change his tactics in Ukraine until after the 2024 election. An anonymous U.S. official told CNN in August: “Putin knows Trump will help him. And so do the Ukrainians and our European partners.” Allies in Europe are also contemplating—or, rather, dreading—a second Trump term. Some observers argue that although Trump executed an unconventional foreign policy when he was president, he did not act on his worst impulses. He did not withdraw the United States from either the WTO or NATO, nor did he remove U.S. troops from across the Pacific Rim. These pundits hold that Trump’s second term would just reprise the bluster of his first term. Such equanimity is misplaced. A second Trump term would transpire with countervailing institutions that are even weaker than they were in 2016. Trump would be supported by congressional Republicans who are far more Trumpish in their outlook than the old-guard GOP leadership of five years ago. According to The New York Times, Trump, if reelected, “plans to scour the intelligence agencies, the State Department and the defense bureaucracies to remove officials he has vilified as ‘the sick political class that hates our country.’” Trump’s own foreign policy team would likely feature hardly anyone with a significant record of leadership in diplomacy or the military that could put the brakes on his wildest ideas—in other words, there will no longer be any adults in the room. There will be no James Mattis, the secretary of defense under Trump’s first term, or even a John Bolton, a former national security adviser, to talk Trump out of his rash actions or persuade him that he cannot bomb Mexico or that he is incapable of ending Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in a single day. Trump’s second term would most closely resemble the chaotic last few months of Trump’s first term, when the 45th president came close to bombing Iran and unilaterally withdrawing all U.S. troops from a variety of trouble spots such as Somalia and Syria. As one former German official told The New York Times, “Trump has experience now and knows what levers to pull, and he’s angry.” Another European official compared a second Trump to the Terminator of the second film in the franchise, which featured a cyborg assassin even more lethal and sophisticated than the original played by Arnold Schwarzenegger.

### Asia Prolif – Turns Case

#### Trump 2024 causes exponential risk and extinction- turns Asia prolif

**Economist 23** [(Economist, The Economist continues to produce journalism of sometimes radical opinion with a reverence for facts) "Donald Trump poses the biggest danger to the world in 2024," 11-16-23, <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/11/16/donald-trump-poses-the-biggest-danger-to-the-world-in-2024>]TDI

Because MAGA Republicans have been planning his second term for months, Trump 2 would be more organised than Trump 1. True believers would occupy the most important positions. Mr Trump would be unbound in his pursuit of retribution, economic protectionism and theatrically extravagant deals. No wonder the prospect of a second Trump term fills the world’s parliaments and boardrooms with despair. But despair is not a plan. It is past time to impose order on anxiety. The greatest threat Mr Trump poses is to his own country. Having won back power because of his election-denial in 2020, he would surely be affirmed in his gut feeling that only losers allow themselves to be bound by the norms, customs and self-sacrifice that make a nation. In pursuing his enemies, Mr Trump will wage war on any institution that stands in his way, including the courts and the Department of Justice. Yet a Trump victory next year would also have a profound effect abroad. China and its friends would rejoice over the evidence that American democracy is dysfunctional. If Mr Trump trampled due process and civil rights in the United States, his diplomats could not proclaim them abroad. The global south would be confirmed in its suspicion that American appeals to do what is right are really just an exercise in hypocrisy. America would become just another big power. Mr Trump’s protectionist instincts would be unbound, too. In his first term the economy thrived despite his China tariffs. His plans for a second term would be more damaging. He and his lieutenants are contemplating a universal 10% levy on imports, more than three times the level today. Even if the Senate reins him in, protectionism justified by an expansive view of national security would increase prices for Americans. Mr Trump also fired up the economy in his first term by cutting taxes and handing out covid-19 payments. This time, America is running budget deficits on a scale only seen in war and the cost of servicing debts is higher. Tax cuts would feed inflation, not growth. Abroad, Mr Trump’s first term was better than expected. His administration provided weapons to Ukraine, pursued a peace deal between Israel, the uae and Bahrain, and scared European countries into raising their defence spending. America’s policy towards China became more hawkish. If you squint, another transactional presidency could bring some benefits. Mr Trump’s indifference to human rights might make the Saudi government more biddable once the Gaza war is over, and strengthen relations with Narendra Modi’s government in India. But a second term would be different, because the world has changed. There is nothing wrong in countries being transactional: they are bound to put their own interests first. However, Mr Trump’s lust for a deal and his sense of America’s interests are unconstrained by reality and unanchored by values. Mr Trump judges that for America to spend blood and treasure in Europe is a bad deal. He has therefore threatened to end the Ukraine war in a day and to wreck NATO, perhaps by reneging on America’s commitment to treat an attack on one country as an attack on all. In the Middle East Mr Trump is likely to back Israel without reserve, however much that stirs up conflict in the region. In Asia he may be open to doing a deal with China’s president, Xi Jinping, to abandon Taiwan because he cannot see why America would go to war with a nuclear-armed superpower to benefit a tiny island. But knowing that America would abandon Europe, Mr Putin would have an incentive to fight on in Ukraine and to pick off former Soviet countries such as Moldova or the Baltic states. Without American pressure, Israel is unlikely to generate an internal consensus for peace talks with the Palestinians. Calculating that Mr Trump does not stand by his allies, Japan and South Korea could acquire nuclear weapons. By asserting that America has no global responsibility to help deal with climate change, Mr Trump would crush efforts to slow it. And he is surrounded by China hawks who believe confrontation is the only way to preserve American dominance. Caught between a dealmaking president and his warmongering officials, China could easily miscalculate over Taiwan, with catastrophic consequences. The election that matters A second Trump term would be a watershed in a way the first was not. Victory would confirm his most destructive instincts about power. His plans would encounter less resistance. And because America will have voted him in while knowing the worst, its moral authority would decline. The election will be decided by tens of thousands of voters in just a handful of states. In 2024 the fate of the world will depend on their ballots.

# Aff --- Elections DA

## 1AR – Uniqueness

#### Harris loses to Biden in the polls now.

Dorn 7/21 [Sara, Reporter, "Here’s How Kamala Harris Performs In Polls Against Trump—As Biden Drops Out And Endorses Harris" Forbes, 7-21-2024. https://www.forbes.com/sites/saradorn/2024/07/21/heres-how-kamala-harris-performs-in-polls-against-trump-as-biden-drops-out-and-endorses-harris/] TDI

Vice President Kamala Harris is the most likely replacement for President Joe Biden, who dropped his 2024 presidential bid and endorsed Harris Sunday—and she is performing about the same as Biden in head-to-head polls with Trump.

KEY FACTS

A flurry of polls conducted in the wake of the June 27 presidential debate showed Harris performing roughly the same as Biden against Trump (who has been leading the president by a slim margin for months), and more recent polls after the attempted assassination of Trump show similar trends.

Harris has also polled better than other Democrats commonly floated as replacement candidates to Biden, but the polls didn’t factor in how months of campaigning could change voters’ perceptions of many of the lesser-known candidates that don’t have the benefit of national name recognition like Harris does.

One CBS News/YouGov poll conducted last week gave Harris a slight edge: Trump led Harris by three points (51%-48%), while leading Biden by five (52%-47%) among likely voters (the poll’s margin of error was 2.7 points).

However, an Economist/YouGov poll (margin of error 3.1) conducted July 13 - 16 and released Thursday found Biden would lose to Trump 41% to 43%, while Harris would perform slightly worse, losing to Trump 39% to 44%.

A Reuters/Ipsos poll conducted and released Tuesday—after the attempted assassination of Trump—found both Biden and Harris are virtually statistically tied with Trump, but 69% of respondents see Biden as too old to work in government (margin of error 3.1).

Democratic polling firm Bendixen & Amandi found Harris beating the former president 42% to 41% (margin of error 3.1) in a survey released July 9 and first obtained by Politico, while Biden, Whitmer and Newsom all trail Trump.

A YouGov poll conducted July 3-6 found more Democrats and independents who lean Democrat prefer Biden over Harris as the nominee, 47% to 32%, while 21% said they weren’t sure (margin of error 4).

A Five Thirty Eight analysis of polls found Harris’ odds of winning the Electoral College over Trump are slightly better than Biden’s (38% versus 35%), but when various economic and political factors are incorporated, in addition to polls, Five Thirty Eight found Biden’s odds of winning swing states and the Electoral College against Trump are better than Harris’—48% to 31%.

A Reuters/Ipsos poll released July 2 (margin of error 3.5) found Harris would lose to Trump by one point, Biden tied Trump, while four governors who have been floated as potential Biden replacements—Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer, California Gov. Gavin Newsom, Kentucky Gov. Andy Beshear and Illinois Gov. J.B. Pritzker—would all perform worse than both Biden and Harris against Trump.

In a CNN/SSRS poll (margin of error 3.5) conducted June 28-30, Harris outperformed Biden, and three other potential candidates commonly floated to replace him, in a hypothetical matchup against Trump—but she would still lose to the former president by two points (while Biden would lose to Trump by six points).

#### Harris loses now.

Pax 7/21 [Christian, senior politics reporter at Vox. “Does Kamala Harris give Democrats a better chance to win?” Vox July 21 2024 https://www.vox.com/2024-elections/361750/biden-drop-out-harris-endorse-polls-against-trump-democrats-dnc] TDI

Presidential candidates, and their campaigns, are the sum of all in which they exist and what came before them. Just after he announced he was withdrawing from the 2024 presidential race, President Joe Biden endorsed his vice president, Kamala Harris, as the nominee in his place — giving her a huge leg up in whatever process could follow from here. But there are still many unknowns about the future of the Democratic ticket. Over the past weeks, amid speculation about Biden's future on the ticket, two debates have played out. The first big question is whether Harris will be President Joe Biden’s replacement, or if another Democratic politician, like Govs. Gretchen Whitmer (MI), Josh Shapiro (PA), or Gavin Newsom (CA) would do better. The other question circulating among pundits, pollsters, journalists, strategists, and regular folks is whether Harris would be a stronger presidential contender than Biden. We can answer this question in a few ways: looking at data on her prospects, her recent performance on the campaign trail, and her past candidacies. Each of these paths give us limited answers, but to borrow a phrase from former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, we can still identify a few “known unknowns” that make the future a bit more divinable. Coconut-pilled backers of a Kamala Harris presidential campaign argue that Harris runs about even or even better than Biden does against former President Donald Trump in polling; they point to Harris’s performance on the campaign trail so far, making the case against Trump and the American right’s plans in Project 2025; and at a base level, they argue that she has been tested on the national stage, while other alternative candidates have not. President Joe Biden endorsed Kamala Harris for president. Here’s what to know about her. Vice President Kamala Harris could replace Biden at the top of the Democratic ticket in 2024. What happened last time Harris ran for president Why is everyone talking about Harris and coconut trees? Harris’s strengths and vulnerabilities as a presidential candidate Critics of the KHive — as the online superfans of the vice president call themselves — and the VP argue that Harris is still really unpopular with the American public. They argue that the polls don’t actually show that much of an advantage for Harris in battleground states or with the popular vote; they point to her failed 2019 presidential campaign and her tepid vice presidential tenure as proof she’s not a particularly good candidate or politician and would likely run an uneven campaign. They also argue that Biden’s flaws and foibles are already built into the electorate’s mind, while the chaos and uncertainty of swapping in Harris would expose the Democrats to even more risks (like how voters react to a woman of color as a nominee). The debate was the roiling undercurrent of the will-he-or-won’t-he drama over Biden these last few weeks. How it resolves now that he is off the ticket could have enduring ramifications for both the Democratic Party and the country. The upsides to swapping in Harris Harris backers have plenty to point to in the aftermath of June’s presidential debate. There’s the obvious stuff: Harris is younger, can actually string sentences together, and has already been campaigning against Trump this year. These points were once again demonstrated this week — while Biden was forced to recover from Covid at his home in Delaware during the week of the Republican National Convention, Harris was on the trail with North Carolina Democratic Gov. Roy Cooper. What the data says: First, a caveat: comparing polling of reality to a hypothetical match-up is always a bit treacherous. What we can say from head-to-head polling of Harris is that the general trend has gotten a lot better for her. A year ago she was underperforming Biden in head-to-head polling against Trump in a variety of surveys. Closer to the debate and right after, she began to perform about evenly. And more recently, in July, a few polls comparing Biden and Harris against Trump in battleground states and nationally have shown Harris even with Biden or slightly ahead of him. The first sign of this change came from CNN’s first post-debate poll, finding the vice president trailing Trump by 2 percentage points (within the margin of error) while Biden trailed by 6 points. And in FiveThirtyEight’s polls-only post-debate comparison of Harris and Biden vs. Trump, Harris performs slightly better than the president in battleground states — though not in all of them. Recent polling from Pennsylvania and Virginia also shows more positive signs for the vice president: New York Times/Siena College polls this month show that while Harris still trails Trump by 1 point in Pennsylvania, that’s a smaller gap than the 3 points that put Trump ahead of Biden there. Both of these results are within the polling’s margin of error, making the race in the state essentially tied. In Virginia, meanwhile, Harris’s lead over Trump is 2 points larger than the lead Biden has over the former president. And a post-assassination attempt national poll from Reuters/Ipsos shows a statistically tied presidential contest for either Biden or Harris against Trump. Under the hood, however, Harris backers can find an additional data point in their column: 69 percent of respondents think Biden is too old; Harris doesn’t face that concern. And Biden is more unpopular than Harris, something that is consistently true: As of July 18, Biden has a net -17.7 approval rating in the FiveThirtyEight aggregate. Harris’s disapproval is at 11.8. And in RealClearPolitics’ average of favorability ratings, Biden (-16.3) is also more unpopular than Harris (-14.9) What the campaign trail shows: Harris backers can point to the vice president’s performance on the road this year and argue that she has evolved as a politician since her presidential run in 2019, and especially since the overturning of Roe v. Wade in 2022 — when she became the White House’s go-to surrogate and messenger on reproductive rights. She has dominated that issue, both in official visits to states where abortion and reproductive rights have been under threat, and also during campaign swings this year that have seen her become more willing to talk about the personal experiences that pushed her to become a sex crimes prosecutor and be able to connect with voters in a way Biden can’t. At the same time, she has been playing up that past as a prosecutor — something she was not able to do during her last national campaign against fellow Democrats. “Prosecuting the case against Donald Trump” is now a go-to part of her stump speeches, both in talking about his and his party’s record on abortion and in talking about Trump’s convictions and indictments. At the top of the ticket, she would be able to zero in on this approach against an unpopular Republican candidate. What history tells us: Before her doomed 2020 presidential bid, Harris had a successful electoral record in California: winning statewide races by tacking to the center or simply pointing out how weird or abnormal her opponents were. Running as a center-left politician was part of her bid during her first statewide race in California — for attorney general — since she was facing a popular moderate Republican during a red-wave year in 2010, and she was viewed as a liberal Bay Area district attorney. She opposed right-wing positions on gay marriage and immigration enforcement, and cast her opponent as an extremist, while also attacking him for not prosecuting more cases, including sex crimes. Her 2016 Senate campaign, meanwhile, showed how she’s able to remain on message and be disciplined — winning support from the Democratic establishment, consistently holding a fundraising advantage, and showing that her Democrat opponent was not a serious candidate. There wasn’t much of a policy difference between Harris and her opponent, former Los Angeles District Attorney Steve Cooley, but she was still able to deliver a landslide win. Even her 2020 campaign shows that she’s a pragmatic thinker — not necessarily tied to a specific ideology that influences the way she would approach issues. She fumbled on policy, and couldn’t make a distinctive, proactive case to the Democratic base in the primary, but she doesn’t have to do that now. Even during this cycle, she has shown moments of pragmatism, too — her position on the war in Gaza, for example, put her to the left of Biden on the issue — but she has found ways to speak to young progressives and voters critical of Israel’s approach while still representing the president. The risks of swapping in Harris What the data says: The major problem in comparing these Harris figures to Biden’s actual standing against Trump is that Biden’s numbers factor in every negative thing that he and his campaign have endured so far. Biden backers would point to the fact that opinions of Harris could still change for the worse as her theoretical campaign becomes not so theoretical anymore, and that her performing about as evenly as Biden against Trump is not that great of a sign when there is more uncertainty about how Harris would even campaign. On that front, they point to the fact that Harris’s favorability numbers are not that different from Biden’s, and could still get worse**.** In recent polls, she performs worse than Biden in battleground states like Michigan, Arizona, and Nevada — losing those states would likely doom a Democratic candidate. And she doesn’t necessarily do significantly better than Biden when looking at how subgroups of voters feel: She wins the same share of Black voters as Biden in head-to-head matchups with Trump in battleground states, per Split-Ticket.org’s polling, and does slightly worse than Biden among white voters, who still make up the majority of voters in swing states and nationally. What the campaign trail shows: Taking the Kamala-critical position on the data as is — that there’s essentially no difference according to polls in how Harris performs against Trump than Biden — you are justified in being worried about what the campaign trail might look like. Harris has only recently, since 2022, been active on the campaign trail, in part because she’s not the most naturally gifted campaigner or communicator. She has found the issues she excels at championing, but that’s only after going through a rocky first year as vice president when her office saw a variety of staff departures, infighting, and missteps in message. She received media training during that first year in order to get better at talking about the president’s agenda, but still struggled to define her portfolio — facing intense criticism on immigration and the border when that wasn’t even her original assignment. Reporters who have been covering her tenure point out that she seems most at home when she’s having more roundtable-style conversations, not necessarily in one-on-one interviews or while giving stump speeches. Harris critics also point out that she will struggle to convince voters to see her as a legitimate candidate given biases against her because of her race, her gender, and the general idea that she’s not that plugged into the White House inner circle or aware of the day-to-day business of running the country. And then come the memes. While the genre of Kamala Harris memes has been exploding in popularity recently because of the chaos over Biden’s own candidacy, those jokes start from a kernel of truth: Harris is an awkward communicator. She’s prone to gaffes, to awkward jokes, to tortured analogies or stories, and is generally perceived as easy to mock. What history tells us: Harris critics also have plenty to point to when criticizing her electoral history. Her toughest race was her first race, for California attorney general, when she was the worst-performing statewide Democratic candidate on the ballot, winning her seat by about 1 percentage point. Read that again. She nearly lost to a Republican in California. There’s the context that this was a red-wave year — the 2020 midterm elections were terrible for Democrats. But in California, she essentially had united Democratic support for her campaign, and still came close to failure — while every other Democratic candidate on the ticket performed significantly better. She cruised to victory during the 2016 Senate race in part because the whole contest was “uninspiring,” and neither Harris nor her opponent were able to excite voters during most of the campaign because Harris’s victory was assumed from the start. She also faced an easy, flawed candidate in that race: a wacky US representative who famously “dabbed” on stage during a debate. And her 2020 presidential contest showed what happens when a candidate lacks clarity about her campaign and reasons for running. She struggled to define herself, and her position on the ideological spectrum, relative to her Democratic rivals. She could not run a disciplined campaign — two rival camps within her operation pulled the campaign in different directions for much of the primary. This record shows the legitimate reasons to question whether Harris would be able to make a proactive case for herself — not just a negative case against Trump. She faces the struggle of convincing voters not to blame her for the unpopular results of the Biden-Harris administration, while still thinking of her as presidential material. That’s one edge the governors and senators who have been talked about as potential alternatives to Biden have: They wouldn’t carry the same baggage from the Biden administration. Harris will likely be seen as tied to Biden’s legacy, which stands as another reason to look elsewhere.

#### Trump beats Harris now.

**Mueller 7/21**, [(Julia, policy reporter for the Hill)"Harris vs. Trump: What the polls tell us", Hill, https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/4785009-kamala-harris-polls-donald-trump/ ] TDI

President Biden is out of the 2024 race and backing Vice President Harris to take over his mantle in November, raising questions about what the polling can help us glean about her chances against former President Trump. Though Harris still has to win over enough delegates before the party’s national convention next month in order to score the official nod, she’s the heir apparent now. This will come as a relief to many Democrats who were alarmed by Biden’s dismal polling numbers in recent weeks. But the vice president would face her own challenges if she were to go head-to-head with Trump, according to the latest polling averages from Decision Desk HQ (DDHQ) and The Hill. Trump, who officially accepted the Republican nomination at the GOP convention last week, leads Harris by 2 points, according to the aggregate of national polls, 47 percent support to 45 percent. That’s around the same as Trump’s 2.5-point lead over Biden, with 46 percent support to the incumbent’s 43.5. With independent candidate Robert F. Kennedy Jr. in the mix, Trump boasts a 6-point lead over Harris, 43 percent support to 37 percent, while Kennedy sits at 6 percent. The vice president’s favorability sits at 38 percent, slightly lower than Biden’s 41 percent. “Her favorability nationally mirrors Biden’s — it’s not great,” Scott Tranter, director of data science at DDHQ, said a week before the news of Biden’s exit broke. “Her upside, though, is she doesn’t have all the baggage Biden has, and voters are going to take a fresh look at her.” Trump’s 2-point edge over Harris in the averages is notably down from around 8 points at the start of the year, and other recent surveys offer her supporters some cause for hope. In an Economist/YouGov survey taken mid-July, roughly 8 in 10 Democrats said they approve of Harris becoming the nominee if Biden steps aside, and a little more than a quarter said they think she’d be more likely than Biden to win against Trump. A CBS News poll released last week found Harris performing better than Biden against Trump, with Harris behind by 3 points and Biden trailing by 5 points. A CNN poll released after the first presidential debate, during which Biden’s disappointing performance renewed talk of taking him off the ticket, found Harris running closer to Trump than Biden was. She came in just 2 points behind the former president, while Biden was 6 points behind.

## 1AR – Link Turn

#### **Hawkishness policies are worse for democrats — soft foreign policy boosts credibility.**

Kane and Norpoth 17, 15-02-2017, [John V. Kane, Associate Professor at New York University’s Center for Global Affairs, Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science at Stony Brook University; Helmut Norpoth, an American political scientist and professor of political science at Stony Brook University, best known for developing the Primary Model to predict US presidential elections], "No Love for Doves? Foreign Policy and Candidate Appeal", <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/ssqu.12377?casa_token=wknGK7H3uv0AAAAA:ap6mPV7xrVY3JjYPCqZQNAbBk8Es-ZGkYk3M_Ne6s5DRCtF_khROZ5W9adRi2RlY_SXomDSzKVMZ-Kc>] TDI

Contrary to contemporary political wisdom and recent empirical evidence, Democratic candidates in the current war-weary context gain no favors from the electorate for taking hawkish positions in foreign policy. Our experimental tests and survey results concur in refuting the “hawkishness-helps-Democrats” hypothesis—that is, the proposition that Republican issue ownership of foreign policy results in Democrats being punished for dovishness and rewarded for hawkishness. In all experimental scenarios tested, the Democratic candidate enjoys greater appeal when taking less hawkish positions, regardless of the position taken by the Republican. Impressively, this result holds even when the participants in our experiments are exposed to vivid information about a potential Iranian nuclear attack on the United States.11 Complementing these experimental findings, our analysis of ANES data reveals that, in both 2008 and 2012, Barack Obama would have more likely been punished than praised for being perceived as more hawkish. So why is the pursuit of hawkish policies now, as opposed to in 2004 and earlier, such a losing strategy for Democratic candidates?

Though we are unable to test it directly, we believe the most compelling reason to be that, compared to the immediate post 9/11 years, the current public opinion context is considerably more averse to going to war. There is a wealth of evidence demonstrating that the current electorate is in a relatively dovish mood and has been so for some time. The recent wars in Iraq and perhaps even Afghanistan have weakened the willingness of the American public to support military interventions. There were signs already in the 2004 election that the war in Iraq was a liability for the Republican administration (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, 2007; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008; Karol and Miguel, 2007), though others saw it narrowly as an asset (Gelpi, Reifler, and Feaver, 2007; Norpoth and Sidman, 2007). In the 2008 election, public misgivings over the Iraq War helped drive the Republican Party from the White House (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, 2009). Since then, aversion to military intervention abounds in national opinion polls e.g., see “America’s Place in the World 2013,” 2013). Very few citizens in the American public, for example, support proposals to take military action against the Syrian government (Dugan, 2013; Thee-Brenan, 2013). Similarly, large majorities view even the war in Afghanistan as “not worth fighting,” and consider the war in Iraq to have been a mistake (Afghanistan War Support Hits New Low, 2013). In such a context, then, it would be highly surprising to find that the public continues to desire national candidates—Democrat or Republican—to be more hawkish. Importantly, as compared to previous research, which has tended to place a strong emphasis on the importance of elite cues in shaping the public’s foreign policy preferences (e.g., Berinsky, 2007), and that has also suggested that voters prefer Democratic candidates who are more hawkish than themselves (Gadarian, 2010), our findings instead place a renewed emphasis upon the importance of citizens’ preferences. In the present context, when candidates of either party deviate from the foreign policy preferences of citizens, the public views them more negatively.

#### Sanction Relief Renews Democratic Perception

David Brooks, 7-18-2024, "Opinion", New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/18/opinion/maga-trump-vance-democrats.html

Well, in any society, there is a legitimate tension between security and dynamism. In a volatile world, MAGA offers people security. It promises secure borders and secure neighborhoods. It offers protection from globalization, from the creative destruction of modern capitalism. It offers protection from an educated class that looks down on you and indoctrinates your children in school. It offers you protection from corporate predators. As Senator Josh Hawley argued in Compact magazine this week, “The C-suite long ago sold out the United States, shuttering factories in the homeland and gutting American jobs.”

To those who rightly feel buffeted by vast and destabilizing forces, Trump emerges as a kind of Aaron Sorkin character: “You want me on that wall. You need me on that wall.” He offers security so people can get on with their lives.

Now, the problem with MAGA — and here is where the Democratic opportunity lies — is that it emerges from a mode of consciousness that is very different from the traditional American consciousness.

The American consciousness has traditionally been an abundance consciousness. Successive waves of immigrants found a vast continent of fertile fields and bustling cities. In 1910, Henry van Dyke, who later became the U.S. ambassador to the Netherlands and Luxembourg, wrote a book called “The Spirit of America,” in which he observed that “the Spirit of America is best known in Europe by one of its qualities — energy.” In the 20th century, Luigi Barzini, an Italian observer, argued that Americans have a zeal for continual self-improvement, a “need tirelessly to tinker, improve everything and everybody, never leave anything alone.”

Many foreign observers saw us, and we saw ourselves, as the dynamic nation par excellence. We didn’t have a common past, but we dreamed of a common future. Our sense of home was not rooted in blood-and-soil nationalism; our home was something we were building together. Through most of our history, we were not known for our profundity or culture but for living at full throttle.

MAGA, on the other hand, emerges from a scarcity consciousness, a zero-sum mentality: If we let in tons of immigrants they will take all of our jobs; if America gets browner, “they” will replace “us.” MAGA is based on a series of victim stories: The elites are out to screw us. Our allies are freeloading off us. Secular America is oppressing Christian America.

Viewed from the traditional American abundance mind-set, MAGA looks less like an American brand of conservatism and more like a European brand of conservatism. It resembles all those generations of Russian chauvinists who argued that the Russian masses embody all that is good but they are threatened by aliens from the outside. MAGA looks like a kind of right-wing Marxism, which assumes that class struggle is the permanent defining feature of politics. MAGA is a fortress mentality, but America has traditionally been defined by a pioneering mentality. MAGA offers a strong shell, but not much in the way of wings needed to soar.

If Democrats are to thrive, they need to tap into America’s dynamic cultural roots and show how they can be applied to the 21st century. It should be said that social dynamism is more complicated than it appears at first blush. It’s not just getting on your Harley and hitting the open road. It’s not really about rugged individualism or the libertarian version of freedom as the absence of constraint.

My favorite definition of dynamism is adapted from the psychologist John Bowlby: All of life is a series of daring explorations from a secure base. If Democrats are to thrive, they need to offer people a vision both of the secure base and of the daring explorations.

Here’s where they have a potentially good story to tell. Americans can’t be secure if the world is in flames. That’s why America has to be active abroad in places like Ukraine, keeping wolves like Vladimir Putin at bay. Americans can’t be secure if the border is in chaos. Popular support for continued immigration depends on a sense that the government has things under control. Americans can’t be secure if a single setback will send people to the depths of crushing poverty. That’s why the social insurance programs that Democrats largely built are so important.

But what Democrats really need to do, in my view, is to offer people a vision of the daring explorations that await them. That’s where the pessimistic post-Reagan Republicans can’t compete. American dynamism was turbocharged by the construction of the transcontinental railway, the creation of the land grant colleges, the G.I. Bill and President Biden’s successful efforts to revive our industrial base in the American Midwest.

Personally, I wish Democrats would spend less time on dumb, reactionary policies like rent control. That reeks of panic in the Biden campaign. I wish they would champion the abundance agenda that people like Derek Thompson and my colleague Ezra Klein have been writing about. We need to build things. Lots of new homes. Supersonic airplanes and high-speed trains.

Democrats need to take on their teachers’ unions and commit to dynamism in the field of education. They need to stand up to protectionism, not join the stampede. Raising tariffs, as Trump wants to do, would not only raise costs on American consumers; it would also breed laziness and mediocrity within those sectors cosseted from competition. Democrats need to throttle back the regulators who have been given such free rein that they’ve stifled innovation.

If Republicans are going to double down on class war rhetoric — elites versus masses — Democrats need to get out of that business. They need to tap back into the more traditional American aspiration: We are not sentenced to a permanent class-riven future but can create a fluid, mobile society.

The economist Michael Strain of the American Enterprise Institute has offered a telling psychic critique of MAGA economic thinking: “The economics of grievance is ineffective, counterproductive and corrosive, eroding the foundations of prosperity. Messages matter. Tell people that the system is rigged, and they will aspire to less. Champion personal responsibility, and they will lift their aspirations. Promoting an optimistic vision of economic life can increase risk tolerance, ambition, effort and dynamism.”

### Lifting Sanctions could Relieve Pressure at the US Border – polls indicate voter support.Sanderson ‘23 [Emma, Communications and Research Assistant, US Foreign Policy. “Lifting Sanctions could reduce pressure on the US Border.” Chicago Council on Global Affairs. <https://globalaffairs.org/commentary-and-analysis/blogs/lifting-sanctions-could-reduce-pressure-us-border>. May 30, 2023] //TDI

Migration at the southern border is near its all-time high, renewing debates over immigration policy. The Biden administration has rightfully acknowledged the need to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement. However, the White House has failed to recognize the role US sanctions play in worsening those same migration drivers. This issue was recently captured in a report from the Center for Economic and Policy Research that assesses 32 quantitative studies on the human impact of economic sanctions. Of these studies, 30 find that sanctions have a negative effect on per capita income, poverty, inequality, mortality, and human rights. Those effects are evident in Latin American countries where broad-based US sanctions have failed to produce improvements in democracy and human rights and have made conditions unlivable for civilians. In Cuba, the US trade embargo has cost the country more than $130 billion since 1962. President Barack Obama lifted some sanctions in 2016 during a temporary thaw in US-Cuba relations, but President Donald Trump reversed those gains the next year and expanded sanctions to an unprecedented level. He redesignated Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism, suspended travel, and barred Americans from sending remittances to their relatives on the island, cutting off a major economic lifeline for many Cubans. These changes, along with a pandemic-induced decline in tourism, led to a 40 percent drop in imports and helped drive the largest-ever Cuban exodus, including 220,000 Cubans fleeing the country in 2022. Moreover, the embargo severely limits Cuba’s ability to access food and medicine, repair and maintain the energy grid, and prepare for and respond to natural disasters like Hurricane Ian. The original purpose of the embargo was regime change in Cuba, yet the Communist party remains in power. The Trump administration also imposed broad economic sanctions on Venezuelan oil in 2017, 2019, and 2020, citing concerns over Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro’s increasingly authoritarian behavior and human rights abuses. However, these sanctions failed to convince Maduro to change course or to secure political change. Venezuelan oil production declined up to $21 billion a year after each round of sanctions, which tanked the country’s economy. The inflation rate passed one million percent, imports fell by 91 percent, and food imports fell by 78 percent. This had devastating effects on the Venezuelan public, and statements by US officials made clear that the suffering caused by the sanctions was not just collateral damage but part of the administration’s strategy, despite previous assertions that the humanitarian crisis was Maduro’s doing. Today, the Venezuelan exodus is the world’s second-largest refugee crisis. In 2022, 189,000 Venezuelans migrated to the US border, compared to 4,500 in 2020. These migration surges overwhelm an already dysfunctional US immigration system and undermine progress made in decreased migration from other countries. The Biden administration’s efforts to address root drivers of migration from Mexico and northern Central America coincided with a 43 percent drop in border encounters from August 2021 to August 2022. But this was offset by a 175 percent increase in encounters by Venezuelan, Cuban, and Nicaraguan citizens. Unsurprisingly, public and congressional support for the US sanctions regime is waning. A study from The Harris Poll shows that a majority of Americans are in favor of lifting sanctions if they damage economic activity and the livelihoods of ordinary citizens (58%) or if they interfere with humanitarian aid and global public health (62%). Earlier this month, 21 members of Congress wrote a letter to Biden urging him to reverse the sanctions on Cuba and Venezuela, and to conduct a broader review on the impact of other US sanctions policies around the world. While it is important for the United States to defend democratic freedom and human rights, it is entirely counterproductive to enact policies that harm the same people that Washington aims to protect. If Biden wishes to address the root causes of migration, rolling back on sanctions in Latin America is a great place to start.

## 1AR – Thumpers

#### Immigration is most important to voters — not sanctions

**Bernal (24) [(Rafael, covers the Latino political world for The Hill and previously worked for UPI) “Immigration overtakes inflation as top voter concern: Poll” The Hill, 22nd of January 2024. https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/4422273-immigration-overtakes-inflation-top-voter-concern-poll/] TDI**

More voters pointed to immigration than to inflation as a top policy concern in January, according to a Harvard CAPS-Harris poll released Monday.

The survey found that 35 percent of respondents listed immigration as their paramount concern among an array of issues, with inflation in a close second, named by 32 percent of respondents.

Immigration skyrocketed as an issue, jumping 7 percentage points in the list compared to the previous month’s poll.

Immigration and inflation were followed by “economy and jobs,” listed as a top concern by 25 percent of those surveyed, while “crime and drugs” and health care were each listed by 16 percent of respondents, the deficit and national security each by 14 percent of respondents and corruption and the environment were each named by 13 percent of people surveyed.

Yet, inflation was by far the most cited topic by respondents asked what issue affects them personally.

Twice as many respondents, 38 percent, said inflation affected them directly, than the 17 percent who cited immigration. The number of respondents who said immigration impacted them directly grew by 3 percentage points from the previous survey.

Crime and climate change were cited by 10 percent of respondents each as affecting them directly, while abortion and racial equity were each cited by 7 percent of respondents.

The pivot to immigration mirrors both a political environment tuning into border policy as a core issue and a reduction in inflation that’s somewhat deflated the political clout of that issue.

Both issues are at the tip of the Republican spear in attacks against President Biden, who is facing a reelection run with dangerously low approval numbers.

According to the HarrisX poll, Biden’s approval in January held at 42 percent, stuck in a low-40s doldrum that’s been the norm for the better part of two years.

That’s despite inflation objectively slowing from its year-to-year peak of 9.1 percent in June of 2022 to 3.4 percent in December, blunting that line of attack.

Republicans and some Democrats — like big city mayors — have kept immigration in the headlines, communicating a sense of crisis that’s taken hold among a large segment of the population.

And the GOP-established metric of success or failure in immigration, the number of monthly border encounters, has generally been accepted by the Biden administration.

Although those encounters have remained high throughout the Biden presidency, they’ve also been more or less stable since fiscal 2022, when U.S. border authorities encountered migrants without prior authorization to enter the country 2,378,944 times.

In fiscal 2023, officials reported 2,475,669 encounters, and the first reported numbers for fiscal 2024 show similar, if slightly higher, numbers in October and November. Homeland Security officials have said encounters lulled in January, though official numbers have not yet been reported, in keeping with expected seasonal fluctuations.

But a broad majority of voters said they believe immigration at the border is a worsening problem.

According to the poll, 64 percent of respondents said conditions at the border are getting worse, while 23 percent said they’re staying the same, and only 13 percent said conditions are improving at the border.

The partisan split on the issue is broad, with 81 percent of Republicans, 68 percent of independents and 45 percent of Democrats saying conditions are worsening — 34 percent of Democrats said conditions are staying the same, while 21 percent said they’re improving.

Additionally, 68 percent of respondents said the administration should make it tougher to get into the United States illegally, and 32 percent said current border policies should remain.

Broad majorities of Republicans and independents — 85 percent and 71 percent respectively — want to see tougher border enforcement, but Democrats are split at 50-50 on whether they’d like to see that.

Those numbers are a boon to bipartisan Senate border policy negotiators, who say they’re approaching a deal that’s been heavily [criticized as tough-but-ineffective](https://thehill.com/latino/4421542-hispanic-caucus-senate-border-ukraine-deal-immigration-israel/)by immigration advocates and members of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus.

## 1AR – Impact Defense

### Climate Change

#### The impact is inevitable—its too late to stop climate change.

McGuire (23)[(Bill, Professor at University College London) “The point of no return: how close is the world to irreversible climate change?” SGR UK, 7th of December 2023. https://www.sgr.org.uk/resources/point-no-return-how-close-world-irreversible-climate-change#:~:text=The%20global%20average%20temperature%20rise%20is%20predicted%20to%20climb%20permanently,very%20soon%20after%20%5B6%5D.] TDI

“Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.”  This quote is particularly pertinent to the future of our planet's climate, which anthropogenic global heating is transforming possibly more rapidly – notwithstanding transient cataclysms like asteroid impacts – than at any time in our world's 4.6-billion-year history. What the end game will be is still anyone's guess, and despite the best efforts of climate scientists, there are so many imponderables that we really have no idea where our world will end up.

Projections of what our thermally-challenged world will be like in the decades and centuries ahead are based largely upon computer modelling. Climate scientists are always very careful about what they put into a model, so that the output is as reliable and as accurate as it can be. Even with the best will in the world, however, the climate system – and the manifold responses of society and the economy to global heating – are so complex and interwoven, that getting the model input right is far from straightforward. The real flies in the ointment, however, are so-called **'tipping points'**, which can see dangerous elements of our changing climate locked onto courses that **are impossible to turn around**, at least on a scale of the human life-span, and which are notoriously difficult to model.

Defining climate tipping points

There are plenty of definitions for 'tipping point' out there, but the most apposite – in the context of climate breakdown – is that provided by the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, which describes it as “the point at which a slow, reversible change becomes irreversible, often with dramatic consequences”. This really does hit the nail on the head, and describes exactly what will happen if we don't rein in greenhouse gas emissions immediately – although even this may no longer be enough. In broad terms, ‘climate tipping points’ (CTPs) mark thresholds beyond which negative feedback effects, which act to maintain stability, are overwhelmed by positive feedbacks, which drive and reinforce self-perpetuating change. The **consequences of** crossing a **tipping point may be** obvious **within decades** or even years, or it may take centuries for the full ramifications to become apparent.

Our understanding of CTPs has changed significantly over the last couple of decades. Twenty years ago, they were recognised as serious threats only if and when unmitigated global heating raised the average temperature of the planet (compared to pre-industrial times) by 4°C or more. Now, however, we know that critical components of the climate system could tip following a hike in global temperature of little more than 1°C [1].  Given that this year is (as of November) 1.43°C hotter than the 1850-1900 average [2], with the temperature rise even breaching the 2°C mark for a few days in November [3], this is a huge cause for concern.

As the global average **temperature rise closes in on** the permanent breaching of the **1.5°C** mark – widely trailed as the ‘dangerous climate change guardrail’ – so the risk of crossing a number of tipping points, which will have dire consequences for our world and our civilisation, becomes more serious by the year [4].

Those parts of the overall climate system that are capable of tipping have been identified through the analysis of past episodes of climate change, and they are known as ‘climate tipping elements’ (CTEs) [1]. There are plenty to choose from, with nine global and seven regional CTEs having been identified as being critical to how our world will look in the future [4].

CTEs can be grouped together according to those parts of the climate system they relate to. ‘Cryosphere tipping elements’, for example, involve large-scale changes to the cryosphere, which is the catch-all term for all the planet's frozen water, including ice sheets, ice caps and glaciers. The two attracting most concern involve the collapse of the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets which, together, would raise global sea-level by 10 m-12 m. A third involves the wholesale, abrupt thawing of permafrost across Alaska, northern Canada and Siberia. If this happens, **colossal** quantities of methane – a **greenhouse gas** far more potent, at shorter times-scales, than carbon dioxide – would be released into the atmosphere, **accelerating** the rate of **global heating.**

**Tipping points** that **affect the biosphere** include the loss of the Amazon Rainforest and the high-latitude boreal (coniferous) forests. Ocean currents can have tipping points too, and particular attention is focused on the Gulf Stream and associated North Atlantic currents that make up what is known as the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), and its potential future shutdown.

How soon will we reach them?

Many countries are coalescing around the goal of achieving net zero emissions by 2050 [5], not for any solid scientific reason, but because it is a nice round number and far enough away to justify inaction in the near term. The global average temperature **rise** is **predicted to climb permanently above 1.5°C** by between 2026 and 2042, with a central estimate of 2032, while business as usual will see the **2°C** breached **by 2050** or very soon after [6]. This means that by mid-century a number of tipping points may already have tipped [4], ensuring a major transformation of our world from which there is no return. Neither rapid cuts in emissions nor the direct removal of carbon from the atmosphere will turn back the clock.

Tipping points that may have been crossed by mid-century include collapse of the system of rotating currents that make up the so-called Sub-polar Gyre in the northernmost Atlantic. This could be instigated as a consequence of a global average temperature rise of as little as 1.1°C and, once begun, collapse could happen in as short a time-frame as five years. The consequences of this would be severe, including a fall of as much as 3°C in temperatures across the North Atlantic region, elevated levels of extreme weather in Europe and serious knock-on effects across the world [6].  There is also the possibility that the AMOC itself could shut down at any point upwards of a global average temperature rise of 1.4°C. Indeed, a recent study [7] proposes that AMOC collapse could happen at any time from 2025 to 2090, with a central estimate of 2050. This is projected to result in regional cooling of anything from 4°C to 10°C.

The fates of both the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets could also be sealed long before 2050. The estimated threshold temperature for the unstoppable collapse of these great ice masses is 1.5°C, but could be 1°C or even less, suggesting that it could already be too late to prevent wholesale melting and – as mentioned earlier – an ultimate **sea-level rise of 10m-12m**.

Climate elements having regional rather than global consequences, which could tip at 1.5°C or less, include the abrupt thaw of high-latitude Northern Hemisphere permafrost, the decay of mountain glaciers, and the sudden loss of Barents Sea winter ice.

A 2°C global average temperature hike, easily possible by 2050, could see the irreversible dieback of the Amazon Rainforest, resulting in the addition of colossal amounts of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere. **Unstoppable melting of** parts of the prodigious **East Antarctic Ice Sheet** could also be initiated at a threshold as low as 2°C, augmenting sea-level rise due to collapse of the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets.

As if all this wasn't bad enough, an additional major concern is that climate elements might well tip in clusters rather than in isolation. This is because the knock-on effects of one tipped element may lead to conditions that bring forward the timing of another – and so on – resulting in a cascade or domino effect that could have devastating consequences for society and the economy [8, 9]. For example, tipping of the Greenland Ice Sheet significantly increases the likelihood of AMOC shutdown, which would have global ramifications for weather and climate. This, in turn, could lead to an intensification of the Pacific El Niño – Southern Oscillation (ENSO), bringing further unwelcome changes to the world's weather [8, 9].  Detailed discussion of the impacts of cascading tipping elements, including how these differ according to the order with which elements tip, is beyond the scope of this article, and readers who wish to know more are referred to the 2016 Nature paper by Cai et al. [8], and the comprehensive 2023 Global Tipping Points report by Lenton et al. [9].

The fact that there is no linear relationship between the level of global heating and geophysical responses such as ice sheet melting, permafrost thaw, and ocean current shutdown, means that the time-frame of climate breakdown is hard to pin down, which in turn makes it more perilous. Consequently, any overshoot of the 1.5°C ‘dangerous climate change guardrail’ is extremely risky. Bringing temperatures down to below this mark, at a later stage, by sucking carbon out of the air will do nothing to reverse tipping elements that have already tipped. The corollary of this is that a net zero target of **2050 is** far **too late**. The longer we delay action to slash emissions as the science demands, the more likely it becomes that we will push one or more climate **tipping** elements **beyond** the **point of no return**, locking in changes to our world with the potential to threaten the very existence of our civilization.

#### No Extinction from Warming – new studies prove over-hype and tech solves.

* Extinction Tipping Point is implausible – we’re on track for 3 degrees, not 4-5 degrees
* Tech and Energy Modernization Solve – Renewable Energy is replacing Fossil Fuels which reduces Climate Mortality by a rate of 5.

Nordhaus 20 Ted Nordhaus 1-23-2020 “Ignore the Fake Climate Debate” <https://www.wsj.com/articles/ignore-the-fake-climate-debate-11579795816>, found by BPS, (American author, environmental policy expert, and the director of research at The Breakthrough Institute, citing new climate change forecasts)//Re-cut by Elmer

Beyond the headlines and social media, where Greta Thunberg, Donald Trump and the online armies of climate “alarmists” and “deniers” do battle, there is a real climate debate bubbling along in scientific journals, conferences and, occasionally, even in the halls of Congress. It gets a lot less attention than the boisterous and fake debate that dominates our public discourse, but it is much more relevant to how the world might actually address the problem. In the real climate debate, no one denies the relationship between human emissions of greenhouse gases and a warming climate. Instead, the disagreement comes down to different views of climate risk in the face of multiple, cascading uncertainties. On one side of the debate are optimists, who believe that, with improving technology and greater affluence, our societies will prove quite adaptable to a changing climate. On the other side are pessimists, who are more concerned about the risks associated with rapid, large-scale and poorly understood transformations of the climate system. But most pessimists do not believe that runaway climate change or a hothouse earth are plausible scenarios, much less that human extinction is imminent. And most optimists recognize a need for policies to address climate change, even if they don’t support the radical measures that Ms. Thunberg and others have demanded. In the fake climate debate, both sides agree that economic growth and reduced emissions vary inversely; it’s a zero-sum game. In the real debate, the relationship is much more complicated. Long-term economic growth is associated with both rising per capita energy consumption and slower population growth. For this reason, as the world continues to get richer, higher per capita energy consumption is likely to be offset by a lower population. A richer world will also likely be more technologically advanced, which means that energy consumption should be less carbon-intensive than it would be in a poorer, less technologically advanced future. In fact, a number of the high-emissions scenarios produced by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change involve futures in which the world is relatively poor and populous and less technologically advanced. Affluent, developed societies are also much better equipped to respond to climate extremes and natural disasters. That’s why natural disasters kill and displace many more people in poor societies than in rich ones. It’s not just seawalls and flood channels that make us resilient; it’s air conditioning and refrigeration, modern transportation and communications networks, early warning systems, first responders and public health bureaucracies. New research published in the journal Global Environmental Change finds that global economic growth over the last decade has reduced climate mortality by a factor of five, with the **greatest benefits documented in the poorest nations.** In low-lying Bangladesh, 300,000 people died in Cyclone Bhola in 1970, when 80% of the population lived in extreme poverty. In 2019, with less than 20% of the population living in extreme poverty, Cyclone Fani killed just five people. “Poor nations are most vulnerable to a changing climate. The fastest way to reduce that vulnerability is through economic development.” So while it is true that poor nations are most vulnerable to a changing climate, it is also true that the fastest way to reduce that vulnerability is through economic development, which requires infrastructure and industrialization. Those activities, in turn, require cement, steel, process heat and chemical inputs, all of which are impossible to produce today without fossil fuels. For this and other reasons, the world is unlikely to cut emissions fast enough to stabilize global temperatures at less than 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels, the long-standing international target, much less 1.5 degrees, as many activists now demand. But recent forecasts also suggest that many of the worst-case climate scenarios produced in the last decade, which assumed unbounded economic growth and fossil-fuel development, are also very unlikely. There is still substantial uncertainty about how sensitive global temperatures will be to higher emissions over the long-term. But the best estimates now suggest that the world is on track for 3 degrees of warming by the end of this century, not 4 or 5 degrees as was once feared. That is due in part to slower economic growth in the wake of the global financial crisis, but also to decades of technology policy and energy-modernization efforts. “We have better and cleaner technologies available today because policy-makers in the U.S. and elsewhere set out to develop those technologies.” The energy intensity of the global economy continues to fall. Lower-carbon natural gas **has** displaced coal **as the primary source of new fossil energy**. The falling cost of wind and solar energy has begun to have an effect on the growth of fossil fuels. Even nuclear energy has made a modest comeback in Asia.

### Nato Collapse

#### NATO is unsustainable. No member support of core tenets.

Moloney 21 [William Moloney, Ph.D., is a Fellow in Conservative Thought at Colorado Christian University’s [Centennial institute](https://centennial.ccu.edu/) who studied at Oxford and the University of London and received his doctorate from Harvard University. He is a former Colorado Commissioner of Education, Opinion Contributor, 12-20-2021, NATO today: The sad decline of a grand alliance, Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/585673-nato-today-the-sad-decline-of-a-grand-alliance/] Eric

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most successful military alliance in modern history. For 40 years, NATO protected Western Europe from the hostile might of the Soviet Union until that ideologically driven empire [collapsed](https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/fall-of-soviet-union) in 1990. Victory in the Cold War, however, would be the beginning of the end for NATO, an alliance that has outlived its time and today is an expanded membership group of disparate nation-states unable to agree on its current purposes.

The [72-year-old alliance](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_67656.htm) has become the victim of its own success and the simple passage of time. In NATO’s heyday, the glue that held it together was a very realistic fear of Soviet Russia and its immense military establishment. Now most members of NATO do not feel threatened by today’s post-communist Russia — and worse, feel little inclination to militarily support the few “frontline” states (e.g., Poland, the three Baltic nations) that do feel threatened.

Polls in recent years confirm this new reality. In 2015, a [Pew Research Center poll](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/nato-publics-reluctant-to-provide-military-aid-to-allies-under-attack/) found that, among NATO members, only in the United States and Canada did a majority support military force to aid a NATO member that was invaded. Earlier this year, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) polled 60,000 people in its 11-member states and found that, by margins well over 2 to1, public opinion believes that their countries [should remain neutral](https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/22/europeans-want-to-stay-out-of-the-new-cold-war/) in conflicts between the U.S. and Russia or China.

These sentiments flatly contradict the core tenet of the NATO Treaty — [Article5](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm), which obligates all members to militarily support a member who is under attack. If European NATO members prefer to remain neutral in any Russia-America conflict, what is the point of the alliance from the United States’s perspective? Add to this the fact that almost all European NATO members long have been [defaulting](https://www.washingtonpost.com/videopolitics/trump-nato-members-havent-been-even-close-to-meeting-financial-obligations/2017/02/06/4cd31a8e-ec9e-11e6-a100-fdaaf400369a_video.html?deferJs=true&outputType=default-article) on the financial obligations required by the treaty, and American skepticism about NATO in recent years is entirely understandable.

The seeds of NATO’s decline were sown at the moment of the alliance’s greatest triumph, and the context was the issue of NATO expansion into the former Soviet satellites. The not unreasonable view of former Soviet leader [Mikhail Gorbachev,](https://thehill.com/people/mikhail-gorbachev/) and later former Russian President [Boris Yeltsin,](https://thehill.com/people/boris-yeltsin/) was that with the Cold War over, the Soviet-sponsored [Warsaw Pact](https://www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/declassified_138294.htm#:~:text=The%20Warsaw%20Pact%20was%20a,(Albania%20withdrew%20in%201968).) dissolved, and with an economically prostrate Russia struggling to become a democracy, there was no justification for expanding a Western military alliance hundreds of miles closer to the Russian border.

Initially, Presidents Bush and Clinton seemed to agree. Then-U.S. Secretary of State James Baker assured Gorbachev in February 1990 that NATO wouldn’t move “[one inch eastward](https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early).” In October 1993, Clinton’s Secretary of State Warren Christopher assured Yeltsin that there would be no NATO expansion, but instead a new organization, “[Partnership for Peace](https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard),” that would include all of the former satellite states and Russia as well. Yeltsin enthusiastically embraced this concept. However, his fury knew no bounds a year later when Clinton reversed course, expanded NATO to include the satellites and excluded Russia. Yeltsin insisted that what was agreed upon was “[Partnership for all, not NATO for some](https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/promises-made-promises-broken-what-yeltsin-was-told-about-nato-in-1993-and-why-it-matters-2/)” and he spoke of betrayal and the purposeful humiliation of a weakened Russia. From the sidelines, Gorbachev lamented the rejection of his concept of a “[common European home](https://www.theguardian.com/world/from-the-archive-blog/2019/jul/10/gorbachev-vision-for-a-common-european-home--july-1989).”

This toxic issue has haunted relations between Russia and the West ever since, and became particularly dangerous when President [George W. Bush](https://thehill.com/people/george-w-bush-2/)said in April 2008 that he “[strongly supported](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/01/nato.georgia)” NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine and wouldn’t accept any Russian attempt to veto this. Bush’s proposal, however, was strongly rebuffed by six NATO members led by Germany’s Angela Merkel, who called such NATO expansion “needlessly provocative.” An outraged Russian President [Vladimir Putin](https://thehill.com/people/vladimir-putin/)declared that NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine was a direct threat to Russia’s national security and he viewed it as a “red line” that could not be crossed.

Putin further countered by becoming involved in the savage ethnic politics of Georgia by supporting dissident separatist groups in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and ultimately recognizing them as independent republics backed economically and militarily by Russia. In 2014, when Western-backed mass protests led to the overthrow of a pro-Russian president of Ukraine, Putin [acted swiftly](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_pro-Russian_unrest_in_Ukraine) to intervene militarily in those areas of Eastern Ukraine whose inhabitants were largely Russian ethnically (Crimea 65 percent) or Russian-speaking (Donbas 70 percent).

It is ironic that, with all its internal problems, NATO should be [pursuing](https://www.voanews.com/a/europe_72-nato-alliance-faces-new-challenges-enduring-threats/6204263.html) high-risk policies on behalf of countries that are not NATO members; are not allies; and assuredly would bring far more burdens to the alliance than assets. As for the United States, which has seriously damaged itself through long wars in distant places, why would we be risking more of the same in places so little-connected to our true national interests?

Clearly it is time for NATO to re-examine the reasons for its existence so far beyond its prime.

## 1AR – Trump Good – China Econ Collapse

#### Trump collapses China’s economy— its collapsing now but Trump pushes it over the edge

Ma 7/20 [(Jason, the weekend editor at Fortune, where he covers markets, the economy, finance and housing. Before joining Fortune, he was an editor at Business Insider, Investor’s Business Daily, and Dow Jones Newswires. He also took time off from journalism to serve in the Marine Corps. He is a graduate of the University of Southern California and UC Berkeley.) “A new round of Trump tariffs on China would drastically slow its economy” Fortune, 7/20/24 https://fortune.com/2024/07/20/trump-tariffs-60-percent-china-trade-war-economic-growth-impact-deflation/#:~:text=Republican%20presidential%20nominee%20Donald%20Trump,to%20the%20brink%20of%20deflation.] TDI

Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump has said he could impose a 60% tariff on Chinese imports if he returns to the White House, and a new analysis predicted it would drastically slow the world’s second largest economy and send it to the brink of deflation.

Taking into account the effects of Trump’s 2018 China tariffs, economists from UBS offered a simplified model of what a new round would do, assuming that China doesn’t retaliate, other countries don’t match U.S. duties, and some trade is diverted elsewhere.

They estimated that a 60% tariff would slow China’s GDP growth by 2.5 percentage points over the subsequent 12 months. About half of that drag would come from lower exports, with the rest from indirect impacts on consumption and investment.

Stimulus policies from Beijing to mitigate the impact of the tariffs would ease the economic drag to 1.5 percentage points, leading UBS to estimate that GDP growth in 2025 and 2026 may fall to around 3% if the hike is implemented mid-2025. That’s down from the bank’s baseline forecasts of 4.6% and 4.2%, respectively.

“Over time, potentially more exports through and production in other economies can help reduce the impact of higher US tariffs, but there is also a risk of other countries raising tariffs on imports from China as well,” the UBS economists wrote in a note published on Monday. “Moreover, the lingering impact of weaker employment and capex will also weigh on the domestic economy.”

If China retaliates in kind, the economic impact would be harsher, while less severe tariffs would have a smaller effect, the note added.

But just the mere threat of such a tariff hike could still hurt China’s economy. Even if the tariff hike is reduced or avoided, “some damage to the economy would be inevitable as producers and US importers move away from China to avoid the risk and uncertainty,” UBS warned.

China’s economy is already slowing amid an ongoing property crash, weak domestic demand, massive local-government debts, and the Biden administration’s expansion of trade restrictions.

In the second quarter, GDP grew by 4.7%, down sharply from the prior quarter’s 5.3% pace and below the government’s 5% target. And a recent meeting of top policymakers produced few signs that Beijing is about to take aggressive steps to stimulate the economy.

Meanwhile, demand in China has been so anemic that consumer inflation hit an annual rate of just 0.2% in June. At the same time, producer prices are already falling.

The UBS note said 60% tariffs would add further deflationary pressure by weakening demand and intensifying price competition. The result would be domestic producer prices staying in contraction in 2025 and core consumer inflation hovering around 0%.

That means overall consumer inflation could be stuck around 0.5% for the next couple of years—as much as 1 percentage point lower than the bank’s current baseline forecast.

Even before Trump’s improving election odds raised the prospect of new tariffs, views on China’s economy had already been turning dim.

“Years of erratic and irresponsible policies, excessive Communist Party control and undelivered promises of reform have created a dead-end Chinese economy of weak domestic consumer demand and slowing growth,” Anne Stevenson-Yang, cofounder of J Capital Research and the author of Wild Ride: A Short History of the Opening and Closing of the Chinese Economy, wrote in a New York Times op-ed in May.

### Taiwan

#### Economic slowdown drowns out talks of invading Taiwan.

Wang 3/21 [(Tao, a Hallsworth research fellow at the Manchester China Institute at the University of Manchester.) “China’s Public Wants to Make a Living, Not War” Foreign Policy 3/21/24. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/21/china-taiwan-public-opinion-war-economy-unification/] TDI

In 2024, however, things have changed. The most recent Taiwanese presidential election—in which the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won a repeat victory—served as an uncomfortable reminder to the Chinese public that neither Taiwanese politicians nor voters are interested in Beijing’s plans for political unification. Although the forceful unification narrative still exists, any push from nationalists to reignite war fever has now run into a wall of skepticism following the DPP victory.

“Wake up,” one Weibo user wrote in opposition to the broader online calls for forceful unification. “Stop dreaming,” another echoed. The defiant voices are becoming a common reaction to the suggested use of military force to an extent rarely seen, given the massive culture of censorship on Chinese social media.

A clear reason for this change is China’s economic slowdown. While Taiwan went to the polls in 2024, China was grappling with a youth unemployment rate above 20 percent, a housing market crisis with sales down by 45 percent, and a stock market in free fall that lost $6 trillion in just three years, the likes of which haven’t been seen in almost a decade. News about Taiwanese elections failed to arouse the same nationalistic reactions among the preoccupied Chinese public that had occurred in the previous two contests.

Instead, the 2024 elections triggered a flood of complaints: “Sort out our own economy, what a mess.” a Shanghai resident said angrily. “Look at our stock market,” an apparently frustrated investor from Hunan grieved, “It’d be better to keep the status quo, and leave Taiwanese alone.” The gloomy economy has made some commenters question the underlying justification for war: “With low-income people making less than 1,000 yuan a month ($140), and the national insurance tax going up, huge medical bills, and unaffordable apartments, why do you want forceful unification? I don’t get it.”

“It is the economy that really matters,” another person from Tianjin pointed out. “[Taiwan] being independent or not has nothing to do with ordinary people.”

The changing attitudes toward Taiwan’s elections reflect a broader shift in public sentiment in China’s online space. Discontent about the country’s poor economic reality has been growing louder, drowning out calls for a military takeover.

Ironically, the CCP’s own past propaganda efforts contributed to this cooling effect. Right before Nancy Pelosi, then the speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, visited Taiwan in August 2022, official and semiofficial rhetoric in mainland China was so belligerent that it led many Chinese to believe that the day of unification had finally arrived and that the military would shoot down her plane and launch its attack on Taiwan imminently.

This was the peak of forceful unification hysteria, but it only left its crusaders disappointed. In the end, there was not only no shootdown of Pelosi’s plane, but there also weren’t even military exercises conducted before she left Taiwan. Many Chinese, especially forceful unification advocates, felt betrayed and disillusioned by their government’s failure to follow through on its belligerent rhetoric, and the after-effects of this letdown are still being felt today.

During Taiwan’s 2024 elections, war enthusiasts were continuously reminded of Beijing’s military inaction following Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan. “Have you guys forgotten Pelosi?” one said. One commonly repeated joke, observing the lack of military action, scoffed that the only thing that was fired up when Pelosi visited was the stove in her hotel. The kinds of threats that once resonated with nationalists now drew widespread ridicule online: “delusion,” “talking a big game,” “an unrealistic fantasy,” and “all hat, no cattle.”

Meanwhile, at the other end of the Chinese political spectrum, the 2024 election prompted the resurgence of the view among many liberals that Taiwan’s democracy represents a desirable political model. In the early 2010s, many Chinese saw Taiwan as a beacon of hope for Chinese society—a liberal, civic, and democratic alternative to the one-party state. The liberal Chinese writer Han Han coined a popular phrase—“The most beautiful scenery of Taiwan is its people.”—that encapsulated the view of how trustworthy and free a people can become under democracy.

But after the crackdown on liberal intellectuals and online speech under Chinese leader Xi Jinping, the honeymoon did not last long and was gradually replaced by a climate of xenophobia, jingoism, war euphoria, and a longing for unification by force. Making matters worse, a growing nationalist mood in Taiwan led many to believe that Taiwanese looked down on mainlanders.

The 2024 elections, however, prompted a renewed interest from the Chinese public about their neighbor, home to the world’s only Chinese-speaking democracy. News about Taiwanese elections aroused great curiosity on Weibo about the nuts and bolts of the electoral process—what a ballot looks like, how many ballots one can cast, how votes are counted, and how candidates are selected. When a few Taiwanese Weibo users answered these questions, they were liked and retweeted by thousands of Chinese accounts, drawing genuine admiration and blessings from many.

“Are we going to see one day like this?” one user from Gansu wondered with a crying emoji. “Maybe this is accumulating experience for our own future: giving speeches, holding debates, and counting votes,” commented another, from Tianjin.

China’s shifting public sentiment is bound to have repercussions for cross-strait relations, but it would probably be a bridge too far to infer that the Chinese public will fiercely oppose a war in the Taiwan Strait. Ultimately, the nationalist base remains. At present, the euphoria about forceful unification is quieting down, mainly because the party’s over-the-top propaganda failed to meet the expectations of its most ardent supporters. But if aggressive rhetoric were followed by military action in the future, war fever could be easily fanned again.

Despite the prevalence of extreme nationalism, Chinese public opinion is more divided on Taiwan than it seems, and these divisions are only likely to increase. What concerns most ordinary Chinese are decent jobs, good income, accumulating savings for retirement, and getting affordable access to health care and housing.

So long as the economy is struggling and people’s livelihoods are threatened, there is no guarantee that the CCP’s attempts to exploit nationalism will work; quite the opposite, it could be faced with plenty of pushback.

#### Taiwan invasion goes nuclear.

Pettyjohn & Wasser ’22 [Stacie; Senior fellow & director of the defense program, Center for a New American Security. Becca; Fellow in the defense program & co-lead of The Gaming Lab, Center for a New American Security. "A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear.” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-20/fight-over-taiwan-could-go-nuclear] TDI

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe.

A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal — not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan — mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear.

Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable. That would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to keep the United States out of the conflict.

China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able to project conventional military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, a growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as well as potentially new warfighting capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and escalation.

China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclear scholars at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around 1,000 deliverable warheads — more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan.

A fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear.

Our recent war game — in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the United States — illustrated that a U.S.-China war could escalate quickly. For one thing, it showed that both countries would face operational incentives to strike military forces on the other’s territory. In the game, such strikes were intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed red lines for both countries, and produced a tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that broadened the scope and intensity of the conflict.

For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory, crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team responded to China’s moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii.

A NEW ERA

One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible. In real life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of experience making nuclear threats. This may push China to preemptively detonate a nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of its warning.

China might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its long-range conventional strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the American people. Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate the seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S. homeland could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would have provoked a response.

The most likely paths to nuclear escalation in a fight between the United States and China are different from those that were most likely during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States feared a massive, blot-from-the-blue nuclear attack, which would precipitate a full-scale strategic exchange. In a confrontation over Taiwan, however, Beijing could employ nuclear weapons in a more limited way to signal resolve or to improve its chances of winning on the battlefield. It is unclear how a war would proceed after that kind of limited nuclear use and whether the United States could de-escalate the situation while still achieving its objectives.

AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION

The clear lesson from the war game is that the United States needs to strengthen its conventional capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to ensure that China never views an invasion of Taiwan as a prudent tactical move. To do so, the United States will need to commit to maintaining its conventional military superiority by expanding its stockpiles of long-range munitions and investing in undersea capabilities. Washington must also be able to conduct offensive operations inside the first and second island chains even while under attack. This will require access to new bases to distribute U.S. forces, enhance their survivability, and ensure that they can effectively defend Taiwan in the face of China’s attacks.

Moreover, the United States needs to develop an integrated network of partners willing to contribute to Taiwan’s defense. Allies are an asymmetric advantage: the United States has them, and China does not. The United States should deepen strategic and operational planning with key partners to send a strong signal of resolve to China. As part of these planning efforts, the United States and its allies will need to develop war-winning military strategies that do not cross Chinese red-lines. The game highlighted just how difficult this task may be; what it did not highlight is the complexity of developing military strategies that integrate the strategic objectives and military capacities of multiple nations.

Moving forward, military planners in the United States and in Washington’s allies and partners must grapple with the fact that, in a conflict over Taiwan, China would consider all conventional and nuclear options to be on the table. And the United States is running out of time to strengthen deterrence and keep China from believing an invasion of Taiwan could be successful. The biggest risk is that Washington and its friends choose not to seize the moment and act: a year or two from now, it might already be too late.

### US-China War

#### Only disengagement avoids US-China war.

Salter 22. [Alexander William Salter is the Georgie G. Snyder Associate Professor of Economics in the Rawls College of Business at Texas Tech University, the Comparative Economics Research Fellow at TTU's Free Market Institute, and an associate editor of the Journal of Private Enterprise. 2-3-2022, Fortune, "Commentary: Decoupling lowers the risk of war with China," https://fortune.com/2022/02/03/trade-less-raid-less-decoupling-lowers-the-risk-of-war-with-china-usa-biden-policy-international-a-w-salter/] //TDI

America’s geopolitical competition with China will define our foreign policy for years, if not decades. History teaches us great conflicts arise when established superpowers jockey with up-and-coming hegemons.

Any war with China, however limited, would be devastating. We should make every effort to avoid it. The best way to keep the peace is by embracing a counterintuitive strategy: less economic engagement with China.

This runs against conventional wisdom. Commercial ties between nations are widely believed to help keep the peace—the more profitable it is to trade, the costlier it is to raid. This isn’t wrong, but it’s dangerously incomplete. The evidence primarily comes from the era of U.S.-led internationalism after World War II. Statesmen would be wise to take a broader historical view. Thucydides knew commercial appetites and imperial ambitions often went hand in hand. Thomas Jefferson and James Madison understood American trade with the British couldn’t keep the young republic out of war. World War I devastated Europe despite extensive economic integration. Peace through trade is simply too fragile a branch to bear the weight of American strategy.

In fact, commercial engagements could heighten the risk of conflict. Elbridge Colby—recently a deputy assistant secretary of defense and a major architect of U.S. strategy—argues Chinese ambitions for Asian hegemony threaten U.S. interests in his book The Strategy of Denial. The biggest danger is economic. Asia accounts for 40% of global GDP, and its rapid growth suggests this share will grow.

“From a geopolitical perspective,” Colby concludes, “Asia is therefore the world’s most important region.” If China achieves regional hegemony, it could use its power to build a commercial bloc that rewards vassal states and muscles out the U.S. Cutting America off from this economically vital region could be devastating for U.S. households and businesses.

To protect commercial interests, the U.S. may very well go to war. This is exactly what we want to avoid. If Colby is right, we should consider sidestepping, not punching back. There’s no need to fear Chinese economic stonewalling if we economically integrate with other parts of the world, preferably far outside Beijing’s grasp. Public policy should create incentives to do business elsewhere, so the threat of China’s economic shutout rings hollow.

The global division of labor is a good thing. It makes us all wealthier. The trick is protecting supply chains and production lines from political interference. We want to redirect these patterns, not destroy them. The solution is simple: raise the costs of doing business with China. Tariffs and capital controls can help.

As a tool for creating jobs or retaliating against foreign trade restrictions, tariffs are nearly useless. There’s overwhelming evidence restricting trade lowers incomes and employment. But for disengagement with China, that’s a feature, not a bug. U.S. tariffs on friendly nations should be greatly reduced, if not eliminated. Tariffs on China should increase.

Currently, the U.S. taxes Chinese exports at an average of 19.3%. That figure should rise over several years according to a predictable schedule. Again, the goal shouldn’t be to punish China for unfair trade practices, but rather to give cost-conscious firms a reason to create wealth in regions outside the Chinese Communist Party’s influence.

The logic for capital controls is identical. The U.S. Treasury maintains a blacklist of companies involved in the “Chinese military-industrial complex.” American investors are currently prohibited from taking a stake in 60 Chinese conglomerates. This blacklist should be greatly expanded. As Andrew Stuttaford, editor of National Review’s Capital Matters section, wisely argues, “Prohibiting any U.S. investment in Chinese technology companies…must be a priority.” As with tariffs, this should occur gradually. We must balance depriving Beijing of capital with giving investors time to adjust. The purpose is reorientation, not punishment.

Let’s be clear: These adjustments will hurt. Contrary to the neo-mercantilism currently popular on both the right and left, this strategy would cause material hardships. Restrictions on buying and investing will reduce the purchasing power of Americans at a time of surging inflation. These measures may pinch, but they pale in comparison to the misery a future war with China would cause. Even winning wouldn’t spare us the wartime deprivations we hoped would be a thing of the past.

Mr. Colby’s recommendation that the U.S. should serve as the “cornerstone balancer” in an anti-hegemonic coalition against China deserves serious thought. If preparing for a “systemic regional war” with China is prudent, steps to avoid war in the first place are even more so.

Redirecting the international division of labor away from China won’t make us richer. But it will make us safer and freer. We should take that deal.

#### War goes nuclear.

Talmadge 18 (Caitlin Talmadge is Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. This essay is adapted from “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States,” International Security, Spring 2017, "Beijing’s Nuclear Option," Foreign Affairs, 10-15-2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option) // TDI

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic com­munity tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place.

### Turns Case

#### Econ downturn decreases the likelihood of diversionary war and improves Sino-US relations — turns the aff

Yin 19 [(George, Dickey Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy and International Security at Dartmouth College, Ph.D. in government from Harvard) “Domestic repression and international aggression? Why Xi is uninterested in diversionary conflict,” Brookings Institute, 1/22/2019] JL

Crucially, diversionary war theory rests on a number of assumptions, two of which do not hold for Xi today.

Assumption 1: Leaders prefer foreign adventure over addressing domestic troubles.

As discussed earlier, in the realm of domestic policies, Xi has been criticized for primarily two things: his promotion of his cult of personality and a slowing Chinese economy overly focused on inefficient SOEs. It is easy for Xi to dial back his cult of personality, and he has already done so. Reverting his policy of *guo jin min tui* (“as the state advances, the private sector retreats”) is not going to be easy and would entail important financial system and legal reforms (see discussions from the 2018 Chinese Economists 50 forum), but is quite  doable. There is little reason why Xi would want to create international tension to distract his critics when it is much more straightforward to directly address the domestic issues. Furthermore, a diversionary skirmish involving Vietnam or the Philippines over one of the South China Sea islands would hardly be significant enough for diversion. To rally the nation behind him, Xi must pick on Taiwan, Japan, or even the United States. The problem is that a confrontation with either Taiwan or Japan is highly risky. The Chinese military, which has not fought a war since the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in 1979 and is embroiled in corruption scandals, might well suffer defeat. Perhaps China could take on the United States in the economics arena, but China has been unable to react effectively to the ongoing trade war with the United States.

Assumption 2: Key domestic political players want conflict.

Most importantly, the CCP elites do not want international conflict, especially one involving the United States. This is not because the CCP elites like the United States, which is still seen by many as an imperial power that supports Japanese militarism and secessionism in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang. However, in Fan’s words, it is important “to deal with domestic issues before pacifying the barbarians” (*an nei rang wai*). In the eyes of his critics, any foreign adventure would indicate that Xi was getting the priorities wrong and further deviate from Deng’s grand strategy of fostering a favorable foreign environment to promote development. A diversionary conflict is therefore likely to further galvanize Xi’s opposition.

In conclusion, the Xi administration’s performance since 2012 has been attacked by a wide range of groups that constitute China’s governing elites; Xi can do little to eliminate rival factions who are waiting for the opportune moment to strike back. Xi is unlikely to be interested in a foreign adventure that would at best distract him from domestic power struggles, and at worst provide more political ammunition for his opponents to use against him. Instead, Xi actually faces a lot of pressure to improve China’s relations with the U.S. in his second term, which could help him deal with his domestic troubles or at least not exacerbate them.